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An Ideology in Transition : ".lbe Iblitical '.doJght of the Social D?J11 CLatic Party 
by 
Michael Lainq 
The thesis of this dissertation is that the p:>litical thought of the Social 
Dem:x::ratic Party can be nost adequately understood by an analysis of the 
relationship between liberty and equality within that p:>litical thought. By 
examining this relationship it may also be p:>ssible to indicate in which of 
the three major ideological traditions SDP p:>litical thought can be placed. 
The first chapter describes the histocy and ethos of social d.en'ocracy 
fcx::using up:>n the disputes in the Labour Party between 1956 and 1981. The second, 
third and fourth chapters deal with the writings of Roy Jenkins, David ONeil and 
Shirley Williams. Their writings are evaluated by the importance they place on 
liberty over equality or vice versa. The work looks at issues such as the 
ownership of wealth. The fifth chapter :reviews the publications of the Tawney 
Society. The same mathcxi is arployed to assess these writings as used on the 
three SDP leaders. 
The conclusion suggests that the SDP has many traditions in its p:>litical 
thought. It has been influenced by events within the labour Party. However, 
the daninant tradition would appear to be liberal and not socialist. 
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This dissertation deals with the political thought of the Social Dem:x::ratic 
Party. As the party was founded on 26th March, 1981 the subject is relatively 
new in the field of political thought. This presents sare difficulties. The 
material available and its content was prone to be overtaken by political events 
such as the marger between the Social DemJcratic and Liberal parties. There is 
no major acadanic work available to which students can refer. There has not 
been tine for attitudes about the Social Derrocratic Party to settle into 
particular groupings. The books and articles on the subject are wid.el y scattered 
and have not been drawn together or organised in a canprehensive way. 
The IIDst important sources are the writings of the Social Derrocratic Party's 
leadership. Of the marnbers of the 'Gang of Four', Roy Jenkins, David ONen and 
Shirley Williams each published a number of books and articles that influenced the 
political thought of the party. William Rodgers did not. He was important 
within the party because of his organisational and campaigning abilities. 
Therefore it is not necessacy to examine his very fEM publications in a ~rk 
concerned with political thought. 
The publications of the Tawney Society deserve attention because they 
attanpted to develop the political thought of the party, offered alternative views 
and explored areas often ignored by the party's leadership. They also placed 
the party's political thought in a wider context than the political battle for 
power. 
In the execution of this dissertation I am indebted to Mr. Henry Tudor for 
his supervision and guidance. I would also like to thank Professor Alan Milne 
and Dr. Ian .Adams for the refi.nem:mts that they suggested. Responsibility for 
any failings is sole! y mine. 
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The thesis of this dissertation is that the political thought of the Social 
Dem:x::ratic Party can be nost adequately understood by an analysis of the 
:relationship between liberty and equality within that political thought. By 
examing this :relationship it may also be possilile to indicate in which of the three 
major ideological traditions SOP political thought can be placed. 
In the first chapter I describe the histo:cy and ethos of social darocracy, 
fran Croslands' 1956 book "The Future of Socialism" which influenced SDP principles 
to the fonnation of the SDP in 1981. 
The second, third and fourth chapters look at the writings of Roy Jenkins, 
David Ov.en and Shirley Williams. In these chapters liberty and equality play a 
major :role. The SDP leaders' writings a:re evaluated by the .importance they place 
on liberty over equality or vice versa on key issues such as the ownership of 
wealth, choice in education, defence and social services. 
Other contributors to the ideology of the SDP a:re surveyed in the fifth 
chapter. I pay ca:reful attention to the publications of the Tawney Society, which 
tried to be the SDP equivalent of the Fabian Society. I employ the sane nethod to 
consider these writings as used on the th:ree SDP leaders. Again liberty and 
equality a:re all .important values. 
Probably the authors whose ideas I have looked at 'WOUld not be entirely at 
ease with how they have been categorised. M¥ analysis has been concemed with the 
author's views on liberty and equality. These values a:re not clearly defined, they 
a:re concepts in dispute, and my classifications are subject to that understanding. 
It is also .important to emphasise that my concern in the following chapters is to 
depict a group position by drawing examples from diffe:rent writers. 
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My conclusion questions the validity of the claim that the SDP is an 
egalitarian or socialist party. The evidence presented in this dissertation 
supports the conclusion that political thought of the SDP is JIDre correctly 
liberal. 
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OIAPmR 1 
'Dle History of the S.D.P. 's Political 'ltDught 
"In order to open up the ideology of a party to a nore satisfactory analysis 
it is necessary to distinguish between two elerrents in that ideology: its 
doctrine and its ethos" 1 
The doctrines of a party are, according to Drucker, those ideas manifest as 
:pJlicies that are accepted by a considerable group of people as an accurate 
assessrrent of :pJlitical reality. Any doctrine or part of a doctrine is open to 
challenge and may be changed if experience shows this to be prudent. I:bctrines 
contain a l:xxiy of thought about the nature of man, about how society should be 
ordered, and which m::>ral values should be enshrined in law. The doctrines of the 
Labour Party have been derived frcm many diverse sources, fran Marx, the Fabians, 
Tawney, Beveridge and Crosland. :HcMaver all of these sources share camon 
doctrinal ground. For example, they all insist that nen are :fundam:mtally equal 
and that a society which does not treat them as equal is unjust. There is 
furthenrore sCll'le agreerrent on :pJlicies to achieve equality such as progressive 
taxation, medical care free at the :pJint of use, and state intervention in the 
economy. But there is not a single, universally accepted definition of equality. 
The diversity of opinions held by the mambership of a :pJlitical party leads 
Drucker to suggest that the doctrines of a party cannot be distilled into a set of 
key concepts that are essentially static. This correS:pJnds closely with 
Greenleaf's view that: 
"We nru.st accept ...... the fact of diversity and contrast, the recognition 
that an ideology is not a single thing at all but a range of ideas and 
reactions" . 2 
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Greenleaf also argues that political doctrines ma.y best be regarded as 
manifestation of the tensions beb.am opposing tendencies within parties 
interpreting values in different ways. 
Drucker's second element in a party's ideology is its ethos, which springs 
fran the experience of party rrenbers. The ethos that exerts rrost influence on 
doctrine is the ethos of the daninant group within the party. The Labour Party's 
ethos incorporates sets of values which spring fran the experience of the British 
'INOrking class. These values effect personal relationships within the Party, with 
other parties, with society as a whole and with the international political 
ccmnunity. The ethos of a party is its group identity. 
An ethos is distinguished fran a doctrine because doctrines can be agreed to 
by new nenbers of a group as a result of sharing carmon values with existing 
nenbers. The new nanber' s understanding of the group ethos, however sympathetic, 
carmot have the sane nea.ning to him that it has to those for wham it arises 
natural! y fran experience. 
Carm:mtators on labour's ideology have focused their attention on doctrine. 
There are a number of advantages in examining doctrine rather than ethos. Firstly, 
evidence of specific doctrines can be identified in manifestos, fXJlicy statements, 
conference resolutions and speeches. This evidence is regularly produced and it 
is fXJSSible to trace influences on party doctrine over tine. Ibctrines can also 
be found in the Fabians, the Tribune Group and others. There are fEM such sources 
for ethos. It is difficult to define the values that spring fran the experience of 
a class of millions of people. Drucker accepts this and tx=>ints to four features of 
Lal:x>ur' s ideology that cannot be accounted for by an evaluation of the Party as a 
purely tx=>licy-making, doctrinally based ma.chine. These features are loyalty to the 
Party leader, loyalty to the labour "novanent" by those who serve it as MPs or 
trad union leaders, a Smilesian attitude to Party finances and the belief in the 
sacrosanct nature of the Party's constitution. 
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Disputes within political parties are as often about ethos as about doctrine. 
In any analysis of disputes within the labour Party it is irrportant to bear in mind 
Drucker's description of the nature of labour's ideology. The disputes in the 
labour Party following its defeat in the 1959 General Election concemed ~ 
areas of doctrine and~ of ethos. The ~ areas of doctrine \Ere public 
ownership and nuclear weapons, the two of ethos \Ere the leadership of Hugh 
Gaitskell and the relationship between Party :rcenbers and MPs. 
The effect of these disputes greatly influenced the future leaders of the 
SDP. Three of them, Roy Jenkins, Shirley Williams and Bill Rodgers \Ere all 
leading mambers of the Revisionist Section of the Party. It is not overstating 
the case to suggest that during the disputes, the ethos of the SDP was developed. 
The three leaders fo:rned their attitudes towards the left of the Party, t:owards 
other MPs, and towards the Party's Constitution. They also established campaign 
groups, nobilised supporters and raised finances. In effect the experiences they 
shared forne:i a bond of sentinent between them. It is interesting to note that 
David Owen played no significant role in the Labour Party at this t:ine. The 
ethos of the Revisionists, developed during the disputes of the 1960's was an 
important factor in the fonnation of the SDP after labour's defeat in the 1979 
General Election, when the sane four issues of public ownership, nuclear weapons, 
the leadership and demxracy in the party caused a split between the left and the 
Revisionists. 
In 1959 the Revisionists believed that Labour's cannitmant to public 
ownership had alienated an electorate that had benefited fran the existing mixed 
econanic systan. The welfare state had largely eradicated deprivation. The task 
for the Labour Party was now to give the people an equal opportunity to enjoy the 
benefits of the mixed econany. 
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Clause IV of the Labour Party Constitution states that the aim of the Party is: 
"To secure for the workers, by hand or by brain the full fruits of their 
industry and the nost equitable distribution thereof that may be IXJSSible 
upon the basis of the ccmron ownership of the means of production, 
distribution and exchange, and the best obtainable system of I.XJPUlar 
administration and control of each industry or service" . 
Drucker identifies three interpretations of Clause IV which had been taken 
up by the Labour Party in 1959. 
The farthest left interpretation considers socialism to be about 
nationalisation. Therefore a Labour Governrrent should takeover the means of 
production on behalf of the nation in order to achieve equality of incc:::xre. At the 
time of the Clause IV debate no body of MPs supported this interpretation. 
The second IXJSition was derived f::ran the work of Herbert Morrison and was 
known as "consolidationalism". This interpretation advocated careful protection 
of the industries nationalised by Atlee' s Governmant and further takeovers of 
private concerns that held a nonotnly IXJ9ition in the market. Bevan and his 
supporters held this opinion. 
The third interpretation held that socialism was not about ownership of the 
neans of production, but about equality of opportunity. Men are perceived as 
citizens and consmners not workers. To achieve equality, society should guarantee 
its citizens protection against Beveridge's five giant evils of squalor, want, 
disease, idleness and ignorance. Having given this protection the state could then 
leave its citizens free to lead their own lives. Governrrents can control the 
econany using keynesian econanic techniques without taking industry into the 
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ownership of the state. This p::>Sition was known as Revisionism. "The future of 
Scx:ialism" 3 by Anthony Crosland published in 1956 was the IIDst .i.mp:>rtant 
Revisionist work, and was quickly adopted by Gaitskell and his supporters as the 
IIDSt satisfactory interpretation of the tru.e neaning of socialism. Crosland 
WIOte: 
"Traditionally, or at least since Marx, socialist thought has been 
daninated by the econanic problems posed by capitalism; poverty, 
mass unemploynent, squalor, instability and even the collapse of 
the whole system. These were problems of the IIDst severe and 
urgent character, and it was correct to argue that major econanic 
changes must precede the execution of socialist policy in other 
fields. But is is gradually ceasing to be correct today. 
Capitalism has been refonnad alnost out of recognition. Despite 
occasional minor recessions and balance of payments crises, full 
arploymant and at least a tolerable degree of stability are likely 
to be maintained. II 4 
Crosland also believed that: 
II whatever the nodes of econcmic production, econcmic power 
will in fact belong to the owners of political power. And these 
today are certainly not the pristine class of capitalists. " 5 
Crosland's assessnent of society had .important implications for Party 
doctrine. He had rejected the idea that socialism was a goal to be achieved 
through a gradual transfonnation of society by nationalisation and increasing 
public ownership. The existing institutions, such as trade unions, could achieve 
a doctrinal concensus with the state, and arployers, to produce a higher level of 
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social responsibility in the private sector. Social refonn should consist of the 
adaptation of a pluralistic society to the full realisation of equality and 
individual liberty within the mixed economy. The Revisionists, therefore, accepted 
self interest as a feature of the mixed economy, and the existing market norality. 
The Revisionist position raised a major political probleM,and two philosophical 
problems for the Labour Party. 
The political problan was one of partisanship. Traditionally the Party had 
always held that public ownership of the neans of production was indispensible to 
the achievement of a socialist society. The :mxierate alliance that had supported 
the revisionists consisted of older trade unionists and right wing I...al:xJur M. Ps. 
Although they accepted the mixed economy and revisionism in their political 
practice they objected to the renoval of Clause IV for two reasons. Firstly, they 
had joined the Party when socialism and public ownership~ closely identified 
with each other and it offended their ethos to see Clause IV attacked. Secondly, 
they saw the Revisionist attack on Clause IV as tactically dangerous in their 
fight against the Bevanites.Hoi.Ell has suggested that to many Party nenbers: 
" • . . . revisionist proposals seerred indistinguishable from the nore 
progressive brands of liberalism". 6 
The first philosophical problan concerned the position that the Revisionists 
had taken on the subject of econanic wants, arguing that because of the decline in 
relative deprivation the existing econanic order was acceptable. This was 
considered to be a break with traditional Labour doctrine and unacceptable in a 
socialist philosophy. If the experience of the British had been one of general 
satisfaction with the existing econcmic order the Revisionists could see no reason 
why that order should be changed. To them the Bevanites' puritanical defence of 
Clause IV was symbolic of a belief in an outdated concept of public ownership. 
This attitude is connected to the "middle" as Drucker calls it in Revisionist 
thinking about neans, ends and equality. 
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"Equality has been the strongest ethical inspiration of virtually 
every scx::ialist doctrine and still n:mains the rrost characteristic 
thought today" . 7 
For Tawney equality was quite fundanEntal as: 
" •••• the necessary corollary of the Christian conception of man." 8 
The socialists argue that equality is necessary for social unity, social 
efficiency, social justice and individual self :realisation. Inequality leads to 
inefficiency because the free market system resp:>nds to c:lemand not needs leading 
to a misdirection of productive effort. It also leads to wasted ability if, as 
Crosland writes: 
II social rrobility is low as it nn.ISt be in a stratified society 
the people cannot easily nove up fran the 1~ or middle :reaches 
to the top, then the IUl.ing elite beccma hereditary and self-
perpetuating; and whatever one may concede to inherited or family 
advantages, this nn.ISt .i.nvol ve a waste of talent. " 9 
Social inequalities offend against ideas of social justice because they 
lead to a denial of natural rights and mens' claim to basic htnnan rights. Citizens 
have, according to Crosland, a right to the position in the social scale to which 
their natural talents entitle than. Inequality is unjust because it gives sare 
groups ~ over others without consent or accountability. 
A society is civilised, argued Tawney, if it uses its material resources to 
provide for the dignity of the individuals who canpose it. Equality, for the 
socialist, is rrore than the equality of opportunity proposed by the Revisionists. 
Indeed, it , is over the issue of equality of opportunity that the Revisionists 
depart fran the mainstream of socialist thought. 
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Tawney clained that equality of opportunity: 
" ••.. depends not nerely on the absence of disabilities, but on 
the presence of abilities . . . . In proportion, as the capacities 
of scma are sterilised or stunted by their social envi..ronmant, 
while those of others are favoured or pampered by it, equality 
of opportunity becaoas a graceful but attenuated fignent. " 10 
If equality of opportunity is to be effective it must be accanpanied by 
other equalising neasures. Equality is not only about social nubility and the 
creation of a neritocracy: it is about equality of regard, of dignity, of culture 
and rights. The equality of inccma position, and the equality of opportunity 
position both place too much emphasis on ecocmic as:pects of equality, cla.inEd 
Tawney. Crosland bnlshed aside the question of how much equality is desirable 
beyond equality of opportunity. He believed that this was not a question that 
practicing politicians -were required to answer. He believed that: 
" a definite limit exists to the degree of equality which is 
desirable. " 11 
The Revisionists viewed equality of opportunity as an end in itself rather 
than a rreans to the ultimate end of a socialist society. 
Crosland's theory of equality gives little regard to the question of freedcm. 
Socialists hold that freedan rests on equality. Tawney believed that freedom is 
the :power that a person has to control the condition of their own life. Freedom in 
the econanic sphere rreans that workers should have a voice in their working 
conditions. Freedcm is the product of positive Governnent action not Goverrnrent 
inaction. Tawney wrote: 
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"The increase in the :freedan of ordinal:y man and waten during the 
last two generations has taken place, not in spite of the action 
of governments but because of it 
in fact, been law. " 12 
The nother of liberty has, 
It can be argued that when neasured against Tawney's concept of equality 
the :revisionist concept of equality is incanplete. 
The opponents of Revisionism in 1959, the Bevanites, fought against attanpts 
to change Clause IV, the Party's carrmit:mant to equality and public ~hip, 
because they saw Clause IV as an end in itself, not a neans to an end. :HcMever, 
their position on equality was as flawed as Crosland's. The Bevanite group had 
ererged. fran the policy disputes and controversies over electoral tactics during 
Attlee's administration. The Bevanites did not propose any :funclanental revisions 
to Clause IV or the Party's policies following the 1959 General Election. Rather 
their dispute with the Revisionists was over the errphasis placed on Lal:xmr's 
ccmni:bnent to public ~hip as idealised doctrine expressed in Clause IV, and 
the acceptance by the Revisionists of existing econamic arrangarents. Drucker 
contends that: . 
"The Bevanites clung to Clause IV partly because it was a totem 
at the heart of their mythology. For their party they were 
willing to make Clause IV an end.. in itself because it was what 
"their" people (the majority of the constituency parties for 
instance) wanted. " 13 
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The Pevanites also disputed the Revisionist idea of the role of the Lal::x::mr 
Party within the parliarrentazy system. The Revisionists saw the party as a 
contender for office, adjusting its policy to majority preferences within the 
b:road Revisionist philosophy. The Pevanites saw the Party as an opposition 
preserving its radical socialist nature. Richard Crosman expressed this opinion 
when he wrote: 
" the prine function of the Labour Party . . • . is to provide 
an ideology for nonconfonnist critics of the Establis.hmant, and 
a political instnnnent for interests and social groups which 
are denied justice under the "status Quo"." 14 
Following the 1959 General Election defeat the Party held a post-nortem 
conference. At this conference Gaitskell presented to the delegates the 
Revisionist case. Labour's ccmnitm:mt to Clause IV had alienated the voters. He 
told the conference that: 
" our object IIUlSt be to broaden our base, to be in touch 
always with ordinary people, and avoid becoming small cliques 
of isolated doctrine ridden fanatics, out of touch with the 
main stream of social life in our tine. " 15 
Gaitskell then suggested the anendrrent of Clause IV, the symbol of the 
Party's ccmnitm:mt to public ownership. Bevan responded: 
"Our main case is and IIUlSt remain that in m::xiern canplex society 
it is ilrq;x>ssible to get rational order by leaving things to 
private econanic adventure. Therefore I am a socialist. I believe 
in public ownership. " 16 
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Michael Fc:x>t a leading Bevanite clained. that it was not Labour's principles 
that should be changed but the values of an inm:::>ral society. 
"In order to win an election, we have to change the m:xx:i of the 
people in this country, to open their eyes to what an evil and 
disgraceful and rotten society it is. " 17 
The confer:ence made no decision on Clause IV, and asked Gaitskell to sul:mit 
an alternative to the NEC for discussion in early 1960. Before Gaitskell could do 
this Bevan restated his position in "Tribune": 
" • • . • there are certain principles that have held good and are 
likely to hold good so long as British society is based in the 
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main)._ institutions of private ownership ..... if the Labour Party 
was to abandon its main thesis of public ownership it ~d not 
differ in any important respect f:rarn the 'lbry Party. The only 
conflict ~d be al::x::mt nuances, alxmt semi-tones and half-limits .... 
The controversy (in the Labour Party) is between those who want 
the mainsprings of econanic power transferred to the carmo..mi.ty and 
those who believe that private enterprise should still ranain 
suprerce but that its worst characteristics should be m:xierated by 
liberal ideas of justice and equality. " 18 
By March 1960 Gaitskell had carne to the view that as a matter of Party 
tactics his supporters, such as Roy Jenkins, ~d be satisfied if Clause IV were 
canbined with a statement of revisionist principles, and he produced such a 
statement entitled the "Amplification of Anns" • Gaitskell had made a series of 
speeches in early 1960 in :tbttingham, to the Ruskin Fellowship and the cambridge 
Union advocating the retention of the nationalisation of steel in Labour's 
manifesto. "Tribune" reported these speeches under the headline "Mr. Gaitskell 
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changes his tune!" "The Tines" interpreted the ~hes as "Mr. Gaitskell calls 
for IlDre public ownership. " The left looked upon the speeches as acts of 
concilliation. Anthony G1:eerMJOd a IlBTlber of the Bevanite group· wrote in :response 
to Gaitskell 's speeches: 
"If it will be able to make for peace in the Party • • • • IlDSt of 
us would .... be able to add anything within reason to the 
constitution." 19 
The NEC met on March 13th 1960 to consider the "Amplification of Aims". A 
powerful alliance of Bevanites, trade unionists who were sent.inentally attached to 
Clause IV, and labour MPs who wished to avoid splitting the Party opposed 
Gaitskell. The "Aims" were accepted by the NEC as only a valuable expression of 
the doctrine of the Party and not as a replacarent for Clause IV. A canprcmi.se 
had been achieved, and both sides claimad victo.cy. 
In the NEC meeting of March 13th the trade unions supported Gaitskell. ~ 
at union conferences every affiliated txxly except USDAW and the NUGMW rejected the 
amended Clause IV statarent. As the trade union block votes controlled the La1:::x:rur 
conference, Gaitskell's stat.arent was condemned. In one swift nove the unions had 
defeated the NEC. The constitution remained exactly as it had been since 1918. 
The unions opposed Gaitskell for three reasons. First, the right wing of the 
unions were enotionally attached to Clause IV. George Brown expressed this view in 
a speech in his constituency. 
"let us accept, on the one hand, that the present constitution 
adopted long ago has a place in our hearts 
quite i.Irlfx>ssible to delete or rewrite it. " 20 
19 
that makes it 
The second reason was that the unions had noved left. An indication of this 
is the election of the "Bevanite" Frank Cousins to the leadership of the 'IQVU. The 
NEC could not rely on the unions for "loyalist" support as they had done in the 
1950s. 
The third reason was that Gaitskell had, through the NEC, proposed a revision 
of attitude and policy. In the 1950s the unions had always taken the initiative 
on policy and in this way wielded ~ by controlling policy. The Gaitskell 
statem:mt was a direct challenge to this ~. 
As a result of the Clause IV controversy Gaitskell 's position as leader was 
~. The Revisionists, having been defeated by the unions, questioned the 
organisation of the Party and its voting structure. In particular, they adopted 
the policy of "one nanber one vote". For the left public ownership assuned. a new 
importance and closer links were forged with the unions. However, left and Right 
had bare! y taken in the consequences of the Clause IV debate when the Party was 
thrown into controversy at the 1960 Conference over unilateral nuclear d.isan'cErrent. 
The debate over nuclear disannanent had gathered pace since 1955 when the 
Churchill G:Jverrment had decided to develop an independent British nuclear 
deterrent. The labour Right had accepted this decision as a way of giving Britain 
a choice. Gaitskell said: 
"The real case for our having our own nuclear ~pons is fear of 
excessive dependence on the United States." 21 
The Revisionists also believed that a Britain without a nuclear deterrent of 
her own v.nlld be an ineffective voice in the World. Bevan agreed with this at the 
1957 Labour Conference. 
20 
"But if you carry this .r:esolution (a unilateral .r:esolution) .... 
you will send a British Foreign Sec:retacy •..• naked into the 
conference chamber. " 22 
In July 1959 a joint NEC-TOC: statarent, "The Next Step" advocated a non-
nuclear club of nations multi-laterally disanred with the exception of the USSR and 
and the USA. This statem:mt supported by Gaitskell faced strong opposition fran 
the left. The Campaign for Nuclear Disannanent had been winning many recruits 
within the Party and these~ joined by pacifists and those, who, after the 
Clause IV debate, wished to change the Party leadership, to oppose "The Next Step" . 
"Tribune" on behalf of the left, :p:>inted out that unless every nation accepted 
disarmament "The Next Step" should be strongly opposed. "Tribune" saw "The Next 
Step" as an attempt to stop the growing unilateral novenent in the Party, led by 
Frank Cousins of the 'lG'JU. 
"Everyone knows the real reasons . • . . The success of Aldennaston .... 
plus the knCMll views of Frank Cousins and the i.ntni.nence of the three 
trade union conferences taking place this va=k." 23 
The left had particular strength because it could marshall the union block 
vote. When, in April 1960 the Conservative Governmant cancelled Britain's 
independent nuclear deterrent "Blue Streak" the left saw an opportunity to raise 
Labour's defence :p:>licy as an issue at the September TUC meeting, and the Ck:tober 
Party Conference at Scarborough. 
At the TOC: meeting "The Next Step" was approved, but so was a unilateralist 
'lGWU state!'rent because of an effort at carpromise by W.J. Carron of the AEU. In 
Scarborough, Gaitskell, deprived of the support of Bevan who had died, fought 
fiercely for a :multi-lateralist defense :p:>licy. In his opening speech to the 
conference he announced: 
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"There are sare of us, Mr. Chairman, who will fight and fight 
and fight again to save the Party we love . . . . to bring back 
sanity and honesty and dignity." 24 
Despite opposition fran the NEC, the TUC and the PLP, the Conference approved 
Frank Cousins' m:::>tion on behalf of the rn:;wu calling for a "carplete rejection of 
defence policy based on the threat of the use of strategic or tactical nuclear 
weapons" and an AEU m:::>tion in favour of the "unilateral renunciation of the testing, 
manufacture, stock piling and basing of all nuclear weapons in Great Britain". The 
m:::>tions were passed by a margin of 1% of the votes at the conference. 
Gaitskell said, after unilateralism became Party policy: 
"It is not the end of the problem because Labour MPs will have 
to consider what they do in the House of Carrm:>ns. What do you 
expect of them? You know how they voted in June - OV'el:Wh.elmingly 
for the policy statenent . . . . 'lb change their minds overnight 
to go back on pledges they gave to people who elected them in 
their constituencies. " 25 
No mechanism existed whereby Conference could impose its decisions on MPs 
and over the next twelve m:::>nths the debate on unilateralism lost nn.1ch of its 
in!>ortance, being eclipsed by the dispute over Labour MPs' relations with Conference 
and a challenge to Gaitskell 's leadership by Harold Wilson. 
Gaitskell 's leadership was questioned by Wilson not because the 1:\\U 
disagreed over defence policy, but because Wilson believed that Gaitskell ~d 
split the Party. Wilson's challenge was easily dismissed by Gaitskell, but the 
leadership campaigns highlighted how vulnerable the Revisionists were in the 
constituencies. As a result of this, and the unilateralist debate, the Revisionists 
established the "Campaign for Dem:x::ratic Socialism" (CDS) . 
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The CDS brought together, in an effective canpligning group, the chief 
Revisionists in the Labour Party. Its leading rrembers included Roy Jenkins, Shirley 
Williams, Bill Rodgers (as COO General Secretary) and Dick Taverne. The group was 
ccmnittecl to revoking the unilateralist defence policy, and supporting Gaitskell 's 
leadership. "Tribune" dubbed COO "a squalid little conspiracy" ained at establishing 
a Labour elite. CDS policies ~ thoroughly Revisionist. On public ownership 
(Clause IV) it believed: 
"Public, co-operative and private enterprise all have a part to 
play in the econany. We regard the public ownership of particular 
industries .... as a useful technique to be justified on its 
nerits." 26 
On Labour MPs relationship with the Party Conference: 
"The only real question at issue is the basic constitutional one 
over the long established right of the PLP not to accept dictation 
from Conference . . • . Mr. Gaitskell 's opponents, in making their 
attacks narrowly :personal, are trying to ignore the right of 
the PLP to do this." 27 
The CDS maintained a continuous canplign against unilateralisrn, and in the 
spring of 1961 USDAW and the AEU overturned unilateralist policies at their 
Conferences. In Septanber 1961 TUC Conference endorsed Gaitskell 's nn.1l tilateral 
"Policy for Peace", and at the Labour Party Conference in 1961 unilateralism was 
defeated. The importance of the COO in these defeats was highlighted by the press. 
"There is no doubt that at a national level the CDS has played 
a decisive role swinging opinions in the unions and local parties. 
It has obviously had impressive results. " 28 
23 
Others wrote that Gaitskell had been saved by "The sheer hard grind of his 
supporters particular! y the CDS. " 29 
The CDS was the first organised Revisionist group in the Labour Party, and it 
becarre the m:x:lel for many other such groups. It drew together the Revisionists, and 
directly challenged the left. Fran its ranks cane three of the leaders of the SDP. 
The two issues that I have discussed in sc:me detail are important in 
understanding why the SDP was foDlEd.. The Clause IV debate established Revisionism 
as party policy and gave the Revisionists the upper hand. The unilateralist debate 
established a Revisionist campaign group to tackle the left. However the two issues 
assumed an even greater importance twenty years later when once again Labour 
debated Clause IV and unilateralism. Throughout 1981 the four future leaders of 
the SDP made constant reference to 1961. Again in 1981 the issue of the relations 
between the PLP and Conference was debated, challenges were made to Revisionists 
in key party positions and there was speculation concerning a split in the Party. 
~, the differences between the events of 1961 and 1981 are as 
important as the similarities. In 1981 the NEC and the Revisionists ~ at odds. 
The unions, the ~ barons of the Party and Conference ~d not supp:Jrt the 
Revisionists in 1981 as they did in 1961. In 1961 the Revisionists selected the 
issue and fought for a straight victocy within the Party. Howewer, in 1981 the 
Revisionists knew that a defeat within the Party could give then the J.X>litical 
freedan to begin a new existence separate fran Lal:x:>ur. 
The positions of~ that arerged after 1961 dictated relationships 
between the left and Right for the following twenty years, and led, eventually, to 
a Revisionist party separate fran Labour. 
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After 1961 the Revisionists, led by Gaitskell, controlled Party p::>licy, and 
this did not lead to any major argunents within Labour. In effect the left was 
denoralised, and it was dividing into ~ groups, the old left of the Bevanites and 
the "New left II o 
The Hungarian Revolt of 1956 caused a crisis within the British Ccmmmist 
Party, as its nembers questioned the Stalinist orthodoxy. Trade union leaders, such 
as Frank Chapple, rejected Marxism altogether and joined Labour. ~ the 
British intervention in Suez in November 1956 led many others to believe that 
imperialism and capitalism still characterised the British state and a Marxist 
critique of society was still valid. Bevanist was not seen as an alternative 
and Bevan's support for :multi-lateralism and Gaitskell repelled many disaffected 
Ccmmmists. One group of Marxist intellectuals led by E. P. Thanpson and John 
Saville therefore sought a "New left" position, rejecting roth Bevanism and 
Ccmmmism. Their aim was to devise a socialist p::>litical response to nEM cultural 
and social influences in an affluent society. In 1957 they founded the periodical 
the "New Reasoner" which ca:nbined. in 1960 with the "Universities and left Review" 
to fonn the "New left Review", directed by an editorial OOard which included 
Thanpson, Stuart Hall and Raynond Williams. 
The "New left" rejected the sterile ideology of Stalinism and called for a 
libertarian socialism akin to English working-class radicalism. Influenced by 
socialist humanism they stressed the Marxist concept of alienation and turned their 
anger against the Establishment. They believed that their views would steer the 
Labour left away fran the narrow questions of nationalisation and into an 
enlightening debate which would rekindle the nora! and intellectual fire within 
the Party. They wished, in short, to bring together the Eastern and Western 
European socialist traditions in order to extract principles which would criticise 
affluent capitalism nore effectively than Stalinism or Bevanism. 
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W::lrking in the era of the "Angcy Young Men" the New left entered into an 
assault on the supposed materialism of British society. They began· their attack 
f:rcm a noralistic p::>sition in "Out of Apathy" 30 published in 1960. They 
explained that they were appalled at vulgar ccmrercialism, but did not argue 
against it on grounds of econanic weakness or inefficiency. They ccxnpared the new 
affluence with the }?OVert.y of the education and health services. By making 
capitalism and affluence the solution to the nation's econanic problems the 
Establishrrent had allowed the selfishness of the market ecoilCil'ey to show through. 
Lal:x:mr was being exploited nore than ever, so that the increasing anounts of 
surplus value that the workers produced financed the new affluence of the few. 
The creation of a socialist co-operative carm:m~lth, based on libertarian 
radicalism was :rrore necessary than ever before. Britain had a demx:ratic fonn of 
Goverrment, but not a dem:x::ratic way of life. The freedan of the citizen as a 
consuner, as explained by Crosland, was an illusion, and a deceitful fonn of 
equality. The citizen's need for security of employment, and the provision of 
health education and protection could not be evaluated using yardsticks of 
ccmpetitiveness and the market econdmy. The citizen as a consuner was in fact 
manipulated by cartels of IlUllti-national canpanied beyond demx:ratic control. 
This led to private affluence and public squalor. Stuart Hall believed that they 
were not unrelated. 
" they are central to the system itself; they are structural 
faults and weaknesses which have survived the managerial and 
corporate "revolution" in capitalism, and cane out of the other 
side, unresolved. " 31 
The problems of the working-class had been reduced to personal problems. 
Ambition, greed and snobbery had replaced co-operation, altruism and equality. 
Derrocracy had been bought off and manipulated to legitimise the establisJ:ment. An 
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alliance of businessman and politicians controlled a bureaucratic state. 
"Butskellism" had snothered the dissatisfaction which had driven the labour Movarent 
by fostering demand managenent and consensus politics. For Thanpson: 
"The nest challenging issue is reduced to a nice choice of 
expediences. At the heart of a disintegrating inperial system, 
with -weapons on annihilation passed over the earth, the Natopolitan 
walks carefully down \Ell known stieets, putting his faith in 
his securities in the bank. " 32 
"Natopolitan" was Thcmpson's nama for the businessman politician who, he 
believed, benefited nest fran consensus politics. Thanpson' s own desire to 
investigate the British radical tradition, and the need of the New left to present a 
socialist alternative, led him to publish in 1963 "The Making of the English ~rking 
Class" 33, in which popular demx:ratic novements and their history \Ere used to 
point to the faults of the static and sterile affluent society. 
The new social and cultural influences which had encouraged the break-up of 
the British Camrunist Party also inspired the New left. Cinema, television and 
popular music allowed the previously :restricted Stalinists to explore, as New 
Leftists, the culture of the affluent society. They turned their attention to 
subversive cultures which challenged existing social values. In his books "Culture 
and Society" 34 (1958), and "The IDng Revolution" 35 (1961) Raynond Williams 
explained the cultural danination of the working class by the British elite. In 
these books Williams departed fran the old Marxist distinction between economic 
structure and cultural superstructure. Culture could not be amitrarily reduced to 
econanics because this led to the cultural Stalinism that had plagued the Soviet 
Union. He argued that: 
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II a Marxist theory of culture will recognise diversity and 
canplexity, will take account of continuity within change, will 
allCM for chance .... but, with these reservations, will take 
the facts of the econanic structure and the consequent social 
relations as the guiding string on which a culture is to be 
understood. II 36 
He believed that this ~d be a nore satisfactory approach than the 
imposition of a strict socio-economic code of conduct onto a cultural and 
intellectual life. 
Willians sought to show that the cultural relationship beoam the elite and 
the educated bourgeois was different fran that beoam the elite and the masses. The 
elite despised the masses, "the swinish multitude" as Burke described than. The 
masses -were easily fooled and alnost tribally primitive. Indeed the educated 
bourgeois, particularly the advertisers and joumalists expressed the elite's 
contanpt for the masses which becarre an important part of I,X>PUlar culture in an 
age of mass mad.ia. Williams contended that: 
"If our purpose is art, education, the giving of infonnation 
or opinion, our interpretation will be in tei:n5 of the rational 
and interested being. If, on the other hand, our purpose is 
manipulation - the :persuasion of a large number of people to 
act, feel, think, know, in certain ways - the convenient foruml.a 
will be that of the masses. " 37 
The popular fo:rms of ccm:m.mication and education 'iNere established by the 
elite for the masses. Consequently they showed the existing oi:der as nora! and 
natural, and pranulgated the ideas of the elite. The masses 'iNere forced to believe 
that they 'iNere inferior, that the class system was nonnal and therefore the best way 
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to organise society and distribute wealth. The masses could react by riot or by 
strike to assert their class dignity and solidarity. ~, this was, Williams 
believed dangerous for dem:x::racy. The masses could also be apathetic, and inert, as 
Williams said the British masses had been since the General Strike of 1926. This was 
also dangerous for dem:Jcracy. By :refusing to take an active tole in politics and 
goverment, the British masses had allowed. elite to m:x::k and manipulate darocracy. 
The idea of "evecyone in their place" in the organic society of Britain had 
undeiJnined the solidarity of the masses by dividing them into groups each with 
its own position. Thus the distinction be~ blue and white collar \«)rkers, 
between artisans, craftsrren and labourers. This division of the masses seriously 
damaged their understanding of, and interest in, co-operation and socialism. 
Culture and carmunication could only be demx::ratic when the daninance of the 
elite over them was ended. The press and television should not glorify individual 
success and capitalism, but give to the masses the dignity and :respect which they 
deserved. The popular culture should not be a series of proclamations handed down by 
the elite which unreservedly praised the class system and the elite's values. If 
culture was dem:Jcratised the creativity of ordinary nen and waren ~d be unleashed.. 
The work of Thanpson and Williams inspired the New left in its early years. 
However in its search for a different philosophy which was socialist, darocratic 
and f:ree thinking the New left was an intellectual m:wenent with no political 
influence. It was disorganised and without a concrete political aim. It needed 
an organisation, and a cause, and it found them in the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disru::mam3Ilt. 
CND was famed in 1958 by a mixed group of Bevanites, radicals and 
:religions. It had a wide appeal in the labour Party. The mass detonstrations of 
CND nanbers ~the New left call for an active, :p:>litically aware and 
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daoocratic \\Orking-class. and provided a forum for the New left to prarot.e its 
opinions. As a result of activity in CND New left clubs were established throughout 
the country. When CND turned Labour fran mu1ti-1atera1ism to uni1ateralism the New 
left hailed it as a great victory. 
In its early days CND did not call for Britain to withdraw fran NAID. 
However the later danands of both CND and the New Left for Britain to break with 
NAID had serious implications for their relationship with the Labour Party. Labour 
was fully ccmnitted to NAID. A Labour GJverrment led Britain into NAID in 1947. 
Gaitske11 and the Revisionists had fought for multi-lateralism and NAID. However 
the relationship between CND and Labour was very ambiguous. On the one hand many 
Labour nenbers were active in CND. On the other CND 1 s Executive did not wish to 
be associated with any political party. Canon Collins, a CND leader, had written 
that: 
II the balance of those in the spearhead of CND was riot political 
as such . • . . certainly the bulk of the Executive . . • . were left of 
··'\r 
'lbryism - but it was based on :rroral principles uncarp:ramisingly. II 38 
This division betM:en :rrorality and party politics was not, as Ian Mikardo 
pointed out, practical. The only way to achieve unilateral disannanent was through 
political action in the Labour Party. In the mind of New leftists Gaitskell 1 s 
Labour Party was allied to the Establishment, obsessed with arrending but not 
abolishing capitalism and achieving electoral success. Gaitskell 1 S refusal in 1960 
to accept the dem:x::ratic decision of Conference on unilateralism indicated to the 
New Left that the Revisionists could not, or \\Ollld not represent the masses. 
Gaitskell 1 s repeated calls fran 1959 onward for labour to shed its \\Orking class 
image only strengthened the New left Is conviction that Labour was not an adequate 
instrument of social change. Hall expressed that general feeling: 
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"Has the Labour IIDVE!fieJlt care through the fire and br.instone of the 
last fifty years to lie down and die before the glossy magazines? 
Has Labour no sense of the capacities, the potential of a society -
nore various, nore skilled, nore literate, less confined, less beaten 
down and frustrated." 39 
Lal:x::rur had sold out to the very groups it was maant to attack. ~the 
New Left could not alienate itself fran a party which carrmanded the electoral 
support of the "WOrking class. labour was a creative achievem:mt of the -workers, to 
establish a co-operative society to benefit the "WOrkers, and found institutions on 
the principle of equality. As Raynond Williams put it: 
II the choice as it presents itself for Labour is be~ qualified 
acceptance in a subordinate capacity or the renewal of an apparently 
hopeless challenge. The practical benefits of the fonrer have to be 
balanced against the profound loss of inspiration in the loss of the 
latter." 40 
The perceived effectiveness of Labour as an inst.rurrent for the achievatEnt 
of socialism d.etennined its relationship with the New Left. After CND's 1960 
victory the New Left Review supported a policy of fighting within the Labour 
MJvalent and Party. 
"Scarborough both generalised and politicised the issue of nuclear 
~pons and either the nembers of CND who are in touch at any point 
with the organised political life of the Labour MJvement put the 
case for unilateralism there, or it will go by default." 41 
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The New left ccmnitted itself, after an intemal struggle, to fight on two 
fronts, inside and outside the Labour Party, to win the unilateralist case. It was 
Ralph Miliband in "Parlianenta:r:y Socialism" 42 (1961) who argued that Labour's 
ccmni:tmant to parliamentary c:iem:x:racy prevented it frcm becaning a truly socialist 
party. Turning Labour's and the Revisionist's claim that the Party was non-
ideological against itself Miliband argued that: 
" .... of political parties claiming socialism to be their aim, the 
Labour Party has always been one of the rrost dogmatic - not about 
socialism but about the parliamentary system. Empirical and flexible 
about all else, its leaders have always made devotion to that system 
their fixed point of :reference and the conditioning factor of their 
political behaviour." 43 
Labour could not rrobilise the working class in direct action because of its 
ccmnitment to parliamentary dem:::x::racy. It could only be a manager of capitalism as 
in 1945 to 1951. Without working class agitation Labour would be absorbed into the 
existing system. For Miliband Labour rrotivated the masses to participate in the 
search for greater profits. Labour was, by its very nature, not socialist but 
labourist. Revisionism was a variety of labourism which: 
II for rrost of its existence has been primarily engaged in political 
brokerage between labour and the established order. This is a function 
which is of crucial importance to mxiern capitalism. " 44 
Miliband did leave open the possibility that Labour might became the party 
of the masses by beccming rrore socialist, rro:re class conscious. If so then Labour 
could survive an initial electoral defeat, provide an effective socialist 
opposition, which would enlist the support and devotion of its rrenbers and the 
(, 
masses and as a grand finale win real power for social change. Labour sholid not 
" 
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accept eternal capitalism as natural, as the Revisionists seared to do. Labour 
should recognise that the masses would always be a junior partner to capital in 
such as society. Hcf..vever Mi.liband could not prove that Labour's weakness was 
fundamental. Geoffrey Foote camented that Mi.liband: 
II had not made a fundamental attack on Labour as a party, as he 
recognised that its conservative {)a5t did not preclude any radical 
change on its part. II 45 
The New left made a distinct contribution to British socialism. As a 
political m:JVatEnt its fortunes were tied up with CND. When the unilateralist 
cause declined after Easter 1963 so did the activities of the New left clubs. The 
detente betw=en the Soviet Union and the USA had a damaging effect. The Labour 
Party rallied around Harold Wilson and, desperate to end thirteen years of To:cy rule, 
declined to debate the divisive issue of unilateralism. Thanpson, Hall and 
Williams lost their positions of power in CND. The "NEM left Review" appointed 
Pen:y Anderson as editor, and the approach of the New left bec:ane less libertarian 
and nore rigidly marxist. There was vicious in-fighting, foll~ by division and 
disorganisation. In the "Soc:ialist Register" 46 of 1965, edited by Mi.li.band, the 
~ groups abused each other, Thanpson described Anderson as: 
"A veritable Dr. Beeching of the socialist intelligensia. All the 
uneconanic branchlines and socio-cultural sidings of the NEM left 
which were in any case, carrying less traffic, were abruptly closed 
down. II 47 
In 1967 Tllarpson, Hall and Willian5 published "The May Day Manifesto" 48 
which protested against the Wilson Goverrment and suggested nore radical policies. 
It was poorly received, and its authors retreated to socialist academia. Thompson 
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was to gain praninence again in a later rise of CND. When Perry Anderson becarre 
editor of the New left Review, with his concern for the relationship between 
structure and superstructure, or the revolutionary eizure of ~ and Marxist 
dogma the death knell was sounded for the radical, free thinking ~on. In its 
place the New left adopted the Marxism of Att!AIJsseV. 
The New left has been criticised on three main grounds. 
First the New left was a middle-class radical novenent which over 
intellectualised socialism. In doing so they created a mystique around socialism 
which did not notivate but confused the working class. Frank Parkin, in a 
history of CND wrote that these middle class radicals were: 
II nore typically concerned with issues of a noral or humanitarian 
nature, as for example, anti-apartheid, the campaign against capital 
punishmant .••. and so on. These goals are intrinsically different 
fran those pursued by working class novenents in that they offer · 
particular benefits to those who support them • • • • The main pay off 
for such activity is in the E!ll'Otional satisfaction derived fran 
expressing personal values in action. II 49 
The New left, cla.im:rl Foote 50, have often followed intellectual fashion for 
its own sake, flirted with Marxist language whilst rejecting basic Marxist 
principles, such as replacing Marx's idea of surplus value and nodifying the 
prophesised crisis of capitalism as a :result of falling profit. The absence of a 
theory of crisis or revolution has been as influential on New left theory as its 
stress on culture and radical sociology, and this fo:rms the basis of the second 
criticism. The Camnunists, and New leftists such as Perry Anderson, argued that 
Thaupson' s ideas, and those of his supporters were merely nodifications of 
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capitalism as they had no theory of revolution. The elite 'iNOUld not give up~ 
faced by a neatly argued radical case, or a group of angry intellectuals. Non-
violent direct action might have caused the elite to m::xtify its approach to welfare 
for the masses but only by s;e~,zing power 'iNOUld the masses achieve power. As the 
Revisionists had adapted the Labour Party and labourism to be good managers of 
capitalism, so Thcxnpson et al had adapted pluralism and liberalism to corrupt them. 
Thirdly the Revisionists argued that, although the New left clained to be 
libertarian and free thinking, its policies ~uld require the deprivation of scxre 
groups of their liberty and the coercion of others by an interfering bureaucracy. 
Liberty involves choice, econanic IlDral and political, and the New left had no 
strategy in the eventuality of the masses c~sing to be greedy grasping and 
" individualistic rather than opting for co-operation and camn.mity. 
Nevertheless the New left presented a strong ideological challenge to the 
Revisionists and the Bevanites. The principles of the New left inspired many other 
groups in the Labour Party such as the Bevanites and_ the feminist IIDVE!lieJlt. However 
the New left had very little support anongst La}:x)ur' s MPs in the 1960's, and failed 
to take political power fran the Revisionists. 
The~ positions of the New left and the Revisionists did not change 
when, after the sudden death of Gaitskell in January 1963, Harold Wilson was 
elected as Party leader. Wilson's primary task was to reunite the Party and to 
develop a plausible manifesto to present at a General Election by integrating 
Revisionist ideas with those of the Bevanites. Wilson and his econanic adviser 
Thanas Balogh believed that the slow growth rate of the British econany in the early 
1960's, canbined with low rates of investnent and a ~rsening balance of payrrents 
increased the need for state intervention. They held that Britain had a stagnant 
econcmy because it had stagnant social institutions. The Revisionist premise of 
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higher spending on social 'V.'elfare had always been dependent on a high and 
sustainable econanic gJX1Nth rate. The Keynesian econanic techniques used by the 
Conservative Q:Jvennrent of the day and favoured by the Revisionsists seared unable 
to :z:evive the econany. The Revisionist idea of noderate state intervention in the 
econany and limited social refonn without state intervention appeared to Wilson to 
be irrelevant. However, Wilson needed to ~rk with the Revisionists to reunite the 
Party and bring an end to the debates alxmt ownership, nuclear 'V.'eafOns and the 
organisation of the Party, at least until LaOOur had ~n a General Election. Wilson 
was not concerned with ideas but with winning a General Election. He was not a 
Revisionist. In fact he did not have close links with any faction within the 
Party. He shared scma of the Revisionist's opinions alxmt the state of the nation 
but he felt that only corporate socialism and intervention could :z:evitalise 
Britain. He proposed an essentially pragmatic solution to Britain's problans. 
Wilson shared the Revisionist idea that the Establis.hnent was the cause of 
Britain's stagnation. He stated: 
''We are living in the jet age but 'lr.'e are governed by an Edwardian 
establislment mentality. " 51 
The way to end the rule of the Establislment was to create a neritocratic 
class of technocrats who ~d stimulate a scientific revolution and breathe new 
life into the econany and actively intervene in its developrent. Influenced by 
Balogh, Wilson held that an economy that was centrally planned could control prices, 
inccmas and profit by technical management and by co-o.I.'dinated decision making. 
This was not consistent with the Revisionist principles that Govel:nrrent should 
influence, but not direct! y plan or control the econany. However Wilson was 
able to avoid disputes over fOlicy by focusing the attention of the Party on 
the need to win a General Election. In O=tober 1964 the LaOOur Party was elected to 
govern. 
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The relationship be"O.Een the Party leaders and the Revisionists during the 
1964 - 1970 La1::x::rur Government was an uneasy one. Wilson led the administration in a 
presidential style. He had the support of the trade unions and the majority of 
La1::x::rur MPs. Although the Revisionists held SCllle inp:>rtant p::>sitions within the 
Governmant the Prine Minister and the Cabinet could not be called Revisionist. 
Wilson had, indeed, incorp::>rated 5Cllle Revisionist thinking into the Party's 
manifesto and into Governmant p::>licy. Yet he maintained a pragmatic non-doctrinaire 
approach. He was prepared to change his p::>licies to suit the tines. He was as 
ready to adopt Revisionism as any other set of principles if they would bring about 
econanic growth and convince the electorate to keep the Labour Party in office. 
Evidence of this can be found in the Government's econanic p::>licy. 
The Government was bedevilled by a balance of pa.ynents crisis fran its 
beginning. This forced Wilson to abandon his p::>licy of centralised planning and 
.ilnpose a variety of fiscal p::>licies which ultimate! y deprived the Governrrent 's 
supporters, the working class. The planned incCllles p::>licy failed in 1966. Sterling 
was devalued in 1967. The Government thrashed around trying to find a way of 
controlling a rise in lll1Ellfq?loynent to half a million in 1967 and trade union unrest. 
In 1969 the Government tried be legislation to curb those very trade unions who 
had given the 1964 Manifesto their support. In the face of such economic crises 
the Governrrent's main objective became the short tenn managem:mt of the econany 
rather than a scientific revolution and the creation of meritocratic class of 
technocrats. 
The Revisionists played a minor role in the Government's econanic decision 
making until the appointm:mt of Roy Jenkins as Chancellor in 1967. He was able to 
achieve a sw:plus in the balance of paynents in 1969 by :restraining denand. The 
failure of Wilson's corp::>rate planned socialist econanic p::>licy also led to the 
frustration of the Revisionist's hopes for limited social refonn. Such social 
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refoiJU needed finance, and the ec:onany was in no fit state to fund increased 
spending on any public utility. ~, as Heile Secretary frcm 1965 to 1967 
Jenkins was able to implem:mt a liberalisation of the laws regarding abortion, 
hcm:>sexuality and censorship. The divorce laws were refoDIECi in 1969. 
Ccmprehensive education and wage related social security contributions and benefits 
~ introduced. The Revisionists encouraged these progressive refonns, but were 
dismayed by reductions in social public expenditure. The Govermrent had not 
radically changed the distribution of wealth or social privilege. Although the 
ethos surrounding the Govermrent' s proposed social refonns was a Revisionist one, 
the implem:mtation of the refonns depended upon the success of an ec:onany organised 
along corporate socialist lines. Labour's economic p:>licy was a failure, and for 
that reason its social p:>licy also failed. 
Wilson had been able to hold the Labour Party together throughout the tenn 
of the Govermrent. The factions within the Party were so preoccupied with the 
Herculean tasks of office that they had no tine or inclination to involve t:.he!rselves 
in divisive conflict. ~' in 1970 the Party fought the General Election on a 
mixed set of Revisionist and Corporatist principles, and lost. As ~11 
remarks, the Labour Govermrent of 1964-70 had presided over the decline of social 
dercocracy into: 
"Mere rhetoric, word! y pragmatism and an open w.:>rship of the IIDst 
traditional symbols of British society. " 52 
By 1970 the Revisionists~ in serious trouble. Their influence in the 
Party had declined. Traditional Labour supporters gave their approval to Wilson and 
the corporatists. M:>re radical Labour supporters looked towards the arerging groups 
on the left and to Berm. The Revisionists ~ in decline for tlu::ee reasons. 
Firstly their principles and p:>licies ~ seen as outdated and were challenged by 
the left. Secondly they had isolated themselves fran the trade union IXJWErr base 
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over Britain's entry into the E.E.C. Thirdly the character of the Labour Party in 
the constituencies, where the Revisionists had never been strong, was IIDVing 
towards the left. 
Crosland attanpted to rejuvenate Revisionism and care to tenns with the 
failure of the Labour Goverrment in a Fabian Tract "A Social Denocratic 
Britain" 53 (1971) and "Socialism Now" 54 (1974). He argued that socialism was 
still about equality and -welfare as ends, but the rreans anployed. should be re-
appraised. He saw the Britain of the 1970's as still divided by class and 
industrial dispute. 
"The labour issue still continues to divide our society, and class 
relations in industry are characterised by a mutual distruct often 
anounting to open warfare. " 55 
He maintained that capitalism could be controlled. Nationalisation should 
only be used as a rreasure of last resort. Multi-national canpanies -were not a 
threat but -were to be -welccned as they increased i.nvest:nent in Britain. Crosland 
wrote: 
"I see no reason to alter the Revisionist thesis that governrrent 
can generally impose its will (provided it has one) on the private 
corporation. " 56 
He contended that Revisionism had been spoiled by the fX>licies of corpratism 
advocated by Wilson. These fX>licies had drawn Revisionists away fran their 
fundanenta.l principles, and into a :rrore Right wing fX>Sition. The Revisionist vision 
had becane blurred. What was :required was a return to :fundanenta.l principles, a 
nove leftward. 
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Crosland suggested: 
"A nove to the left is needed, not in the traditional sense of a 
a nove tcMards old fashioned Clause IV Marxism in the sense of a 
sharper deliniation of :fundaroontal objectives, a greater clarity 
about egalitarian priorities and a stronger determination to 
achieve them. " 57 
Crosland, and Jenkins who used similar argunents in ''What Matters ~" 58 
(1972) did not link the failure of the Labour Party to the inability of the state 
to employ Keynesian danand managenent with any effect on inflation. John Gyford 
and Stephen Haseler called on the Revisionists in the Fabian pamphlet "Social 
DemJcracy : Beyond Revisionism" 59 (1971) adopt on a llDre populist and 
participatory strategy. The followers of Gyford and Haseler called t.hem9el ves 
Social Dem:x::rats to differentiate themselves fran the Revisionists. 'rhey advocated 
a llDre grass roots approach to p:>litics and the reduction of inequality. Their 
principles were adopted by Dick Taverne who resigned his seat as a Labour MP and 
successfully fought a bye-election as a Dem:x::ratic Labour candidate as a protest 
against left-wing activity. Taverne cla.inEd.: 
" . . • . our guiding principle should be "small is beautiful", that 
variety provides for independence, and that independence provides 
for greater security and freedan. " 60 
As the Revisionists were caning to terms with their :role in the Labour 
Q:)verrnrent they also entered into a dispute about Britain's rranbership of the E .E. C. 
In 1959 Jenkins and his supporters established the Labour camon Market Carmittee. 
This group entered into a close friendship with the leaders of the GeDran SPD and 
both sides regularly net at Konigswinter. This allc::Med the Labour delegation to 
canpare the SPD's p:ro-EEC p:>Sition with the increasingly anti-EEC opinions of their 
awn Party. The Lab::>ur Ccmron Market Ccmnittee in the 1970's acted in the sarre way 
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as the Carrpaign for Demx:ratic Socialism had behaved in the 1960 1 s. Both were a 
front for the Revisionists to establish a supporting organisation for their disputes 
within the Party. To a certain extent it acted as a party within a party. In 
Ck::tober 1971 sixty-nine Labour MPs organised by the Labour Ccmton Market Ccmnittee 
voted against a three line whip on the principle of EEC entry. On the 16th April 
1972 after the Shaciow Cabinet first rejected then accepted Tony BennIs proposal that 
a Labour G:Jverrment would hold a referendum alxmt EEC nenbership Jenkins, ONeil and 
their colleagues resigned their Party Offices. 
The Revisionists began to organise for a campaign inside and outside the 
Party in favour of entry into the EEC. The .i.nq;x>rtance of the issue declined until 
the national referendum in 1975. However the stance taken by the Revisionists 
alienated them fran the Labour leadership and the trade unions. The Revisionists 
had depended upon the support of the trade unions to counterl::>alance their ~s 
in the constituencies. The EEC issue not only separated the Revisionists fl:cm the 
trade unions but also fran those sections of the Labour Movement who were 
syrtq?athetic to them but anti-EEC. This problem was canpounded by the changes in the 
Labour Party nanbership. The Labour Party was being taken over by the middle 
class. 
Throughout the 1940 1 s and 1950 1 s the Labour Party in the constituencies had 
been run by 'i.IOrking class trade union activists. In 1945 39% of Labour MPs were 
fran the 'i.IOrking class. However, by Ck:tober 1974 the constituencies had becare 
dependent upon the 'i.IOrk of teachers, local authority anployees and the like, and 
only 4% of Labour MPs were fran the 'i.IOrking class. Aided by their generally greater 
articulateness and organisational abilities the middle class took control of the 
constituencies. Their ethos was very different fromthe 'i.IOrking class. Many were 
graduates, familiar with the tactics of the protest :rrovarents of the 1960 Is. They 
were disappointed by the perfonnance of the Labour QJverrment and its perceived 
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aband.orunent of socialism. They attanpted to re-introduce socialism by applying 
pressure on their local MPs, pressing Conference notions critical of Labour 
policy, and by gaining positions of authority at local and national level. The 
fraternalist approach inherited fran the trade unions was damaged. Labour MPs, 
previously considered semi-divine, -were looked on as the semi-satanic upholders of 
capitalism. After 1966 Conference often passed resolutions critical of Party policy, 
an event alnost unimaginable before 1959. All of this seriously weakened and 
clem:Jralised the Revisionists, and was a major reason why the SOP was fonred. 
Whilst the Revisionists contanplated their principles and their role in the 
1964-1970 Labour Governrrent, the left began to marshal their diverse range of 
opinions into a nore coherent prograrrma of econanic and social policies. The ideas 
of the New left -were absorbed by sene of the Bevanites who had no desire to join an 
intellectually pure but enclosed order of socialists. They wanted the IXJWer to 
transfonn society in a radical way. The failure of the 1964-1970 Lal::x:mr Q:wernrrent 
convinced Michael Foot that the Revisionism of Jenkins and Crosland could not 
liberate the working class fran capitalism. These fo:orer Bevanites entered into a 
coalition with the nanbers of the New left within the Labour Movenent. They 
conducted their political activities through the Institute for Workers Control 
(Dl:) and its journal "The Voice of the Unions". As it had the support of the 
leaders of the Engineers Union and the Transport Workers Union the lN: group could 
not be dismissed by the Revisionists as a minority interest advocating eccentric 
ideas. 
The leaders of the lN: -were Ken Coates and Tony Topham. Coates argued 
against both the limited nationalisation of Revisionism and the idea of public 
corporations advocated by Labour since the 1930's. Both of these types of public 
ownership had becare capitalist syndicates, managed by a bureaucratic oligarchy 
which was subservient to the private sector and continued to exploit the 
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workforce. As a reaction to this Coates and the DC advocated traditional 
syndicalism. In spite of consurrer capitalism and affluence the economic 
:relationship ben..am owner and w:::>rkers was still one of exploiter and exploited. 'lb 
achieve a humane and dignified series of economic :relationships w:::>rkers IIUlSt control 
their industry. He claim3d: 
"W::>rkers control brings back into the working class . . . . all that 
trarendous weight of self esteem, of self recognition, of self 
:respect, which has been stripped BNmy by years of bureaucratic 
intrigues and manoeuvres in p:::>litical institutions. A man who 
wants w:::>rkers control is a man who's aNm.:re of his fundamental 
humanity .••• nen who a:re convinced that they a:re not marely 
"hands", that they're not merely "cogs" but they have human 
dignities and rights." 61 
'lb Coates w:::>rkers' control constrained the power of employers to act against 
the interests of the workers. Having been involved in the control of their industry 
the workers w:::>uld :realise how unnecessacy capitalist owners were and demand the full 
control of their industry and the end of capitalism. The "social audit" of the 
costs and benefits of finns, including an analysis of tha distribution of profit, 
would further educate the w:::>rkers in the need for them to exercise economic power 
and control. This control was to be organised in small units avoiding co:rporatism. 
W::>rkers control was an alternative to w:::>rkers participation in corporate industry 
which was seen as an exercise in class collaboration, and legitimised the capitalist 
distribution of wealth. Ernie Roberts of the DC, an Engineering Union offical who 
later becarre a Labour MP argued: 
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"The reason for the existence of the La1::xJur Movenent is to bring 
about a redistribution of . . . . wealth in the interests of those 
who create it. When we think of planning our economy, this again 
depends upon real ownership and control of the economy. " 62 
The cause of the :m:: within the Labour M:Jverrent was aided by the 
consolidation of union rank and file organisation around the shop steward. The 
decentralisation of power in the unions gave a grass roots impetus to the IVl:: that 
the New left had lacked. In 1967 Hugh Scanlon, a defender of the power of shop 
stewards, and an influential member of the :m:: was elected President of the 
Engineering Union. The attack on corporate socialism had reached the trade unions. 
Scanlon believed that: 
"the leadership of the trade union m:JVE!l'Ceilt is now a.lnost part of 
the establislment - nore .inp)rtant still is a recognised part of the 
establishrrent. That wasn't as apparent in the thirties and during 
the war. It's nore a phenarenon of full anploynent and anployers 
utilising the trade union leadership rather than the heavy stick of 
unanployrrent. II 63 
The shop stewards m:JVE!l'Ceilt would link leaders with the militant rank and 
file and cause than to reject the corporate system. 
In reality the shop stewards acted as an lU1Co-on:linated and unpredictable 
group without reference to any long tenn end or principle. Worsening industrial 
relations, unofficial strikes and closed shops could not be accepted by the 
Revisionists or by the nore traditional trade union leaders who saw their positions 
of power being threatened. Workers control might well rarove capitalist owners 
fran influential roles, but it would also damage those Keynesian ITEChanisms 
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manipulating demand and supply on a macro econanic basis as favoured by the 
Revisionists. Although the IVl: and the Revisionists both disliked corpratism the 
IVl: favoured an extension of state ownership broken down into \'Drker controlled 
small units. 
The Revisionist belief in the effective managarent of capitalism in favour 
of the \'Drkers was attacked by Michael Barratt Brown. Barratt Brown argued 
that the 1964-1970 Labour Goverrment had pursued corporatist policies in a society 
torn by class conflict. Following David Ricardo he argued that profit and wages 
were directly linked. Higher wages reduced profits and vice versa. The pressure 
applied to private companies to grow and increase tax revenues to finance 
Revisionist social refoDIIS \'Dllld not in the capitalist system reduce profit. 
Private ccmpanies \'Dllld have to satisfy the demands of their shareholders for 
increased dividends, the inevitable consequence of which was holding wages at a 
static level. This in turn increased the danand for social services to be 
financed fran taxes and econanic growth. Thus corpratism had built into it the 
protection of profit. When the econany overheated the fiscal policy adopted after 
1967 fell nost heavily on restraint of wages. The Revisionist idea that Q:Jverrments 
could control the econany by influence without a further extension of public 
ownership was a nonsense because of the growth of multi-national canpanies. These 
companies could hold such an iJntx:>rtant position in an econcmy that their actions 
could cause serious econanic decline which no Q:Jverrment \'Duld risk by attempting to 
:reduce profits and increase wages. Secondly multi-national canpanies could transfer 
resources between nations or between different parts of their organisation at such a 
rate as to make it iJntx:>ssible for any Govermrent to use its supposed influence 
effectively. He wrote: 
"The rivahy today is not so much between capitalist states, in which 
finance capital is integrated with the state machine, as between 
transitional campanies. " 64 
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Barratt Brown argued for the end to the 11Butskellist II consensus in the face 
of such a concentration of econanic power. Rather than bringing about a partnership 
between labour and capital consensus tx>litics had allCMed the capitalists to fool 
the workers into an unfair agreenent. In this agreenent the workers had legit.i.mi.sed 
an unfair distribution of ~th. They had unconsciously strengthened the selfish 
and inegalitarian parts of capitalism by abandoning radical socialism and the 
tx>litics of conflict. For Barratt Brown, only a return to fundarcental socialist 
principles could restore the Labour Party as a force for progressive change within 
British society. He claimad: 
"Socialism is not about equality, as Crosland insisted, nor even 
about liberty, important as refonns in these directions may be; it 
is about the eradication of class, about social control and production 
for use, instead of profit, for socially fonnul.ated needs in place 
of privately managed markets. II 65 
The labour Party would, he thought, be propelled towards a radical prograntTE 
by the pressure applied by the growing danand for workers control. By hamessing 
the power enbod.ied in the workers control llDVE!lleilt which was organised into small 
units Labour could act against the multi-national companies. It could also act 
against supra-national organisations which \Ere the power bases of the multi-
national canpanies, :particularly the Ccmron Market. 
Barratt Brown saw the Labour Party not only as a socialist organisation but 
also as a standard bearer behind which the nation could gather to defeat the multi-
national corp:>rations. He did not advocate conflict within the nation. Capitalism 
he contended had changed since the t.i.ne of Marx~ The capitalists of Marx's tine had 
worked on a small scale canpared to the multi-nationals. He claimad: 
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"The division arerging in the ruling class in the 1970's is between 
giants of industry and finance with international connections and 
pygmies in the national market." 66 
Barratt Brown's colleagues in the DC accepted his analysis of society, and 
his principles. For their tactics and strategy the DC turned to Ken Coates. As 
the representative of radical socialism Coates felt that the DC should not destroy 
its chances of gaining~ and influence in a Labour Goverrment by being hostile 
to the Party as the New left was, or by acting as a small "ginger" group. If the 
IWC deserted Labour it deserted the natural Party of the ~rking class. The ~rkers 
would then have no alternative but to support a Revisionist Party. Coates wrote: 
"Whatever else British socialists may be doing, whatever experiments 
they may feel meet to conduct, either in ccmm.mity action or trade union 
agitation, the one thing they should not do is to tum their backs on 
the official Labour Movarent . • . . it "WOuld be tine enough to talk 
about defeat if the battle were over assuming our victories left us 
tine, but it is quite, quite wrong to concern ourselves with it ncM, 
as the battle lines are just beginning to fonn." 67 
A period of strikes and daronstrations against the Heath Goverrment boosted 
the norale of the IWC and increased its influence in the Labour Party. The Upper 
Clyde Shipbuilders Dispute in 1971 daronstrated, in the opinion of the DC, that 
'WOrkers could run their industJ:y without capitalist managers. Detennined ~rking 
class opposition to the Industrial Relations Act 1972 as shown by "WOrkers victories 
in the January 1972 Miners Strike, and the proposed General Strike in July 1972 gave 
further credibility to the views of the IWC. This series of strikes led Eric Heffer 
to conclude in "The Class Struggle in Parliament" ( 1973) 6B that the Lal:x:mr Party 
was a "WOrking class m:JVeiient because of its trade union base. If the trade unions 
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defended the ~rking class the Labour Party would do the sane and adopt r.olicies 
that were radical and socialist. The Labour leadership wished to avoid a split with 
the trade unions. The ~ parties cane to an arrangerrent whereby a I.al:xmr 
Goverrment would premise to introduce neasures that would redistribute incare in 
exchange for union support. This agreem:mt known as the "Scx::ial Contract" was 
fonnally expressed in "Labour's Progranne 1973" 69 which was adopted by the Party 
Conference in O::=tober of the sane year. The sane docurrent was used as the basis for 
Labour's manifesto during the General Election of February 1974. "The Lalxmr 
Programre 1973" was based largely on the ~rk of Stuart Holland. 
Holland developed the thought of Barratt Brown. He had studied European, 
particularly Italian, mathods of public enterprise and by applying this research to 
Britain had derived sarre interesting conclusions. He believed that the IlUllti-
nationals had made Keynesian demand management useless by their exercise of 
nonopolistic ~· The activities of the IlUllti-nationals put into question the 
Revisionist thesis that capitalism could be managed and class conflict eradicated by 
a gradual redistribution of wealth. Monetary maasures against IlUllti-nationals were 
useless as the canpanies could raise finance on the international markets. Fiscal 
IXJlicy becane a nonsense because tax concessions had to be given to keep or attract 
the multi-nationals. 
The private sector had failed to resist the IlUllti-nationals. It had failed 
the people of Britain. The public sector was J:?aSSive, dependant on growth. The 
Goverrment had concentrated on social services and infra-structure that benefited 
the multi-nationals. The Goverrment had ignored the nationalisation of the 
profitable sectors of the econany and had taken on board ailing industries. The 
private sector had not grown quick! y enough to sustain invest:Irent or full 
anploymant, to be canpetitive in the international markets. The Labour Q:Jverrment 
of 1964-70 had been unsuccessful because the National Plan had attempted to supr.ort 
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capitalism and the existing class relations rather tban redistributing \Eal.th. 
Holland suggested that: 
" having failed to grasp that social redistribution depended 
upon socialist transfollllation it was forced to cut back on the very 
social expenditure supposed to alleviate injustice and inequality. " 70 
Holland argued that Governmants must use the power of leading canpanies by 
extending public ownership or by using a state agency to divert private investrrent 
into social! y acceptable industry. The state agency was to be similar to the 
Italian Industrial Reconstitution Institute ( IRI) . 
"A British IRI type state holding canpany ...• could place an instrurrent 
of unprecedented flexibility and effectiveness at the disposition of 
the Goverrnnent. " 71 
Holland advocated a fo:rm of state capitalism which changed the mix of the 
econany but did not abolish the private sector. He dismissed objections by sane 
nanbers of the left to these proposals thus; 
" to ignore the techniques of state capitalism because they are 
state capitalist is not only to allow the devil sana of the best 
tunes but also is to risk siren seduction of sc.ma sections of the 
working class, who would readily change job insecurity for job 
security, whatever the prevailing m:xie of prcx::iuction." 72 
Therefore it was state intervention not cm:poralist state ownership in which 
Holland placed his faith. Workers would still be expected to control their 
industries rather than the state. He wrote: 
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"The question of social control is crucial. Without a socialisation 
of control, with new fonns of industrial and econanic denocracy, and 
new negotiation of changed ends for the use of resources, the 
institutions of state ownership and plarming 'NOuld tend to mean 
co:rporatism or state capitalism rather than a transition to socialist 
plarming and socialised developtent. " 73 
Holland's theories -were aimad at restoring the British economy and national 
soveignty. Like Barratt Brown, Holland envisaged a labour Q:wernmant leading the 
nation away fran the multi-nationals. They both placed the interests of the nation 
above those of class. licM3ver for them the 'NOrking class -were the nation as the 
class of British capitalists had been destroyed by the multi-nationals. 
Labour 'NOn the February 1974 General Election with a rrore left wing 
manifesto than that used in 1970. The minority administration led by Wilson had a 
rrore radical ethos than the 1964 Q:wernmant. Although Revisionists held .i.mp.:>rtant 
positions, notably Jenkins as Hcire Secretary, the followers of the I'VC and 
Holland, such as Benn, also occupied influential ministries. 
The labour Q:wernmant of 1974-79 was not a happy affair for the 
Revisionists . Noel Tracey CCilllE11ts: 
"If the 1964-70 Labour Governrrent represents the failure of social 
demxracy to cope with economic difficulties, the 1974-79 Q:wernmant 
was in t:eJ::ns of social dem:x::racy a total disaster. " 74 
In CX::tober 1974 another General Election gave labour a small 'NOrking 
majority. The Governrrent had proposed a series of radical refonns in social 
services and equality but the effects of the 1973 oil crisis forced the 
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administration to abandon its socialist approach and revert to a m::>netarism. 
Chancellor Denis Healey used deflation and fiscal policy to control the econany. 
The Revisionists swallowed their Keynesian pride and endorsed Healey's nethods. 
Their newspaper ''Socialist Carm:mtal:y'' stated: 
"It seems clear to us in 1975, the level of anploynent will be alnost 
entirely beyond the control of the British G:werrment." 75 
The newspaper expressed similar views a year later. 
"During 1976 there is a priority for British econcmic policy .... to 
bring down the rate of inflation. There is a second priority .•.. the 
i.nprovem:mt of productivity ..•• a third reducing unernploynent, which 
can be tackled only when we have beaten inflation." 76 
'lb the left it appeared that the Revisionists had accepted the analysis of 
the econany presented by the newly elected Conservative leader Mrs. Thatcher. 
Motivated by the legitimate desire to place individuals of like mind into Parliarrent 
the left began to challenge the policies of sitting Revisionist MPs in the 
constituencies. In late 1974 Eddie Mci,ln€1 MP for Blyth was ousted. -
Eddie Griffiths MP for Sheffield Brightside, Frank Tanney in Harmersmith, Richard 
Crawshaw in 'lbxteth and Edward Lyons in Bradford, all leading Revisionists, were in 
trouble with their constituency parties over the econany, defence and the EEC. The 
activities of the left were not restricted to baiting the Revisionists. In Newham 
North-East Reg Prentice a "WOrking class m::xierate anti-EEC nenber was asked to retire 
by his constituency party. 
The Revisionist's alarm at the activities of the left were increased by 
difficulties at the constituency level. They believed that Wilson would not curb 
these activities for the fear of splitting the Party. The NEC carmissioned Reg 
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Underhill, the national agent, to prepare a report on "Entryist Activities" 
particularly those of the Militant tendency. The report was presented to the NEC in 
November 1975. Much to the disgust of the Revisionists its recCITilelldations were not 
acted upon, nor was it published. 
Outside Parliament a group of Revisionist and social c:lem:lcratic sympathisers 
fo.nned the Social Dem::lcratic Alliance (SDA). The SDA, launched in June 1975, 
attenpted to provide support to those Labour Party nenbers who felt that the Party 
was: 
II being driven fran its historic course by an intolerant dogmatism 
alien to its socialist tradition and c:lem:lcratic systan." 77 
The SDA led by Stephen Haseler and supported by Jenkins ained at: 
"creating a dem:x::ratic socialist society and works within the British 
systan of Parliamentary daoocracy." 78 
The SDA was not a popular group in the Labour Party. It instigated a witch-
hunt against the ~ft by anploying a canbination of vitrolic personal attacks in the 
press and attempts to undennine the position of the Labour leaders and the NEC. It 
caused many noderate non-Revisionist MPs to distrust Jenkins and his supporters. 
The Revisionists had IIDbilised its forces through the Manifesto Group and the 
Campaign for Labour Victory ( CI.V) • These groups gave the younger followers of the 
Revisionists such as David Marquand, John Mackintosh and Brian Magee the opportunity 
to voice their opinions and assume positions of responsibility. These groups were 
used by the Revisionists during the European Referendum campaign of 1975. 
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As would be expected the Revisionists played a leading part in the Britain 
in Europe Group. They fonred links with Edward Heath, Jeremy Thorpe and other 
mambers of the very political parties of the centre and right whan they were meant 
to opp::>se. It was nanbers of the labour Party, particularly Michael Foot, 'lbny Berm 
and Peter Shore with whan they disagreed and whan they publicly criticised. The 
Referendum campaign caused Jenkins, at least, to question the value of the ~ party 
systan. 'lb him the divisions caused by~ party politics seemad artificial after 
the shared experiences of the 1975 Referendum. The campaign highlighted the 
differences between Labour MPs. It opened the way for Labour to approach the 
Liberals to fonn an electoral alliance in Parlianent. The effect of the 1975 
Referendum was similar to Peel's Repeal of the Corn Law for all of the parties 
involved. As Peel split the 'lb:cy Party and that split led to the foz:mation of the 
Liberal Party so the issue of Europe split Labour and gathered together the eventual 
leaders of the SOP and the Liberal Party. 'lb this campaign the Alliance that 
contested the 1987 Election and the Social and Liberal DemJcratic Party can trace 
its origin. The campaign also caused a reM within the family of the labour 
labour Party which cane to a head at the 1976 Party Conference. 
At the Party Conference of 1976 the Revisionists~ humiliated. They were 
not alone. The Conference shouted down Wilson and Healey. It passed notions to 
nationalise the major banks. It gave its support to the Labour Prograrrma 1976 which 
advocated a return to Clause IV socialism and did not nention NAID. Janes Callaghan 
took over the Labour leadership in March 1976 following Wilson's sw:prising 
resignation. In the election for the leadership, and the premiership, Jenkins' and 
Crosland's canbined votes did not total those of Michael Foot the principal champion 
of the left. The disappointing perfo:onance of Jenkins and Crosland indicated the 
weakness of the Revisionist position. They had identified themselves too closely 
with the EEC and alienated too many MPs of both noderate and left wing persuasion to 
m::nmt a successful challenge. It was against this background of political weakness 
and defeat that John Mackintosh reassessed Revisionism. 
53 
Mackintosh had enjoyed a successful acadanic career at Edinburgh before 
entering Parliament. Although he was a Revisionist supporter he was fiercely 
independent, critical of the LaOOur leadership and by 1976 convinced that the 
Revisionist policies of the 1950's and 1960's were irrelevant. In effect 
Mackintosh developed an idea Crosland had expressed in 1974. Crosland wrote: 
"I was too canplacent about growth. I did not anticipate that 
successive Goverrnnents ~d use deflation as allrost their only 
rreans of regulating the economy. " 79 
Mackintosh echoed Crosland when he clai.ned: 
"I had not thought about or appreciated how far the views of what 
is now called the social darocratic section which was then dominant 
in the LaOOur Party depended on the kind of growth we had claimad 
. was possible once the 'lbries were out of office. " 80 
He rejected the Wilsonian Theory that a series of accidents had diverted the 
Revisionist policy of long tenn econanic revival. He traced the causes of Britain's 
econanic decline to the rise of corporatism. The political systan had adapted 
itself to corporatism. Power was centred in the Cabinet. This challenged the 
legitimacy of Parliament as did corporate bodies such as the TUC and CBI. 
"The denial of legitimacy is a clear consequence of two concepts. 
First that passage by the House of Carm::>ns is not of itself an 
adequate indication of the consent of the ccmnunity, and second, 
that the prior consultation with recognised groups has beccare an 
essential part of the legitimising process. " 81 
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Mackintosh :realised that the changes in the social and econanic 
establishrrent advocated by Crosland could not bring about changes in the social 
attitudes of the people. The British people felt powerless faced with organised 
laOOur and big business which challenged the power of Parliamant and unde:t:rnined 
daux:racy. The people had becana uninterested in politics. They saw that, 
whichever party ruled in consensus politics, the will of the corporatist groups would 
prevail. The two party system that confined individual MPs strengthened the 
corporate state. Mackintosh adopted a very dangerous position for a Labour MP. He 
considered that organised labour, that is the trade unions, acted against the 
interest of the people. He clained that the only way in which the colp)rate state 
could be dismantled was by individual MPs acting against the two party system 
without fear of de-selection by their constituency parties. Mackintosh was 
fo:rmulating an anti-labourist theo:ry of Revisionism at the tine of his death. 
Crosland had died in February 1977. At the end he insisted on calling himself "a 
dem:x::ratic socialist". He described a social dem::x::rat as "satebody about to join 
the 'lbz:y Party". 82 In the sarre nonth Roy Jenkins, disillusioned with British 
politics left Westminister for the Presidency of the EEC. The Revisionists \llere 
dem:::>ralised, in disarray and leaderless at exactly the sarre tine when they needed 
courage, organisation and leadership. 
callaghan's Goverrment staggered fi:an crisis to crisis. The "Social 
Contract" fomecl by Wilson with the trade unions carre to an end. The G:Jverrment 
survived with the support of the Liberals. The Lib-Lab Pact reinforced the 
Revisionist belief that the two party system was an artificial barrier in British 
politics. They found that the Labour Party was not the only purveyor of socialistic 
policies. The co-operation achieved be'boam Labour and the Liberals had a minor 
impact on the leaders of the SOP during the fonnation of that Party. Hc'.w3ver 
the experiences of the Lib-Lab Pact W3re influential in the Alliance later fomed 
be'boam the SOP and the Liberal Party. In April 1979, racked by industrial disputes 
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during the 1978-79 ''Winter of Discontent" and Party in-fighting, and tonmnted by 
an effective Opposition, Labour was defeated in Parlianent. callaghan called a 
General Election for early May and Labour was heavily defeated. 
On the activities of the Revisionists during the 1970's Haseler camented: 
"The central plot in Labour's story in the 1970's is not one of sarre 
great left wing triumph of will, ideology or tactics. The Labour 
left are certainly the victors, but they ~ handed the victory by 
the Labour Right. " 83 
He also recognised that Revisionism was a set of principles whose tine had 
passed. 
"The social darocrats consensus of post war optimism was fast becoming 
past history. It was breaking asunder. " 84 
Indeed the Revisionists did hand victory to the left. They ~ identified 
with a discredited econanic policy. They ~ judged to have caused divisions 
within the QJverment during the 1975 Referendmn campaign. In Labour's J;X>St 
election Shadow Cabinet Owen, Rodgers and Healey had positions but Peter 
Jenkins observed: 
"For the tine being the social darocrats in the Labour Party are generals 
without a strategy, an elite without a cause. Their prograJl'l're is in 
tatters, but they continue to preside. " 85 
Whilst the social darocrats had no strategy and a stagnant philosophy the 
left ~ preparing for p:JWer. They had adapted the \\Urk of Barratt Brown and 
Holland to suit the circumstances after 1979. The rrost important variations on the 
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themes of Barratt Brown and Holland cane frcm tv.lo Cambridge ec::onani.sts, Wynne Godley 
and Francis Cripps, Geoff Hodgson previously a Trotskyist, and 'lbny Benn. 
Godley and Cripps worked into Holland's analysis the Keynesian principle of 
demand managem:mt to control production and employment. They argued that the lack 
of external controls over .imports and investrrent had countered the effects of demand 
managem:mt. The nation's international trade proble:ns had made Keynesian atte:npts 
to stablise prices and achieve full employnent useless. They advocated .import 
controls, reflation and an expansion of demand. The increased prosperity caused by 
these policies would be confined within Britain by .import controls and would 
therefore stimulate British jobs. This ran against the EEC policy of free trade 
between the European states. ~ the work of Godley and Cripps becane the 
foundation for the left's Al temati ve Economic Strategy (AES) . 
Hodgson accepted Godley and Cripps' prescriptions for the ec::oncmy but he was 
rrore concerned with the role of Parlianent within the corporate state. In 
"Socialism and Parlianentary r::lerocracy" ( 1979) 86 Hodgson outlined his belief that 
Parlianent in the corporate state could not exercise ~ and would be nerely a 
"rubber stamp" for decisions made by the Cabinet. He shared this belief with 
Mackintosh. He did not advise, as Mackintosh did, a rrore active role for individual 
MPs. Hodgson wanted to see organised labour acting in an extra-Parlianentary way to 
force a Labour Cabinet to seize power fran the capitalists. When this had been 
achieved local ec::onanic carmittees, subservient to Parlianent would control their 
own industries. Hodgson's local economic carmittees resembled the soviets of 
workers control suggested by lenin in "State and Revolution". ~ Parlianent 
for Hcxigson would be suprema. It would also act as a national fonnn. 
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"Parliament 'WOUld act as a counter-balance, an expression of the general 
interest in counter-:position to the particular will of the soviet. It 
would be the main arena for bringing the various aspirations of the 
workers, for the forging of a camon hegaronic :policy. " 87 
The :role of Parliarrent and sovereignty~ the main subjects of the work of 
Tony Berm. He had been successively Industcy Minister and Energy Minister in the 
1974-79 Goverrnnent. That Goverrnnent was a bitter disappointzrent to Benn. He rejected 
the Goverrnnent' s economic :policy of co-operation with capitalism: 
II the m:>re I saw of this process (i.e. state-coaxing of the 
private sector) the m:>re I became convinced (a) that it would not 
work (b) that it was corporatist and (c) that it was anti-trade 
union and undem:x::ratic. " 88 
Berm placed himself in the tradition of English radicalism which called for 
the establishnent of a society based on human b:rotherhcxxi, equality and liberty. He 
rejected Marxism but described himself as: 
" . . . . a Christian whose :political ccmnitzrent owes 11Ulch nore to the 
teaching of Jesus without the mysteries with which they are presented -
than to the writings of Marx, whose analysis seems to lack an 
understanding of the deeper needs of humanity. " 89 
Fran this :position Berm clained that the corporate state and the 
Establishnent had bypassed Parliament and und.ennined its legitimacy. Fu.rthentore, 
the EEC had :robbed the British Parliament of the exclusive right to levy taxation 
and govern independent! y. The nation's sovereignty, previous! y invested in the 
Crown acting through Parliarrent legitimised by the votes of the people, had been 
transferred to the IlUllti-national canpanies and :political organisations. The rredia, 
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controlled by the multi-nationals extended the "cultural hegem::>ny" of corporation and 
ained at discrediting the Labour left. The people were fed false infonnation by the 
madia and refused access to vital facts by an over protective state security force. 
W::>rse still, the Establislmlent had turned Britain into a colony of the USA, the 00' 
and the EEC. The absence of a written constitution allovm the forces of the 
Establishnent to act in an und.emx:ratic way. Britain needed a new constitutional 
settlarent based on a written constitution. Berm thus argued for freedan of 
infonnation, an accountable Civil Service, abolition of the House of I.Drds, a 
constitutional premiership answerable to the House of Camons and an extension of 
local d.emx:racy. 
Benn favoured the mixed economy and rejected total d.emx:racy. He 
endeavoured to restrict the activities of capitalism rather than abolish it. He 
opposed corporate fonns of nationalisation and expected future extensions of public 
CMnership to canplarent transfers of~ to the workers. He claimed: 
''We have waited too long for the transformation of the public 
corporation .••• we should be talking about the transfer of ~ 
within industry and we should not accept existing fonns of 
nationalisation as a fo:rm for the future. We have had enough 
experience now to k:now' that nationalisation plus IDrd Robens does 
not add up to socialism. " 90 
During his pericx:i of office as Industry Secretary in the 1974-79 G:werrlrrent 
Benn attanpted to extend workers control and consuner representation. He favoured 
workers co-operatives and industrial daoocracy. He regarded the Labour Party as the 
heirs of the English radical tradition oorn at the tine of Magna Carta, and 
continued through the centuries by people canmitted to d.emx:racy and free thought. 
There was a .I:C!llailtic elarent in Benn' s work matched only by his careful and 
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selective use of history to justify his argurrents. Yet this rcmance did not 
restrict Benn's activities in practical politics. 
Following Labour's defeat in 1979 the Left assembled their forces in a co-
ordinated campaigning group. This group has been called the Bennite left. It 
consisted of Pevanites, members of the New Left, members of the IWC and followers of 
Benn. This broad alliance, notivated by a synthesis of the ideas of its constituent 
parts, presented a strong challenge to the Revisionists. 
The scene was set for the final act in the drama of the future SOP leaders 
in the Lal::x:>ur Party. The Revisionists ~ a spent force. Their policies and 
principles discredited by ~ failed Governments. They had little supfXJrt in the 
constituencies or in the trade unions. The Bennite Left presented dynamic policies 
and radical principles. They had support in the constituencies and in the trade 
unions. They~ poised to use these sharpened weapons to kill off the 
Revisionists. 
In May 1979 the Revisionist camp contained~ schools of thought about 
their future in the Labour Party. The "Gang of Three", David Oval, Shirley Williams 
and Bill Rodgers believed they could rescue the Lal::x:>ur Party from within. They 
thought that Callaghan \Olld purge the nore extrema left such as Militant Tendency 
fran the Party. They hoped that once this purge had been canpleted the Party ~d 
return to what it had been in the halcyon days of Gaitskell. The performance of 
Callaghan at the O::tober 1979 Conference and his failure to challenge the left in the 
NEC shattered the Revisionist's hopes. In Novanber 1979 Rodgers, speaking in 
Abertille.ry, gave Lal::x:>ur one year to save itself, one year to return to Revisionism. 
The other school of thought, led by Roy Jenkins, favoured the fonna.tion of a 
new centre party. The question the Jenkinsites faced was when would be the 
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best tine to launch such a party? In July 1979 David Marquand, a leading 
Jenkinsite, published an article in "Encounter" entitled "Inquest on a MJvarent". 
It was an eloquent funeral oration on the traditional labour Party as he perceived it. 
In Novanber 1979 Jenkins delivered the Dirobleby lecture "Hare Thoughts fran Abroad" 
suggesting a refonnation of the radical centre to challenge the Ieft. The 
activities of the Jenkinsites effectively undennined the position of the "Gang of 
Three" • The Jenkinsites sought to influence sitting labour MPs to act against the 
Ieft. Many MPs therefore identified the Jenkinsites with the "Gang of Three", and 
this brought into question the loyalty of the "Gang of Three" to the Party. 
The Bennite Ieft now focused their attention not on theo:ry and policy, but 
on~· 'lb gain this~ they were to attempt successfully to change the Party's 
organisation. As after the 1931 election defeat, the trade unions noved to take 
control of the Party. In doing so they entered into a coalition with the Bennite 
Ieft. At the 1980 O:tober Conference, an internal enquiry was instituted to 
consider the method of electing labour's leader, the control of policy and 
manifestos, and the re-selection of sitting MPs. These m:wes, seen as a challenge 
to the PLP, favoured the Bennite Ieft who were -weak in Parliament but active and 
vociferous in the constituencies. 
The question of the "independence" of Labour MPs and Councillors becane a 
key issue in the events which led to the founding of the SOP. 
In August 1980 Owen, Williams and Rcxigers wrote an open letter to the Party 
published in "The Guardian". It stated: 
"MPs are chosen by their constituents to exercise their consciences 
and judgarent. MPs or Councillors who are nothing but mandated Party 
delegates, cannot be representatives of their constituents in the 
true sense. " 91 
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Clause V of the Party's constitution placed policy effectively in the hands 
of the PLP and the "Gang of Three" wished to support this position. However the NEC 
at the tine supported the Bermite left. The Revisionists declared: 
If the NEC :r:emai.ns cannitted to pursuing its present course .... then 
support for a centre party will strengthen .... if the Labour Party abandons its 
dem:x::ratic and internationalist principles the argurrent may grow for a new 
dem:x::ratic socialist party." 92 
At the 1980 o:tober Conference all of the Revisionists' fears becarre 
realities. Conference supported the .AES, reselection of sitting MPs, withdrawal fran 
the EEC, and unilateral nuclear disannarrent. It placed an obligation on the PLP to 
stand by any policies made by Conference which now controlled the Manifesto. 
Inmadiatel y after the Conference Callaghan resigned to be succeeded by veteran left 
winger Michael Foot. 
The election of Foot and the adoption of Bermite policies, were the 
.imrediate causes of the split be~ the Party and the Revisionists. However the 
underlying cause was the debate, or rather pitched battle over Party organisation. 
In January 1981 at a Special Conference to re-structure the Party, an 
electoral college to elect a leader was established giving the unions 40% of the 
votes, the PLP 30% and the constituencies 30%. The Revisionists, now joined by 
Jenkins, who returned fran Europe in late 1980 had favoured a policy of "one party 
member one vote", as they had done in 1956 and 1961. As a direct result the "Gang 
of Four" forned. the Council for Social Derocracy. In February 1981 Williams 
resigned fran the NEC confinning that organisational issues caused her departure. 
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"The party that is now aterging is not the ciatDcratic socialist 
party I joined, but a party intent on controlling those of its 
nanbers who are elected to public office by the people of Britain. " 93 
On the 26th March 1981, after sare weeks of agonising, the "Gmg of Four" 
launched their new Social Der!Dcratic Party. 
The events of 1980-81 had only been the final act of a sequence stretching 
back to 1961. The Social Der!Dcrats had seen their dream of a Revisionist plural 
civilised society destroyed, ironically, by the leadership of their own party in 
1964-70. They had witnessed their opponents develop into an effective political 
organisation, a suspected "party within a party", that was able to erode their 
elitist position and eventually take control of the Party that they had led for~ 
decades. Social Der!Dcratic opinions were ignored, their policies rejected and their 
right to belong to the Party questioned. In such circumstances there was no 
alternative but to leave the Labour Party. 
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CHAPl'ER 2 
Roy Jenkins was oom in Pontypool on 11th November 1920, the son of Arthur 
Jenkins, a trades union official. By the standards of South Wales in the 1920's 
Jenkins enjoyed a secure hone life, in a house that was the focus of local Labour 
Party activities. In 1935 Arthur Jenkins was elected Labour MP for Pontypool and 
his son was brought up very finnly in the Labour tradition of civic responsibility 
and peaceful progress. 
In 1938 Jenkins went up to Balliol College, having left Hoerschan County 
School with academic distinction. At Balliol he read Philosophy, Politics and 
Economics. For the first and second years, however, he devoted much of his time to 
the University labour Club. He applied himself rrore conscientiously to academic 
work in his final year, and was awarded a first class degree. 
It has been said "Life is one Balliol man after another" : the farrous joke is, 
arrongst the Revisionist leaders of the labour Party, only a mild exaggeration. 
Increasingly in labour fran 1945 onwards Oxford men, and often dons, such as 
Gaitskell, Wilson and Crosland led the Party. During his time at Balliol Jenkins 
forged strong friendships with these people, friendships which carried over into 
political life. For the rest of his life Jenkins has carried the impress of 
Balliol, typified by Asquith -aloof superiority and an inability to suffer fools. 
These characteristics left Jenkins open to criticism in a predominantly working-
class party. 
After leaving Balliol in 1941 Jenkins served in Military Intelligence until 
1945. On being denobilised he began to search for a seat in Parliament. Whilst 
searching for a constituency that would adopt him Jenkins took the first steps on a 
69 
career as a biographer. In 1948 he published a biography of Attlee, 1 and since 
then has focused upon the early Twentieth Century, particularly the Liberal 
Government of 1906. In "Asquith" ( 1964) 2 Jenkins expresses his sympathy for a 
radical liberal philosophy and this is further evidenced by "Mr. Balfour's Poodle" 
(1954) 3 and "Sir Charles Dilke" (1958) 4 
A by-election in Central Southwark in 1948 put Jenkins into Parliarrent and 
when that constituency disappeared in :tx:mndary changes he served as MP for 
Birmingham Stechford. During his political career Jenkins has been successively, 
Minister for Aviation ( 1964) , Harne Secreta.Iy ( 1964-67) , Chancellor of the Exchequer 
(1967-70) and Harne Secreta.Iy again (1974-77). In 1977 Jenkins resigned from 
Parliament and became President of the EEC Corrnnission. In 1981 he returned from 
Europe to found with Williams, Owen and Rodgers the SOP, becoming its first leader 
in 1982, having won the Hillhead by-election. 
Jenkins' past record has been sununarised to give an indication of the 
atnosphere in which his principles were fonred. Jenkins was a man used to power, 
able to wield immense decision-making capabilities, and it is with constant 
reference to what could be achieved in "present day" circumstances that he wrote, 
not in an abstract utopian way. 'lb his supporters Jenkins was a very able 
politician, hardworking and imaginative. 'lb his critics he was a lazy 'bon viveur, 
who used the Lal:x:mr Party as a vehicle for his own ambitions and who rejected his 
"Labourist" roots to found a middle class party. However, although his actions may 
be open to criticism, it is not my intention to discuss them. My task is to 
analyse Jenkins' principles, and I will from time to time draw attention to his 
actions only to illustrate a principle. 
Jenkins' first statement of his principles in 'book form was "Fair Shares for 
the Rich" 5 published in 1950 by Tribune. Jenkins had been writing for Tribune for 
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three years, mainly cautious articles on economic and financial matters. "Fair 
Shares for the Rich" advocated taxing the rich on a scale which ~uld effectively 
abolish large private fortunes. This, radical as it may sean now, was linked by 
Jenkins on a practical level to the financial neasures of Lloyd George's 1909 
"People's Budget" . "Fair Shares for the Rich" is an important statement of the 
position of the Revisionist wing of the Labour Party that was energing in the 
1950's. The central question for the Revisionists was ownership, and Jenkins 
addressed ownership and nationalisation in "Fair Shares for the Rich" thus: 
"The coal industry .... railways .... gas .... and electricity were 
all brought under public control because it was thought necessary to 
take a particular industry .... and to run it as a unified whole. 
These nationalisation neasures were essentially planning neasures 
Further nationalisation will be nore concerned with equality than 
with planning, and this means that we can leave the nonolithic 
public corporation behind us, and look for nore intimate fonns of 
ownership and control. It will not matter if on! y sections of 
industries are publicly owned, so that they have to meet ccmpetition 
from the sections remaining in private hands •••• for the widest 
possible diffusion of control and responsibility is the essential 
aim of dem:x::ratic socialism." 6 
Parallels with Crosland's "Future of Socialism" (1956) can be found in "Fair 
Shares for the Rich". First, both writers see nationalisation as a rrethod of 
effective redistribution of ~ and wealth; both reject a planned nationalised 
ecoilCIIT¥, and their idea of "equality" or, nore accurately described, their idea of 
"equity" does not look rrerely to a levelling of J?er capita incane. The 
relationship between Jenkins and Crosland was a very complex one but a very 
important one. The two shared similar educational backgrounds and a similar ethos. 
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They held the sane loyalty to Gaitskell and the campaign for J:)em)cratic Socialism. 
Their personal relationship was often stonny, and not unrelated to mutual jealousy. 
Of the two, Crosland was the intellectual in the speculative sense, being drawn to 
ideas for their own sake, whilst Jenkins was the politician, subtle, able to gauge 
the strength of feeling in the Party or to tell which way the political tide was 
turning. As a result Crosland's ideas in "The Future of Socialism" inspired the 
CDS, but it was Jenkins who organised the supporters and to sc:::HIE extent bullied 
them into action. In their early beliefs both placed the scope and fonn of future 
nationalisation as the central, symbolic issue. They both rejected nationalisation 
of whole industries on the Mbrrisonian m:xiel of huge public corporations and held 
that the public sector should be advanced pieceneal within the frc3IleNOrk of a mixed 
econany. Fmn the pre-war works of Evan Durban, Dalton and D.Juglas Jay, Jenkins 
and Crosland made the critical departure from the traditional socialist assumption 
that what mattered was ownership, an assumption which equated socialism with 
nationalisation. Crosland daronstrated instead that in a m:xiern managerial economy, 
ownership had became irrelevant. Jenkins had already stated in "Fair Shares for 
the Rich" that ownership had been replaced by equality as the reason for any rrore 
nationalisation. Crosland reiterated this belief in equality and meritocracy. 
Jenkins expanded the Croslandite belief in meritocracy by adding a large dose of 
individualism in his later writings. In 1974 Jenkins wrote of Gaitskell's 
philosophy that it contained: "A strong strand of unselfish hedonism .... He wanted 
to make people happier. " 7 
The sane hedonistic note runs through "The Future of Socialism" where Crosland 
would like the Labour Party: 
"to place a greater errphasis on private life, on freedan and dissent, 
on beauty, culture and leisure and even frivolity." 8 
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Jenkins' philosophy too contained this strand of hedonism, and it is in marked 
contrast to the puritanical socialism of Cripps and 'Ibny Benn. Jenkins scxretirrEs 
consciously echoed Crosland in his writings and both used their friendship to 
thrash out the meaning of practical socialism. However, despite their early 
friendship and agreement over the meaning of socialism, equality and ownership they 
divided in the 1970's over Europe and, after the failure of Revisionism, over 
equality. In 1975 Crosland published "Scx::ialism Now" in which he rejected 
Revisionism in favour of a :rrore state based econany. This caused a serious breach 
between Crosland and Jenkins which was never really healed. Jenkins still favoured 
the Revisionist ideals of equality and meritocracy and a society in which 
"socialism" was achieved without state control. 
"Fair Shares for the Rich" was endorsed by Gaitskell as a blueprint for the 
society he wanted to create. Jenkins, as Gaitskell 's industrious apprentice, 
\'lUrked on speeches and importantly wrote with Gaitskell the "Amplification of 
Aims". A small group, which included Jenkins and Crosland, surrounded Gaitskell 
and discussed his ideas and policies. In the struggles in the labour Party during 
the 1950's Jenkins was an unapologetic Gaitskellite, and a finn supp::>rter of 
disciplinary measures against the left. In 1953 he explained his (and the 
Revisionists) feelings to Crossman: 
II we feel that every speech, every action must nrM be considered 
as part of the power fight within the Party. That's why we have 
Bevanism. Before it began one could have free speech, nrM one 
can't afford to. The el~torate is extremely Conservative minded, ,.. 
and we can never win except with the kind of attitude represented 
by the right-wing leadership. " 9 
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During Gaitskell 's leadership of Labour, Jenkins' p::>sition can be in no doubt; 
he was a ccmnitted Revisionist. In his "Pursuit of Progress" 10 , published in 
1953, Jenkins arrplified the sentinents expressed to Crossman. "The Tines Literary 
Supplerrent" 11 CatlllEilted that the book could have been called "The Pursuit of 
Office" because of the errphasis placed on achieving power. The book took an 
historical fonn tracing utopian and realist thought in labour from 1900. The 
author strongly identified with the realist school. The chapters dealing with 
domestic and economic p::>licy repeated what was said in "Fair Shares for the Rich", 
and an in essay entitled "Equality" in "New Fabian Essays", 1952. 12 Jenkins' 
ccmnitment to the mixed economy was unchanged. 
"It is quite imp:>ssible to advocate both the abolition of great 
inequalities of wealth, and the acceptance of a one-quarter public 
sector, and a three quarter private sector arrangerrent. A mixed 
econany there will undoubtedly be, certainly for many decades, and 
perhaps pennanently, but it will need to be mixed in a very 
different prop::>rtion to this. " 13 
On foreign p::>licy Jenkins directly confronted utopian and left wing views. 
For Jenkins one of the 1945 Labour Governlrent 's greatest achievements was Britain's 
clear aligrnrent with NA'IO and the USA. In 1953 the Bevanites believed a 
"socialist" foreign p::>licy would ccmnit Britain to a neutral p::>sition between the 
two super-powers. In Jenkins' opinion: 
"Neutrality is essentially a conservative p::>licy, a p::>licy of defeat, 
of announcing "We have nothing to say to which the world will 
listen." 14 
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Having rejected neutralism, Jenkins argued that Britain should play a role 
carrnensurate with her real ~. Labour should reject neutralism and pacifism and 
accept a finn and positive foreign policy even if this maant a split. Further 
endorsing "realism" Jenkins wrote: 
"The first duty of a party of the left is to be radical in the 
context of the noment, to offer the prospect of continuing advance 
and to preserve the loyalty of those whose optimistic hmnanism 
makes them its natural supporters. " 15 
In his work before 1953, especially "The Pursuit of Progress", Jenkins 
referred to his principles as "humanism" but just as often as "socialism", 
"progressive" or "refonning". For Jenkins the essential ideological divide was 
tell'peranental not doctrinal. The Conservatives were fatalist and pessimistic, the 
liberal socialists were optimistic and sure of the imp:roverrent of society. 
Jenkins 1 principles at this tine can be ad.equatel y described as non-doctrinaire 
socialism. 
From 1953-59 Jenkins strengthened his working relationship with Gaitskell so 
that J.P. W. Ma.llileu observed of Jenkins: 
II he is reputed to be so close a confident of Mr. Hugh Gaitskell 
that only the keenest observer can detect where Jenkins I rrouth 
ends, and Gaitskell 1 S ear begins." 16 
So close was Jenkins to Gaitskell that for the 1959 General Election he was 
asked to write "The Labour case" 17 by Penguin. (l.Drd Hailsham and Roger Fulford 
put the Conservative and Liberal cases.) In "The Labour case" Jenkins reiterated 
the views expressed in his previous writings. He advocated a capital gains tax, 
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and the retention of the public school system (an issue in the early days of the 
SDP) . The emphasis in "The Labour Case" was not on the detail of policy, but on 
the optimistic, unselfish hedonism which characterised Revisionism. In his final 
chapter entitled "Is Britain Civilised?" Jenkins advocated a free, sOOE ~uld say 
pennissive, society. 
"IBt us be on the side of those who want J?E!Ople to be free to live 
their own lives, to make their own mistakes and to decide .... the 
code by which they wish to live." 18 
Jenkins also expressed his idea of "socialism": 
"The principal object of a socialist party should be to enlarge the 
freedom of evecyone to live their own lives fully. This fullness 
cannot be achieved without a gocxi standard of living and a real 
equality of opportunity for everyone." 19 
"It is a socialist party, and it looks fo:rward to a society in which 
class barriers will disappear, in which rewards will be equated with 
service. At the sane tine it is a practical party. It is quite 
as much concerned with inmediate refonns as with ultimate purposes. 
Any radical party must specify this, for without a sense of noving 
towards a goal, the idealism which is essential to the rromentum 
of a left wing party .... It is difficult to see how the course 
of politics will develop. The solution of one set of problems 
invariably uncovers new ones, the nature of which cannot be seen 
in advance. " 20 
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In these revealing passages is the essence of Jenkins' p::>litical philosophy, 
or lack of it. For Jenkins, socialism should attempt to provide higher standards 
of living and a civilised society. These aims are to be achieved with practical 
p::>licies and this meant that no single nethod, no one blueprint ~d produce the 
ideal society. Jenkins avoided anything that could be called doctrinaire. He was, 
in 1959, a p::>litical agnostic believing in salvation by gcxx:i w::>rks not by faith. 
Fran 1960-64 Jenkins' anti-doctrinaire stance was a handicap in a "Socialist" Party 
in tw:m::>il. However to Jenkins the man of goverrunent between 1964-77 it becane a 
p::>sitive strength. It may be argued that to be non-ideological in a socialist 
party was inconsistent, and indeed, it is p::>ssible that "non-doctrinaire" is not 
the best description of his writings. It would perhaps be rrore accurate is to say 
that pragmatism was rrore inp:>rtant to him than doctrine. He would have folla-a:l 
many neans to achieve the aim of social demx:racy. In a time when the p::>licy of 
the labour Party, and the p::>litical envirolliTEnt 'lll1ere constantly changing, to be 
without doctrine could have been an advantage. However being without a socialist 
doctrine in a party professing a w::>rking class socialist history was a 
disadvantage. 
Jenkins never romanticised his w::>rking class background. In fact, he did not 
consider himself a nember of any class. What he was concerned about was that the 
influence, real or imagined, of the w::>rking class ethos might confine Labour's 
p::>licies within the bounds of nationalisation. He also believed that the tie to 
the w::>rking class would lead labour to advocate divisive ideals and to lose the 
growing vote of what sociologists call upwardly rrobile groups who were crossing 
boundaries. In a lecture to the Fabian Society delivered in November 1959 he said: 
"It w::>uld be a tragedy if the Labour Party, which has been a pioneer 
of a classless society were not to adapt itself to the break up of 
SOilE solidarities and class loyalties. " 21 
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Writing in "The Spectator" in the sanE ITDnth, he placed nationalisation very 
near the bottom of his political aims, and unilateralism was attacked as a "phoney 
compromise". 22 
Throughout the conflicts within the Labour Party Jenkins hoped that "the Party 
recovers its good sense, its nerve and its will to win". By 1964 the Labour Party 
had done just as Jenkins wished and \VOn a General Election. However Gaitskell had 
died in 1963 and Wilson was !Eader and Premier. Without Gaitskell the Revisionists 
looked to Jenkins and Crosland for leadership, but Jenkins did not at first achieve 
Cabinet rank; he entered office as Minister for Aviation. He was a great success 
at Aviation, and in December 1965 he was appointed Harne Secretary. 
At the Home Office Jenkins set about writing legislation to create a 
"civilised society". His tenn at the Harne Office coincided with Beatlemania, the 
mini-skirt and "Swinging London", but also with halycon time of national liberty or 
the onset of national decadence depending on one's point of view. From 1965 
Jenkins was constantly in the middle of political controversy. Understandably he 
did not find time to write much, but his speeches make up for this. 
Speaking of his philosophy in running the Harne Office Jenkins said: 
"We exist as a Party not only to make a ITDre comfortable society for 
all of its members, but also to make a ITDre civilised, ITDre free 
and less hidebound society. " 23 
Speaking about the abortion and harrosexuality Bills he added: 
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'"Ib enlarge the area of choice socially, .POlitically and economically, 
not just for a few but for the whole carmmmity is very nn.Ich what 
d.em::.x::ratic socialism is about. " 24 
Jenkins was only Hc:lrre Secretary until Novanber 1967 when he was appointed 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. He had been a successful Hc:lrre Secretary, but he had 
also been "lucky" in that office. When he went to the Treasury, Labour's economic 
.POlicy was in difficulties. In particular it was beset with balance of pay.rrEnts 
problans. Jenkins advocated devaluation, expenditure cuts and pay restraint and was 
too absorbed in his work as a Minister to do any writing. Therefore it was only in 
1972, with "What Matters Now", 25 that Jenkins presents us with any further 
statement of principles. 
"What Matters Now" was written when Labour was in Opposition. Revisionism 
under Wilson's 1964 Governrrent had failed, or had not fulfilled its promise. Again 
Jenkins turned to nationalisation and the economy. He advocated a State Holding 
Company similar to the Italian IRN or ENI. He summed up his view of 
nationalisation thus: 
"I have always believed that public ownership should be judged nore 
by the results it will produce than by abstractions and preconceived 
views." 26 
On this subject Jenkins had not changed his J?OSition from the early 1950's. 
All of the principles and sent.imants expressed in "What Matters Now" are consistent 
with his previous writings, but they look towards the "next Labour Goverrnnent". 
"If the next Labour Governnent is to launch a nore successful attack 
on poverty and privilege than did the last one it will need the right 
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principles . . . . It will need the conscious and active suP{X)rt of 
the British people .... through all the doubts and setbacks which 
even a successful Government inevitably encounters." 27 
The goal set by Jenkins for the next Labour Governrrent was nothing less than 
"the elimination of poverty as a social problem" 28. 'lb do this Jenkins did not 
look to class war, but to gentle Revisionist persuasion. 
"We have to persuade men and women who are themselves reasonably -well 
off that they have a duty to forgo same of the advantages they would 
otheiWise enjoy for the sake of others who are much poorer than they 
Our only hope is to appeal to the latent idealism of all men and 
women of goodwill - irrespective of their income brackets .... of 
their class origins . . . . of their past political affiliations. " 29 
Jenkins ended this chapter with a phrase which ten years later was to became a 
cliche. 
"We have to break the m:mld of custom, selfishness and apathy 
In place of the politics of envy we must put the politics of 
compassion, . . . . justice . . . . the politics of principles. " 30 
These paragraphs give a clear indication of the SOP's first statemants. 
Jenkins realised that Labour could win and became: 
"A broad based, international, radical generous-minded party, aware 
of its past but m::>re concerned with the future, could quickly seize 
the imagination of a disillusioned and uninspired British Public." 
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When analysed, the message is clear. Lalx>ur can advance towards "social 
justice" with Revisionist policies, but with Bevanite policies the Party ~uld 
becane class based, narrow minded and out-dated. Jenkins could not remain 
carmitted to a Bevanite party. 
In "What Matters Now" Jenkins discussed main! y darrestic issues, but at the 
time Britain's EEC nembership was Jenkins' main pre-occu:pation. So fervently did 
he believe in nenbership that when the Labour Conference voted against it Jenkins 
resigned the Deputy leadership of the Party and all NEC and Front Bench 
spokesrnanships. Despite this, in 1974 when Lalx>ur were re-elected, Jenkins became 
Harre Secretacy. 
Again at the Harre Office he repeated his belief in the demx:ratic liberal 
pluralist system and outlined what he believed it to be: 
"It means in a demx:ratic society the law passed by an elected 
Parlianent and applied by irrpartial courts. You cannot have the 
rule of law while dismissing with disparagarent Parlianent, the 
courts and those who practice in them. " 32 
This was said in the face of leftist activities in Clay Cross, industrial 
disputes at Shrewsbury and rumblings in the Police Federation. 
Jenkins delivered a speech at Haverford West in July 1974 to the Pembrokeshire 
Labour Party in which he suggested that the two :party system was weakening. He 
discussed talk of coalition but added: 
"At the sane time one should not doubt that there is in Britain a 
great b:x:ly of m::xierate, rather uncommitted opinion, and that unless 
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substantial sectors of such opinion can feel happy in supporting 
one or other of the major parties the result will be intolerable 
strain upon the traditional pattern of politics. " 33 
Jenkins perceived the nation as being divided between the equally unacceptable 
ideologies of the extrene left and Right. The ordinary voters vvere caught between 
two parties which ignored m::x::lerate opinion. He commented: 
"If vve are to get through the .i.mrense problems of the next few years 
vve need to heal and not to deepen the wounds of the nation. That 
can, I believe, be done upon the basis of party goverrutent, with 
the coherence of policy and the offering to the nation of effective 
choice which makes that possible. But it cannot be done upon the 
basis of ignoring middle opinion and telling eve:cyone who does not 
agree with you to go to hell." 34 
He identified four fundamental questions on which Labour's position should be 
perfectly clear. The four questions vvere obedience to the law, the Western 
Alliance, the mixed economy and inflation. On obedience to the law, and with 
particular reference to Clay Cross and industrial action Jenkins wrote: 
"No-one is entitled to be al:xJve the law. If vve weaken on that principle, 
vve can say goodbye to dem:x::ratic socialism, because what is sauce 
for the goose will be sauce for the gander. " 35 
He argued that Britain needed to ally itself with the Western Alliance. 
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"If anyone wants a Britain poised uneasily between the Western Alliance 
and the Canmunist block they can, in the inirortal words of 
Mr. Sam Goldwyn, "include ne out" . " 36 
The policy of the left to restrict free trade and lead Britain in a retreat 
into a sl.ege economy was criticised by Jenkins. He was in favour of the mixed 
economy: 
"I am in favour of a sensible and well argued extension of public 
ownership . . . . But I am also in favour of a heal thy, vigorous and 
p:rofitable private sector. " 37 
Before the consequences of this speech could be fully appreciated, the 
European Referendum Campaign intruded. Jenkins led the Pro-Europeans and the 
campaign allowed the future members of the SDP to think outside the bounds of party 
rhetoric. It also had the effect of opening the rift between Labour's factions. 
When Tony Benn clai.m=d that membership would cost 500,000 jobs, Jenkins retorted, 
"I find it difficult to take Mr. Benn seriously as an economics Minister". (Benn 
was Secretary of Industry. ) A "yes" vote raised a hope that Labour might change 
its official policy. But the hopes were dashed when Labour refused to change and 
worse still, Reg Prentice was attacked by I.eft-wingers in Newham, who a.ilred at 
ousting him. Jenkins defended Prentice, and in doing so gave a speech that would 
not have been out of place in 1981: 
"If tolerance is shattered fonnidable consequences follow. Labour 
MPs will either have to became creatures of cowardice, concealing 
their views, . . . . or they will have to be nen far to the left of 
those whose votes they seek. Either would make a m:x:kery of 
Parliamentary dem:x::racy. The first would reduce . . . . respect for 
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the House of Carmons. It would became an assembly of craven spirits 
and crooked tongues. The second would quite simply divorce the 
Labour Party from the people. " 38 
The trouble at Newham, the failure of the Underhill investigation to expel 
"entryists" combined with Jenkins' failure to be elected leader after Wilson's 1976 
resignation, disheartened the Revisionists, and disillusioned Jenkins. So low was 
Jenkins' standing in the party that an elderly Yorkshire MP when asked if he would 
be voting for Roy Jenkins replied, "No lad, we're all Labour here" . 39 
With these defeats fresh in his mind, Jenkins resigned from Parliam:mt to be 
appointed President of the EEC Ccmnission in 1977. Hov.erer, he left with a half-
promise that he might be back: 
"I never believe in looking too far into the future but I can tell 
you one thing for certain, I am not going to preclude sitting in the 
Cc:mrons by sitting in the lords. " 40 
For twenty-eight years Jenkins had been involved in the internal p:>litics of 
the Labour Party as a standard bearer of Revisionism. He left derided by many as 
a "closet 'lbry", a middle class Ramsay MacDonald, a betrayer of the working class. 
As was said at the beginning of this chapter, Jenkins felt no close affiliation to 
any class, but wished only to widen the appeal of the Labour Party, and to give it 
a Revisionist manifesto. However this attitude was out of place in a Labour Party 
strongly tied to Miners' Galas, collective d.em:x:racy and an idea of "socialism" as 
a constant set of principles embodied in Clause IV. Jenkins resigned from the 
Labour Party with many regrets; it accepted his resignation with few. 
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As President of the EEC Jenkins did not lose touch with British politics. He 
watched the experiment of the Lib-Lab Pact with admiration and on his return fran 
Brussels early in 1979 he knew that his m::mant of opportunity \\Uuld COllE if Lal::x:mr 
lost the General Election scheduled for May. When Labour went into opposition, and 
internal warfare erupted, Jenkins gave a clear indication that he \\Uuld be prepared 
to fonn a new political party in the "Dimbleby I.ecture" of November 1979. This 
lecture is the clearest statement of Jenkins' principles during the break with the 
Labour Party. The lecture caused a stonn at the time and acted as a prcmpt to the 
Revisionists still in the Labour Party. What Jenkins made was "an unasham:rl plea 
for the strengthening of the political centre" 41 claiming that the rot was setting 
into the British political system as the two main parties grew in strength. As the 
two parties becarre rrore ext.rene the electorate was alienated: 
"In 1951 83% of the electorate voted and no less than 97% of those 
voted for one or other of the big parties. In the second 1974 
election only 73% of the electorate voted and only 75% of them 
voted Labour or Conservative. 'lb put it another way, the Lal::x:mr 
Party in 1951 polled 40% of the electorate and it just lost. In 
O::tober 1974 it polled 28% of the electorate and it just \\Un. Even 
in 1979 with SClllE :recove:ry with the total vote and a substantial 
victo:ry the Conservative polled only 33% of the electorate." 42 
The missing voters were, argued Jenkins, disillusioned by the false hopes and 
promises of the two parties and by the unfairness of the electoral system. What 
the electorate wanted was good Governrrent not political partisanship and ideology. 
As Jenkins put it: 
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"Exaggerated J?Olitical partisanship, the pretence that everything is 
the fault of the other side, was no longer convincing to the majority 
of the electorate whose aspirations pull far nore towards the centre 
than towards the extrerres. " 43 
This being so, the case for PR was, Jenkins believed, "oveiWhelming". 
"The old Labour Party of Attlee and Gaitskell was a coalition of the 
Liberal, Social Der!ocrats and . . . . trade unionists. Helmut Schmidt 
and Willy Brandt have governed the FDR with a coalition of Social 
Der!ocrats and Liberals for the past decade. " 44 
"The test is whether those within the coalition are closer to each 
other and to the nood of the nation they seek to govern, than they 
are to those outside their ranks. " 45 
For Jenkins, PR brought all J?Olitical coalitions into the open. 
"I 'WOuld much rather it maant overt and canpatible coalitions than 
that it locked incanpatible people . . . . and philosophies into a 
loveless .... bickering .... and debilitating marriage even if 
consecrated in a camrron tabernacle. " 46 
Jenkins continued: 
"The great disadvantage of our present electoral system is that it 
freezes the pattern of politics and holds together the incanpatible, 
because everyone asstnl'les that if a party fails it will be electorall y 
slaughtered. I believe the electorate can tell a "hawk from a 
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handsaw" and that if a new grouping with cohesion and relevant 
policies, it might be rrore attracted by this new reality than by 
old labels which had becarre increasingly irrelevant. " 47 
This was interpreted as a call to the Revisionists who: 
"should not .... slog through an unending war of attrition .... but 
to break out and rrount a battle of novement on new and higher gound. " 48 
By changing the political system and ending the see-saw of irrelevant dogma 
dictating policy a coalition, or new centre: 
"gives a return for enterprise and to spread the benefit throughout 
society in a way that avoids the disfigurerrents of poverty, gives 
full priority to public education and health services and encourages 
co-operation and not conflict in industry and througout society. " 
Without mentioning a new party Jenkins concluded: 
"I believe that such a develo:pnent could bring into political 
carrm.i:t.Inent the energies of many people . . . . who • • • • are at 
present alienated from the business of Govermnent by the sterility 
and fonnalism of the political ga~ne. I am sure this 'iNOuld improve 
our p:::>litics. I think the results might help us to improve our 
national perfonnance. But of that I cannot be certain. I am 
against too llUlch dogmatism here. We have had rrore than enough of 
it. but at least we could escape from the pessimism of Yeats' 
"Second Coming" where: 
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The best lack conviction, while the worst are full of passionate 
intensity .... and "Things fall apart, the centre cannot hold." 50 
Jenkins' lecture caused a storm of critical reaction. To many, Jenkins' 
thesis was banal and hackneyed. Talk of coalitions and PR had been circulating for 
many years. The lecture was condemned by the left and the Right. However, Neil 
Kinnock in a surprising response, conceded that Jenkins' view had: " .... The appeal 
of reason and the authority of c::ienonstrated carrmitment." 51 Paul Foot clai.rrEd: 
"A call to battle from Jenkins might have been useful, even well 
received. Instead he drops a hint that if the system is changed 
and always assuming he hasn't been offered a better job in the 
meantine - then he might consider accepting the leadership. " 52 
Jo Gri.nnvnd took a similar view: 
"If Mr. Jenkins agrees to let him cone down into the battle. let 
him shave with the rest of us. All too many social c::ienocrats have 
gone off into banking, consultancy, TV etc. It is Mr. Steel who 
has been in the serum. Will they join him? The opportunity is 
indeed great but tine is short. " 53 
Encouraged by the response to his Dimbleby lecture, Jenkins delivered a 
follow-up to the Parliamentary Press Gallery at the sane tine the Labour Conference 
endorsed the "Peace, Jobs, Freedom" policies which were anti-EEC, unilateralist, 
and against an incorres policy. 
At the launch of the SDP Jenkins p:roclai.rrEd, "We offer not only a new party, 
but a new approach to politics" . We might ask at this point what was new about 
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Jenkins' principles? Had he, as his critics suggested, becarre a Conservative, and 
"WOuld he make the SDP the sane? Is there any similarity between the Jenkins of 
1961 and that of 1981? In the following paragraphs I aim to answer these questions 
by looking at Jenkins' statements on specific issues beginning with his idea of the 
nature of the SDP. As he remarked: 
"We are a radical party, and must remain one. But our radicalism 
does not spring from the need to seek a particular segrrent of votes. 
We are radical because the countcy is in desperate need of change. " 54 
Again Jenkins used "radical", not "socialist" as the key "WOrd. In this 
respect he had not changed. Jenkins applied his mind frequently during the first 
years of the SDP to the economy. 
"Much of the dispute between Keynesianism and Monetarism is rather 
sterile. What sure! y matters is the total spending of rroney - the 
GOP. What is foolish is to tcy to rrove it one way with the right 
hand of fiscal policy and one way with the left hand of rronetary 
policy. the two ought to pull together. " 
"In what direction should we turn? .... We cannot simply afford to 
go on with sudden lurches of policy .... We should rrount a major 
programme of public infrastructure investmant direct! y related to 
the flaw into the Exchequer of oil revenue. " 55 
Again Jenkins advocated a middle path, but he also argued for neasures to 
stimulate the economy by public spending, which placed him finnly outside the 
rronetarist camp. 
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Speaking of the central aims of his economic belief, Jenkins said: 
"We need a three phase operation. First a reversal of the trend of, 
and a significant reduction in unemployment. Second the rekindling 
of growth on a steady and substantial basis. Third a restructuring 
of the econany through measures to strengthen our industrial and 
exporting base against the day . . . . when the flow of North Sea Oil 
begins to ebb. " 56 
These three points would, argued Jenkins, reduce unemployment by one million 
over two years costing £3 billion. However, Jenkins had not so far m:mtioned the 
key economist in the Revisionist policies of the 1950's - Keynes. Did Jenkins 
still believe himself to be a Keynesian? Or was he proposing policies without 
reference to a particular economist? Jenkins rejected this suggestion in the 1983 
I..ecture for Keynes ' Centena:r:y. 
"What is needed now •••• is an injection into Ibwning Street, the 
White House and other chancellories of the world some of the 
rational panache which Keynes showed . . . . We may not see his like 
again but let us at least hope that the world econany is not ruined 
by his denigrators. " 57 
Clearly Jenkins had remained "faithful" to Revisionist economics. This 
faithfulness carried over into other issues of the day such as defence. In a 
lecture at Chatham House on February 3 1983, as Labour intensified their carrrni1::lrent 
to unilateralism, Jenkins made his position clear. 
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"First I believe that nuclear weapons do deter, and that there is at 
least a strong possibility that without them we would not have had 
peace on the central front . . . . for the past thirty eight years 
it is clear to me that western unilateralism would make matters 
worse not better. " 58 
Speaking to the Council for Social Dem:x::racy on 15 January 1984: 
II the only route to safety is Im.lltilateralism. The other 
(unilateralism) is not merely unwise or hazardous. It is meaningless. 
It does not deal with the problem. The worst dangers arise from a 
break up of NA'IO, which might well encourage Russian foolishness. " 59 
The same principles expressed in 1961 are restated in 1984: a belief in 
Imlltilateralism, nuclear deterrence and NA'IO. Jenkins concluded this speech with a 
call to internationalism: 
"We are as opposed to the weak isolationism of the left as we are 
to the jingo isolationism of the Right. We believe that we can 
only safeguard Britain, by safeguarding the world." 60 
Defence aside, the other issue which in 1984 was dividing the Labour Party was 
Britain's :rrernbership of the EEC. Jenkins was a committed European, as we have 
seen, and his position had not changed. 
" .... in 11¥ view the case for Britain coming out of the EEC remains 
preposterous both from a trade and inward investment point of view, 
and from the fact that deliberately to introduce a major element of 
instability at the present dangerous time in the world .... would 
be an act of frivolity." 61 
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However, Jenkins was not totally uncritical of the EEC. He advocated a nove 
away from economic policies to place emphasis on the political future of the 
community and Western Europe. These views -were again expressed in the "New 
Dem:x::rat" magazine of January 1985. 
"If -we are to be confident of our future up until and beyond the 
year 2000 -we must get our head out of the groceries and regain the 
vision, nerve and perspective of those who rrore than thirty years 
ago -were responsible for the European Community's creation." 62 
Jenkins' principles on Europe had, as is obvious, remained constant. ~r 
in the area of constitutional refonn his position had changed from the pre-1979 
era. 
In September 1983 Jenkins addressed the Council for Social De!m:X::racy at 
Salford on the subject of "Fair Votes" : 
"The case against the present electoral system is ~ful and 
obvious. It produces a House of Camrrons which is unrepresentative of 
opinion in the country. We can and must rrount a major constitutional 
debate, comparable to the great refonning campaigns of the nineteenth 
centwy. It is for a great cause .... It is for fairness and the 
better Govermnent of this country. " 63 
Jenkins had benefited from the traditional voting system as an MP and 
Minister, so why now in the 1980's had he became a convert to PR? His supporters 
cla.inEd that he had been in favour of PR whilst still a Labour Minister in 1975 and 
before. They cited as evidence of this the proposal he put before cabinet for a 
Speakers Conference to consider PR. This did not meet with the Cabinet's approval 
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" the hard core of the Jenkinsite coalitionists .... beavering 
away .... until they have finally destroyed the Labour Party's 
power to govern singlehandedl y. " 64 
Having rejected the idea of a Speaker's Conference and PR, according to castle 
the Cabinet sent "Roy away with a flea in his coalition ear". 65 
In 1976 the "National Ccmnittee for Electoral Refonn" was set up, and its 
founder ITEmbers included John Mackintosh and David Marquand, tw::> of Jenkins' nost 
trusted advisors. Jenkins himself did not join but gave tacit support. In 1983, 
drawing upon his experience of Europe, and maybe also reflecting upon the task that 
faced the SDP of joining together widespread, unconcentrated votes he reaffi.rnEd 
the position on PR which he had expressed in the "Dimbleby I.ecture". 
"Do we really believe that we have been nore effectively and 
coherently governed over the past tw::> decades than have the 
Gennans? .•.• 
Do we really believe that the last Labour QJvernment was not a 
coalition, in fact if not in narre, and a pretty incompatible 
one at that? I served in it for half its life, and you could not 
convince me of anything else." 66 
The value of PR was that all coalitions were open, not Parliamentary Party 
factions competing against one another. The electorate "WOuld at least know that 
it was either voting for a coalition or not voting for one. It can be argued, that 
Jenkins supported PR well before the SDP was even thought of, and there is evidence 
to support the view that in his principles on voting he had been consistent. 
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The companion to PR was decentralisation and the two policies are 
c~lementary. Jenkins admittedly did support decentralisation before the fonnation 
of the SDP, especially when the Devolution Bill was before the Camons and earlier: 
"On what principles should a decentralised systan of government be 
based? I described the broad objectives of what is now our policy in 
March 1976 in a speech in Inverclyde." 67 
Jenkins argued for decentralisation not only of Scotland and Wales but of the 
English regions. Britain would become similar to the FDR in its political and 
constitutional structure, the exception being that the House of lDrds would remain 
to scrutinise UK legislation ensuring it did not encroach on the region's ~· 
This speech became the basis of the SDP's policies on decentralisation. 
The principles Jenkins held in 1981 and those he held in 1961 were very 
similar. In essence he did not change his views to any marked degree. He is best 
grouped as a liberal, a thorough Revisionist. He had taken on board the politics 
of Gaitskell and Crosland. 
However, if as I have suggested Jenkins has been consistent in his view, could 
he claim to offer the electorate a new politics to "break the nould"? Sare critics 
such as Ken Coates in "The Social Demx:rat" 68 have seen Jenkins as crying 
"Forward to yesterday". Many others have levelled the charge of opportunism at 
Jenkins, and even nore have claimed that he had been responsible for founding a 
junior 'Ibry Party. Jenkins replied to these critics on 11th July 1984 at the first 
"Tawney Society lecture" : 
"I echo Keynes' 1925 cri-de-coeur I do not wish to live under a 
Conservative Government for the next twenty years. 
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There have been same ludicrous suggestions in the past few rronths 
that the SDP is on the way to becoming a sort of junior 'lb:ry Party. 
"Not while I'm alive it ain't" as Ernest Bevin said." 69 
This does, I believe, give a clear indication of Jenkins' opposition to the 
conservatism and emphasises the link, of which Jenkins is proud, between his 
principles as a member of the SDP and his principles as a leading Revisionist 
member of Gaitskell's La1:x:mr Party. Jenkins could argue, with same validity that 
the SDP was the heir to Gaitskell 's Revisionist tradition. 
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CHAPI'ER 3 
David Owen, the leader of the Social Demx:ratic Party, has been an MP for 
Plynouth since 1966. He was rom in Plynouth in 1938, the son of a successful 
General Practitioner who had no particular political interest, but expressed 
liberal syrtq?athies. Owen, unlike Roy Jenkins, had no family history of political 
activity and no association with the Lalx>ur Party. He was educated at Bradfield 
College, Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge and St. Thomas' Hospital, I.Dndon, where 
he qualified as a Doctor of Medicine in 1962. He was appointed Psychiatric 
Registrar at St. Thomas' in 1964, and until his election to Parliarrent in 1966 
enjoyed a very successful medical career. 
When he entered Parliarrent Owen, unlike Jenkins, Shirley Williams and Bill 
Rodgers, had not been involved in the Revisionist campaigns to change Clause IV or 
in the nuclear -weapons debates of 1961. He had never worked for Gaitskell, or been 
associated with Crosslandite groups such as the Campaign for Demxratic Socialism, 
and this has influenced his writings. He rarely rrentions the events of Gaitskell's 
leadership to give legitimacy to his manbership of Lalx>ur as Jenkins does. Nor 
does he use Cros· land's ideas to make a point or support an arc]\Dlellt. He does not 
"romanticise" the La1::xJur right or their battles with the left as Williams 
occasionally does. Instead, he presents a set of principles derived from many 
sources outside the La1::xJur right, samatirres even from outside the conventional 
scope of British politics. He makes many references to rredicine and was 
influenced by the rise of Thatcherism in such a way that his critics have often 
accused him of taking the SDP too near to rronetarist economic and New Right social 
policies. 
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As a J?Olitician in the Labour Party ONen gained a :reputation as a "loner". He 
was never active in any particular pressure group, but he was a fierce opponent of 
the Left. From his first years as an MP Owen expressed a particular interest in 
Defence and Health J?Olicies, and in these areas he has frequently disagreed with 
the Left. 
Owen's ministerial career began in 1968 as Under-Secretary for the Navy. In 
1974 he was appointed Minister of State in the Department of Health. In 1976 he 
was noved to the Foreign Office and after Crosland's death in 1977 becarre Foreign 
Secretary. After Labour's defeat in 1979 Owen becarre Shadow Energy Spokesman but 
:resigned this J?OSition in 1980. In 1981 he co-founded the SDP, being elected its 
Leader in 1983. 
'lb his admirers o.ven is a tough and imaginative radical. Seen from an 
alternative J?Oint of view he was prarroted to high office too early, and was an 
unsuccessful Foreign Secretary. 'lb save his failing J?Olitical career he helped 
create the SDP and abandoned the Labour Party. Admittedly Owen is very ambitious, 
and of the "Gang of Four" he is the rrost forceful. His writing style :reflects 
this. It is clear and precise, and his books published after the fonnation of the 
SDP have given him a reputation as a radical political thinker. 
His first piece of J?Olitical writing was a pamphlet called "Change Gear" 
( 1967) 1 published in association with John Mackintosh and David Marquand. It was 
a critique of the Labour Govermnent's economic policy. It argued that the 
government had no strategic approach to the country's economic problems. The 
pamphlet was a :reaction to deflationary methods adopted by the gover:rment following 
the economic crisis of July 1966 and the devaluation of the J?Ound in 1967. 'lb the 
:reader the pamphlet gives little indication of CMen's principles. It is concerned 
with a political event of 1967 and was not intended to be a carefully thought out 
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explanation of ~n's political beliefs. However the fact the ~n had written the 
pamphlet with John Mackintosh and David Marquand and that it had been published by 
Socialist Commentary indicates his position in the Labour Party at that time. 
Owen's second political publication "The Politics of Defence" (1972) 2 is concerned 
with decision making and accountability in governrrent, particularly in the Ministry 
of Defence. 
The Politics of Defence placed ~n fillnly on the "right" of the Labour Party. 
In it he dealt with defence policy-making, nuclear ~pons, and the accountability 
of the "military establishment". However, as is found in many of his writings, 
~n approached these subjects from no particular ideological position. He did not 
claim that disarmament would open up Europe to a "Soviet threat", nor did he claim 
unilateral or European disarmament would end the "Soviet threat". In effect ~n · 
rejected policy made from an "ideological" starting point. 
"Right-wing politicians too frequently exaggerate the military threat; 
while for left-wing politicians it is easy to focus attention not on 
the actualities of the anns race but on the so-called rreasures of 
disarrnanEnt . . . . Politicians have been guilty of distracting attention 
from unpleasant facts and of making extravagant claims for what have 
been .... only partial neasures of anns control. " 3 
The ideological approach is, he suggests, not only to be found anongst 
politicians in defence policy-making. The "military establishment" has its own 
ideology, its own ethos, which it uses to great effect: 
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"The insidious process of military indoctrination, a heady mixture 
of JX1ffiP and secrecy to which nost politicians involved in defence 
are suceptible tend to blunt one's no.:rmal sensitivity. One can 
easily become part of the very military machine that one is supposed 
to control. " 4 
From this, -we can suppose that Owen takes the Liberal view of ideology. That 
is to say, ideology blurs reality, it stops the individual from acting in a rational 
way. Ideology is, for <:Men, the root of prejudice. This manifests itself in 
defence policy decision-making by excessive use of secrecy, which Owen believes is 
an example of the military establisl:lrrent protecting its sacred documents, rituals 
and nore iroportantl y failures. This raises the issue which was, and still is, at 
the centre of present SOP policies on "open goverrnrent". It also played a major 
part in the labour Party's divisions after the 1979 election. Owen gave d.arocratic 
control of defence a very high priority. 
"A nation's control of its own defence forces is seen throughout 
the world as a hallmark of a true derrocracy. Yet .... it is 
striking how little effective parliamentary machinery exists for 
controlling or scrutinising the defence forces of nost derrocratic 
countries. " 5 
"The extent of the commitment, whether the existing treaty or pledge, 
or the actual troop levels involved is far too often disguised fran 
the general public under the overall cloak of national security. " 6 
To counter the secrecy of decision-making and, Owen believed, to improve the 
quality of the decision reached, issues should be open to discussion: 
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"Inforrred discussion would also do sOIIEthing to ensure that politicians 
understand the implications of their decisions. " 7 
In the administrative process a political structure controlling budgets and 
military policy would be needed to ensure that long-tenn strategy was made 
dem::x:::ratically. 
In advocating inforrred discussion and parliarrentary control ~ seared to be 
seeking a consensus on defence decision-making. In the age of "Butskellism" SOliE 
critics called the Revisionists "consensus politicians". That sarre phrase appeared 
frequently at the SOP's launch and during its early history. ~ in 1972 was 
advocating consensus decision-making. 
In the final section of his book <:Men turns his thoughts to issues that ~ 
important in 1961 and have maintained their importance - nuclear weapons and 
Britain's membership of NA'IO. 
<:Men approached Britain's nuclear policies thus: 
"Nuclear war is conceivable .... The plain facts are that it would 
not make sense to rely on all out conventional defence. " 8 
On the basis of this belief, simply expressed, Owen placed Britain's nuclear 
capacity in a NA'lO framework. 
"NA'IO's strategy of deterrence has always been finnly based on the 
credible threat of nuclear escalation and no one in NA'lO envisages 
a long drawn out war in Europe like the Second World War. " 9 
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Owen justified the existence of NA'IO' s nuclear weapons in economic terms. He 
believed that the USA, and particularly the isolationist eleroonts within that 
country, expected Europe to share :rrore of the costs of NA'IO. However, the European 
nations, who ~re no longer super-powers, had not the economic capability to 
raise, equip and train large annies. Therefore faced with the possibility of US 
withdrawal of her conventional annies from NA'IO and bearing in mind that the size 
of the conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact outnumbered European troops 3 to 1 
Europe had no alternative· except nuclear weapons. 
In "The Politics of Defence" then, Owen indicates he is a "dem:x:rat" (in the 
sense that he favours open governmant), a multi-lateralist and supporter of NA'IO. 
A very noticeable feature of the book is that it gives a "labourist" point of view 
without direct reference to the LabJur Party. Ch.el does not mention the nuclear 
debates of 1961, or the Revisionist support of NA'IO, nor is he concerned with a 
"socialist" defence or foreign policy. Owen is not advocating the beliefs of a 
group, of a party or of a particular philosophy but he is putting fm:ward his own 
individual beliefs about defence. 
Shortly after the publication of "The Politics of Defence" Owen forfeited the 
luxury of being a "loner" in the LabJur Party and for the first time in his career, 
associated himself with the Social Dem:x:rats. The LabJur Manifesto of 1970 had 
been in favour of Britain joining the EEC. 
However after the election LabJur's policy changed to being opposed to British 
membership. In O::tober 1971 sixty-nine LabJur MPs led by Jenkins and including 
Owen voted against the Party and with the Conservative Governrrent. In April 1972 
Owen resigned his spokesmanship on defence over Britain's entry into the EEC. From 
this point onward Owen was associated :rrore or less with the Social Dem:x:rats. 
However he was not admitted to the inner sanctum of the Social Dem:x:rats' decision-
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making group. During this time o.ven worked consistently for the pro-Marketeers and 
he did form a close working relationship with David Marquand, an associate of 
Jenkins and Bill Rodgers. 
Owen's resignation over Europe and his joining the Social J:)em)Crats did not 
seriously damage his status in the party and in 1974 after Labour's General 
Election victory he was appointed Minister of State at the JJepart:Irent of Health. 
During his time as the Minister of Health ONen published in 1976 "In Sickness and 
in Health" 10 , a collection of articles and speeches concerning the National Health 
SeiVice. Unlike in "The Politics of Defence", Owen here dealt with an organisation 
considered to be the greatest m:>mnnent to the Labour Party. He examined issues 
that are fundamental to socialist thinking, and to the Labour Party's philosophy 
and history. Indirectly o.ven looked at inequality in British society, and at the 
role of the state in its capacity as the guardian of the ill and vulnerable. ONen 
acknowledged that the NHS was not established only to provide a comprehensive 
seiVice, but: 
" embraces within its structure and practice a broad philosophy 
of contemporary society in Britain. Bevan wrote of the foundation 
of the NHS that "society becomes m:>re wholesome, m:>re serene and 
spiritually healthier if it knows that its citizens have at the back 
of their consciousness the knowledge that not only themselves but 
also their fellows have access when ill, to the best that medical 
skill can provide. " 11 
Owen fully endorsed the sentiments expressed by Bevan's work "In Place of 
Fear" ( 1952) 12 which gave the NHS a set of principles to work by. However Owen 
was not a Bevanite, and in 1976 he anEnded Bevan by placing greater emphasis on the 
role of the individual in the NHS and Social SeiVices. 
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"The individual's responsibility and society's responsibility cover 
sickness and health. We need to foster the attitudes of care and 
concern on which any health care system is based. we have grown 
resistant to discussing the values of society. We can talk too 
much al:x::>ut nnney values al:x::>ut the values of the market place and 
not enough al:x::>ut altruism, al:x::>ut being a gocxi neighbour, al:x::>ut 
family life, and al:x::>ut the virtues of the strong and healthy 
shouldering the burdens of the -weak and sick." 13 
Obviously Owen placed himself on the left of British politics but he placed 
great emphasis on the individual's responsiblities and "altruism". In this, he 
differed from the mainstream of Labour Party opinion. The 1974 Manifesto, for 
instance, put responsibility for the sick on the state not nentioning "altruism". 
Owen also steered a course between the Labour Party, and the market forces approach 
of the newly elected leader of the Conservatives in 1976, Mrs. Thatcher. Although 
altruism was not a new concept in the philosophy of the British Labour m:JVeiiEnt, 
(Men combined it with the responsibility of the individual in such a way that it 
becomes a value that he believed was stifled by the state. <:Men's views on the 
role of the state, and the rights and responsibilities in health care are well 
illustrated in the controversial area of private health care. He began by saying 
why he disapproved of private nedicine but also why its al:x::>lition by legislation is 
also unacceptable. 
"The philosophy of a demJCratic society is one which allows for 
minority views, tastes and practices. It is a philosophy which 
believes in balancing the freedom of the individual against the 
freedom of the many . . . . There is, in effect, a predisposition 
to find in favour of individual freedom . . . . It has been a clear 
and openly stated policy of the 1974 Labour Government that private 
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madicine does not deserve the support of the state. This is not 
the same as believing it is desirable to express such a policy in 
the fonn of legislation designed to ban private madicine. " 14 
Owen therefore sided with the individual against the state. He did not 
advocate the return of the NHS to the private sector. ~, he recognised that 
whilst a private health service existed it would be a source of conflict within the 
madical profession. 
"Those doctors who wish to preserve the status quo for private practice 
nrust recognise that its preservation is merely a fonnula for continued 
conflict: it will ensure that the isse of private practice remains a 
running festering score within the health service." 15 
Owen wished to allow the private health service to continue because he felt 
that its abolition infringed individual liberty. He contended that individuals 
also had duties towards the NHS. Those who had the nost resources at their 
disposal had the greatest responsibility to support the NHS. The private nedical 
service and those who used it had a m:::>ral responsibility to contribute towards the 
NHS. They could not be forced to make extra J?ClyrrEilts as this would be an 
infringerrent of their liberty. However, individuals should contribute towards the 
runnings costs of the NHS inspired by altruistic values. 
"We all need to concern ourselves m:::>re with the place of altruism in 
society. This is not a subject we can leave to the theologian. The 
al truisic impulse is the nost valuable asset that any nation possesses. " 
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16 
He felt that the centralised state could not organise the NHS in a manner 
which was sensitive to local needs. The _policy-makers were seen to be remJVed fran 
those hospitals that their decisions affected. Throughout "The Politics of Health" 
ONen suggested although never fully developed the concept of a devolved NHS. 
"Central or local governrrent should not becCllle the sole source of 
finance; not even the dominant source . . . . There are dangers of 
developing a m::xiern society whose values are solely conditioned by 
the market place where "Wh<tt is the price?" and "What is sClllething 
worth?" predominate. We should not be afraid . . . . to champion the 
true values of a society: love, altruism and concern for our neighbours. 
These alone will provide the essential cohesion and serenity we all 
seek." 17 
In praroc>ting altruism ONen challenged the role of the state in the health 
services as envisaged by the Revisionists. The state, it seems, was there to 
provide a safety net, and it had no res_ponsibility to eradicate poverty and 
holistic causes of ill health. No nention was made of the effects of Beveridge's 
Five Great Evils on health. In short ONen can be accused of looking only at a very 
narrow area of health _politics and trying to apply the universal cure-all of 
altruism. He does not make provision for a situation where notxxiy wishes to give, 
for the inequalities which may arise between rich and poor areas, between hospitals 
and between provisions for "nedia-worthy diseases" and cOITIIIOn but unnoticed 
illnesses. ONen in an effort to combine individual freedom and compassion in a 
philosophy for Social Services had sacrificed socialism for a muddled naive belief 
in altruism which does not take into account the failure of people to be 
altruistic. 
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Owen's next major work, published in 1978, was "Hlmlan Rights" 18 a bc:x::>k of 
speeches and articles written when he was Foreign Secretary. It traced the history 
of human rights and the violation of human rights in Britain and abroad. The bc:x::>k 
also outlined those values by which Owen believed a society should live and by 
which it should regulate its nenbers, and is therefore a very valuable guide to 
Owen's principles. In the first chapter he defended pragmatic ways of making value 
judgements. He implied that moral absolutes are restrictive to those engaged in 
the practice of politics. 
"I do not believe that the public man .... can ignore morality and 
ethics . . . . Once you say that however you becorre a vict.i.ne for those 
people to wham consistency is itself an absolute value, to whom any 
deviation from principle is seen as weakness. " 19 
He contended that no single explanation of human nature or set of principles 
could be universally applied and considered to be absolutely true. 
" human nature and its values, though profound and even sacred 
to the individual are so personal so unique that there are not nor can 
there be, absolute values." 20 
This does reflect a certain strain in Roy Jenkins' thought. ~, Owen did 
not associate his principles with Asquithian liberalism but with derrocratic 
socialism. 
"The British tradition of Dem:x::ratic Socialism, l:x:>th drawing on and 
p:rarroting the value of altruism, is the one with which I identify and 
from which I derive inspiration. British Socialism has never been 
dogmatic or prescriptive. Its strength has lain in its practical, 
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non-doctrinal attack on poverty and inequality, and in the variety 
of p6litical traditions from which it has evolved . . . . There have 
always been contradictions between the various strands which make up 
British Socialism - between participations and paternalism, beb.am 
collectivist and libertarian instincts and between statism and the 
anarchic tradition of decentralised ~r. " 21 
This is surely Owen explaining, with passion, his membership of the Labour 
Party, and saying how that :rranbership is consistent with his views. His opposition 
to statism and his belief in decentralisation, which is an important part of SDP 
policy are explained thus: 
"While there always~ bureaucrats and statists am:::mg British 
socialists, British socialism as such has never been cormnitted to 
these attitudes. Carmn.mity co-operation , participation, w:>rkers 
dem::x::racy, decentralised decision-making, the virtue of the small unit 
these .... have always been valued in British socialism, yet until 
recent! y they seem to have been less influential and the socialist 
philosophy and appeal correspondingly ~ened." 22 
In contrast with his previous 'WOrk, Owen here gave a clear opinion of his 
values and their place in the socialist tradition. In classing himself with a 
decentralising group of socialists aiming to achieve socialism without the state, 
Owen is in conflict with the Corporatist, nationalising Labour Q)vernrrents. But he 
may also have been trying to disassociate his view of the individual from that of 
the New Right. He put his values in the socialist tradition, and he also gave his 
view of the rise of the New Right. 
111 
"The New Right is succeeding .... in discrediting the ideals of socialism 
by pointing to the failure of bureaucratic or statist policies 
Many aspects of the New Right's philosophy which socialists appear 
to favour in this country .... the criticism for example of large 
schools under the slogan "Big neans bad" is not rrerely fashionable 
rightist dogma but fair criticism." 23 
<Men, having roundly criticised "statist socialism" and given sarre credibility 
of the New Right critique of the m:x:l.ern state, gave an explanation of the values he 
believed were central to a socialist state and again he focused upon altruism. 
"The essential value of socialism is altruism. The eradication of 
inequalities and the striving for a nore egalitarian society are 
aims inspired by that value. The dilemna comes with the word 
equality, easy to espouse, yet impossible to fulfil .... 
The concept of equality has been devalued by its inobtainability 
and by its imperfect implementation .... Perhaps "equity" is the 
nost accurate word to describe the actuality rather than the 
objective of equality. That conflict is inevitable, the response 
to it is not. We can either be inspired to reduce inequalities and 
to enlarge individual freedan or .... inequalities remain, liberty 
is restricted and the basis of socialism is eroded. " 24 
We may, then, take it that "equity" rather than "equality", is the second 
canponent of ~n's principles in 1978. The third is d.em:x::racy, and it is 
d.errocracy and d.errocratic procedure that in <Men's view separate "socialists" fran 
the British Labour Party. Demx:racy is not only confined to the ballot box but is 
participation in decision~g as advocated by the Guild Socialists. "Socialism 
is participation, responsibility and d.errocracy." 25 
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'Ib achieve dem:x::ratic participation the electorate must have infonnation, and 
with the rights of dem:x::racies go duties. During the division between the Social 
Denocrats and the Labour Party in 1979-81, ONeil was, by his own admission, obsessed 
with the concept of dem:x::racy in the party and with the campaign for "one nanber, 
one vote" . This was the cause of his resignation from the Party and provided his 
main charge against the left, that they -were u.ndem:x::ratic. His opposition to 
statism finds parallels in Crosland's work and with "Labourist" thinkers such as 
Tawney. However he does not share the trade union based "Labourist" ethos. This 
has led his critics to claim that he is inconsistent and that during and after the 
fonnation of the SDP he fundamentally changed his views. 'Ib examine this 
accusation I will now look at Owen's principles during and after the fonnation of 
the SDP. 
The story of Owen's joining the SDP begins in <X:tober 1979, and it is the 
story of Owen being humiliated publicly and privately. It must be rerrernbered that 
Owen, a man needing~ and influence, wanting to be at the centre of decision-
making, was in 1979 the Opposition Spokesman on Energy. Six IIDnths before he had 
been Foreign Secretary, and thirteen years before he had been a neurologist with a 
promising career before him. During his ti.rre in ParliarrEilt he had made enemies but 
alongside his conceit, arrogance and ambition he was clever and capable. Now in 
O:::tober 1979 Owen had been humiliated at a Labour Party ward rooeting in Homsey by 
"Marxists" bandying catch-phrases. Owen had decided then to fight to save the 
Labour Party. However in Shadow Cabinet rooetings his views were ignored. 
Callaghan, his patron, was (as he saw it) selling out to the "militants". In May 
1980 at Labour's Special Wembley Conference Owen was booed and hissed and drowned 
out when making a pro-nuclear, multi-lateralist speech. The Party was abandoning 
social derro:::::racy, accepting unilateralism, putting the election of officials into 
the hands of a "militant" Electoral college, and disregarding its fo:rner Foreign 
Secretary. In this atm:>sphere Owen decided first to fight for the Party. Then he 
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realised it was a lost cause and he finally decided to leave. However as recently 
as 1981 Owen still called himself a socialist: 
"What is needed is a socialist philosophy, outside the restricted 
confines of the present polarised political debate, which asserts 
the radical dem:x::ratic traditions of decentralised socialism." 26 
At the same time Owen wrote: 
"One thing I can promise you, I will not become a Liberal, or join 
a rootless Centre Party that means abandoning my socialist convictions. " 27 
Shortly before joining the SDP Owen published his major work "Face the Future" 
28 in which he advocated the "social market economy", thus providing arrmunition for 
those who believed that he held 'Ibry views. Surprisingly in the first edition of 
"Face the Future" published in January 1981 the word socialism is used very 
frequently. However, in the paperback edition published in November 1981 a chapter 
first entitled "The Values of Socialism" became "Social Derrocratic Values". In the 
second edition "dem:x::ratic politicians" is used in preference to "demx:ratic 
socialists". This had been cited by some as an example of opportunism. For others 
it confi.nned Owen as a 'Ibry. In a speech at York University leon Brittan in 1983 
claimed Owen was part of the new 'Ibry consensus. The Financial Times said 
admiringly that Owen had became: 
"One of the first prominent British politicians to endorse the social 
market economy. " 29 
The Financial Times also described his philosophy as "Thatcherism with a human 
face". It is easy to brand Owen as a "'Ibry", but what sort of "'Ibry" is he? 
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"His commitment to decentralisation at a time when Thatcher is strengthening 
the centralised state would make him a 'lbry wet. ~, many of his 
other attitudes his hostility to trade unions, his enthusiasm for 
market forces and privatisation, place him well to the right of the 
wets., 30 
By analysing the principles Owen expresses in "Face the Future" I hope to shed 
sarre light on the validity of these accusations and on any changes in Owen's 
ideology. let us start with the brief description he gives of what the SOP is 
al:x:>ut: 
"In essence the Social De!nocrats will draw on the traditional LabJur 
Party ccmnitment to social justice and social conscience . . . . Social 
De!nocrats will draw on the traditional Conservative ccmnitment to the 
nerit of private enterprise and a market economy. They will not 
shrink from acknowledging that in the main people will work harder 
if they can ensure .... a better standard of living themselves .... 
There will be an open acceptance of the need for profits .... Social 
De!nocrats must ensure that the mix (in the economy) will becarre a 
partnership • II 31 
"Face the Future" draws up:m all of the traditions Irentioned, and Owen, 
with the honesty that few politicians can afford, admitted the virtues 
of the opposition. He set out the task for the SOP as: 
"Nothing less than to revive the fortunes of our country, to allow the 
resourcefulness, the boldness to re-errerge to halt the drift and to 
face the future with resolution." 32 
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The sane optimism, even aggression, of Crosland in 1956 and the Revisionists 
comes through in ONeil's book. He gave an interpretation of his values in the wake 
of Thatcherism. He called for a political philosophy outside the confines of 
Britain's political tradition and began to build one by looking closely at the 
ideals of "Liberty,-Equality,-Fraternity". 
"For nore than a century political thought has been daninated. by the 
interaction between liberty and equality but surprisingly little 
attention has been given to the other elerent of this historic 
triad, fraternity, representing the sense of fellowship . . . . This 
neglect of fraternity especially by socialist thinkers has meant 
that the espousal of equality has lacked an unifying force to bridge 
the gaps and contraditions between equality and liberty." 33 
This led Owen on to discuss the concept of equality, a key concept in judging 
ideology as Socialist, Liberal or Conservative. Predictably, he combined equality 
and altruism: 
"For all socialists . . . . Whatever exact position they may occupy in 
the political spectnnn of the left there is carmon ground •••• in the 
need to redress poverty and reduce inequality." 34 
However he did not charrpion equality in its Croslandite maritocratic sense, or 
in its nechanical redistributive sense. Owen charrpioned equality as an ideal based 
on altruism. For Social Dem:x:rats, striving for equality is not founded on 
satisfying envy or bourgeois guilt, but it is altruism in action. Owen quoted 
Tibnuss in his description of altruism: 
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"No m:mey values can be attached to the presence or absence of a 
spirit of altruism in society. Altruism is giving to a stranger 
it may touch every aspect of life and affect the whole fabric of 
value. Its role in satisfying the biological need to help .... is 
another urnneasurable element. " 35 
The argurrents of the Right against equality, that inequalities are the product 
of functional stratification and that equality is a sure path to ruining the 
economy are all dismissed by Owen as assuming that men will maximise their rewards 
and ignore altruism and public service. Yet the one argtnrent of the Right that 
equality can only be achieved at the cost of dem:x::racy and choice is not so quickly 
dismissed. 'lb s<::~~e extent Owen accepted this argtment and suggested a way to 
achieve the "maximum" level of equality. 
"Derrocratic politicians are rightly unwilling to put at risk or to 
dismantle Western liberties and dem:x::racy in order to rerrove 
inequalities. Gradual persuasion in a dem:x::racy is the only way of 
bringing abJut greater equality without degenerating into the kind 
of undem:x::ratic and restrictive society that is spawned by authoritarian 
state control. " 36 
This statement, and others concerning "equality" made in "Face the Future" are 
very similar to those made in "Human Rights" and because of this it has been said 
that Owen had been consistent in his beliefs. There can be little doubt that 
"equality" understood as "equity" is a central value in Owen's thought, ~he 
also believed that policies to achieve greater "equity" nrust be legitimised by 
derrocratic consent. This illustrates the importance Owen attaches to derrocracy, the 
second value he discussed in "Face the Future" . 
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"Dem:x:racy" has been given many different meanings and has been much used and 
abused. It has taken on an all-embracing quality so that it has been used to give 
legitimacy to reg.ines as diverse as the Soviet Union under Lenin and Gennany under 
Hitler. Owen realised this and attempted to give a critique of dem:x:::racy that 
looked at its costs and its advantages, whilst still strongly advocating 
pluralistic liberal denocracy. He was very much aware of the need to develop a fonn 
of Social Dem:x:racy which v.uuld suit what he considered to be British values and 
Britain's institutions. He cited as the main influences on his thoughts about 
denocracy G.D.H. Cole and Isaiah Berlin. He tried to combine Cole's advocacy of 
social justice and decentralised GovernrrEnt with Berlin's belief in pluralism, 
freedom, and the individual's right to self direction. He believed that: 
"Such a philosophical attitude if linked to a political approach that 
is unequivocally dem:x:::ratic and socialist, radical and bold could 
appeal to those who identify with the past values of the British 
Labour Party but who now see its political counterpart in the Social 
Dem:x:racy successfully practised by many other socialist governments 
in Western Europe." 3? 
In Owen's view to "denocratise" society was to release individual citizens 
from the centralising influence of the m::xlern state and to encourage participation, 
decentralisation and altruism. 'Ib do this the role of the state must change. 
"The state has however, now not so much outlived its usefulness but 
has itself becama an i.:mpeclinEnt to further change towards the developnent 
of a participatory denocracy, wider ownership, co-operation and carmnmity. 
The state has a contuining role, m::xiern society cannot do away with 
the state." 38 
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Here the influence of the New Right philosophers can be found. Owen was 
asking to "roll back the frontiers of the state" . He did not want to dismantle the 
state total! y, but just as the Conservatives believe that they were extending 
deroocracy by increasing the opportunities to own property and shares, so Owen 
believed he was extending deroocracy by allowing individuals to participate in, and 
shoulder same of the resfOnsibilities of, the state. He did not ask who 
participated, or why they participate, and it might be {X)inted out that, 
as happened in the Labour Party, those who are the nost vociferous, and exert the 
greatest influence on fOlicy do not always represent the majority. However 
CMen had an ai1S\Er to those charges. He saw an extension of dem:x::racy coming 
through devolution and an extension of elections to cover water authority l:x:lards 
and Quangos. 
"A true deroocracy will mean a progressive shift fran Westminister out 
to the regions, to the country and town halls, to carrmmities. 'lb 
introduce radical refonns it will be necessacy to harness the frustrations 
and return the confidence of a public which feels little enthusiasm for 
participation . . . . since they do not believe their participations will 
have any influence on decision-making. " 39 
From the opening chapters of "Face the Future" we can with same certainty say 
which ideologies CMen did not subscribe to in 1981. He is not a Conservative. His 
belief in "equity" and social action by the state excluded him fran the ranks 
of the New Right. Nor can he be called a traditional Conservative because he 
believed that a rational economic and social plan could be imposed on society, 
which Conservatives such as Oakeshott believe is irrational and organic. At the 
other end of the {X)litical spectrum his belief in a liberal, pluralist dem:x::racy, 
his version of "equity" and his rejection of centralisation makes his principles 
incompatible with the form of socialism advocated by the labour Party. Having 
eliminated two of the three "classical" ideologies we are left with liberalism. 
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Evidence to support my view of Owen as a liberal can be found in his ideas of 
equity, open govermrent, the :role of the individual, and the decentralisation of 
power. He believed in a pluralist society. He cited Isaiah Berlin as a notable 
influence on his ideas. And, as ~ shall see, Rawls, who he also narred as a 
philosophical influence, believed individual liberty is a priority in deciding 
social justice. 
The Lal::x::lur Party's philosophy has two main sources. The first is Marxism, 
inherited from the Independent Lal::x::lur Party and the Social Dem:x::ratic Federation. 
The second is based on Liberal ideas held by the Fabians, and also by Beveridge, a 
Liberal MP. Owen ~ld argue that he held views consistent with the "Liberal" 
elerrents of Lal::x::lur 's philosophy. Owen's vindication of his nenbership of Labour 
has been discussed earlier in this chapter. 
So far ~ have only looked at Owen's principles developed as a philosophical 
exercise. Now I propose to look at these principles in action as policies. The 
greater part of "Face the Future" is devoted to policies and the practice of 
politics. 
Britain's economic failures since 1945 gave Owen sufficient material to 
illustrate his economic policies. He particularly criticised "Revisionism" for 
failing to recognise the conflicts between private and public sectors. He wished 
to see a "mixed economy" which was flexible enough to react swiftly to market 
changes, in other 'iNOrds an economy which is not restricted by a bureaucratic public 
sector. 'Ib Owen the strengths of the mixed economy: 
II came from a sensitive understanding of the extent to which an 
amalgamation of public and private sector attitudes and policies is 
tolerable and a readiness to sense the point at which amalgamation 
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destroys the dynamics of the system itself: when curbing profits 
really does limit investment, or when squeezing prices reaches the 
point when it does limit expansion or when a novem:mt towards average 
wages and job security impares innovation and risk taking and contributes 
to low productivity and inefficiency. " 40 
The greatest attraction of the mixed economy is its flexibility. The essence 
of the Social Demx:ratic and Owen's economic programme was that no one policy can 
or should be pursued in isolation. So for <Men to try, for instance, to control 
the noney supply without regard to growth or employrrent would be disastrous. The 
economic relationships in society are so complex that only the mixed economy can 
respond quickly enough to change and, importantly, can maintain consensus. The 
mixed economy is a pragmatic and changing economy, and according to Owen, it is the 
only economy that would redistribute income and maintain the peace be~ the 
classes. The type of mix is not alx>ut percentages but will be detennined by 
prevailing economic conditions. So if a major nationally important industry in 
private hands was near to collapse the Government should give it support as Mr. 
Heath did with Rolls Royce. Similarly if an industry in the public sector would 
operate nore successfully in the private sector, for exanple British Telecom, it 
should be sold off. 
The economy, being run along these flexible, pragmatic lines would not embody 
the Revisionist ideal of the Goverrnnent controlling the economy by macro-policy to 
achieve greater equality. The Government should attempt to improve the quality of 
life of the poorest by giving a higher priority to the v.elfare services but in the 
low-growth economy of the 1980's increasing wages from public spending marely 
creates inflation and eventually worsens poverty. The nethod Owen would use to 
redistribute -wealth is to introduce a "truly progressive" system of taxation. His 
policy would be to effectively increase the incare of the poorest by reducing the 
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arrount of tax they pay. This would also act as a spur to their desire to earn ITOre 
ITOney because they, and not the Treasury would benefit fran their labour. The 
Treasury, would however be able to pay for its "Welfare prograrrrres by the increases 
in tax levied upon the "Wealthy and "Well off mambers of society. This policy 
contradicted the Revisionist belief in Goverrlrient stimulated econanic growth. Cklen 
noted that: 
II the emphasis of the Revisionists on economic growth was not 
accompanied by a sufficient awareness of the degradation of values 
that would accompany growth and it was wrong to imply that ITOre growth 
could satisfy all the needs of our society. " 41 
Tax concessions would act as a stimulant to enterprise and would to SCllE 
extent redistribute income. A ITOre effective way to secure ITOre "equity" in the 
economy according to Owen would be to give workers a share in profits as a 
condition of employmant, and by extending industrial dem:x::racy to involve 
individual workers in a wide range of issues. WOrkers would be obliged to sit on 
boards of managem:mt of public and private organisations. Worker participation in 
decision-making would be increased. He argued for an extension of equality and 
dem:x::racy throughout British industry. In Parlianentary Gavernrrent, the next area 
of his concern, "equity and dem:x::racy" again greatly influence his politics. 
"Knowledge is :p:JWer" claimed Cklen, and Civil Servants have ITOre infonnation 
than anyone else in the British system. He did not believe that Civil Servants 
fonned conspiracies to end radical prograilliiEs. However he believed that ITOre 
dem:x::ratic control by Parlianentary Select Committees "WOuld make the Civil Service 
less bureaucratic and would allow it to administer ITOre effectively without 
political interference. He advocated a Freedom of Infonnation Act, and the 
strengthening of the Select Cammittees. 
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His nost radical policy was related to electoral refonn. He suggested that 
the "first past the post" system be abandoned in favour of a system of proportional 
representation similar to that of West Germany. His basic argument was that PR 
would be nore derrocratic but it should be combined with a host of other refonns 
including the founding of Regional Assemblies, replacing the House of I.Drds with a 
Second Chamber akin to the US Senate with restrictive powers exercising a delaying 
veto aver the House of Camm:::ms. 
"Face the Future" greatly influenced the newly for:rred SOP in its policy and 
principles. It is a book of the left, written by a politician of the left. CMen 
was "obsessed" by "equality and derrocracy" and also the role of the individual, 
which led him to advocate decentralisation as a cure for Britain's governmental 
problems, and an altruism combined with a "derrocratic" social policy to cure 
Britain's social ills. He rejected bureaucratic socialism, advocating instead 
"socialism without the state". So taking the evidence in "Face the Future" ~can 
with sarre confidence reject the interpretations offered earlier by Wheen and leon 
Brittan. ONen is not part of the new 'Ib:ry consensus, nor are his principles 
"Thatcherism with a hmnan face". In short he was in 1981 a politician of the 
European social derrocratic type and a decentralising socialist of a type rarely 
seen in British politics. 
In 1983 David Owen succeeded Roy Jenkins as Leader of the SOP, and in 1984 he 
published a collection of speeches and articles written during his first year as 
Leader. The book's title was "A Future that Will Work" 42 . When the book was 
compiled the Thatcherite influence was ve:ry strong in British politics, and the 
ideology of its supporters, focused upon the free market economy, was the 
"conventional wisdom" in the governing party. I intend to compare the views in "A 
Future that Will Work" with those expressed in "Face the Future" remembering the 
influence of what \ve can call Thatcherism and (Men's belief in "equity and 
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"A Future that Will Work" tackled the problems of advocating a mixed econany 
and inca:TEs policy at a time when those policies had been discredited, their 
weakness exposed, and increased emphasis placed on the market. Owen began by 
rejecting the old Revisionist idea of a mixed economy. 
"Socialist revisionists in Britain advocate the mixed econany but 
refuse to face the political difficulties of admitting that there 
are necessarily differences between the two sectors." 43 
Owen suggested instead of the mixed economy the "social market approach" . 
This developrent in his thought on the mixed economy was not just an exercise in 
finding a phrase which suited the times to describe his econanic policy. The 
"social market approach" is not a plagarised latter-day laisser-faire policy of 
non-intervention combined with support for the welfare state. The "social market 
approach" rests on a number of philosophical asstnnptions. The first is that the 
public and private sectors have different objectives and meet different needs. 
Secondly he held that decentralisation of decision-making is vital to the success 
of the approach. Thirdly, he argued that an inca:TEs policy is the best way for 
Government to influence the economy in a pragmatic way, and finally, that the 
distribution of profit in the economy should both reward the industrious and help 
the 'IIIOrst off members of society. He developed the context of the approach thus: 
"The social market approach to the economy does not advocate retaining 
the status quo. It does not accept the current levels of unemployment 
nor does it tolerate present inequalities. The massage is necessarily 
complex. " 44 
Owen combines decentralisation and the social market in this way: 
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"A novement towards decentralisation must be by its very nature an 
endorsement of the market IIEChanism. Decentralisation challenges the 
centralisation of industrial and economic power that is the legacy of 
decades of central direction: it also makes one analyse what exactly 
is meant by the mixed economy. " 45 
Decentralisation was combined with extended industrial dem:::x::racy, profit 
sharing and worker ownership. Having said that, Owen then rather paradoxically 
advocated a centrally controlled incomes policy. Having claimad that the 
Revisionists attempted to combine incompatible objectives in the mixed econany, was 
not Owen doing the same thing by advocating decentralised decision-making and an 
imposed centralised incomes policy? He attempted to validate his beliefs this way: 
"The social market advocates openly same fonn of in.cares policy but 
it recognises that the dilemna. is how to pursue a nore expansionary 
policy designed to reduce unemployment without triggering inflation. 
It recognises that in the private sector market realism on wage 
bargaining cannot be guaranteed at a ti.rrE of expansion." 46 
Is this not one of the very same reasons why the Revisionists advocated an 
incomes policy, and why large centralised union organisations became so important 
in a GoveD1Jl'eJlt run policy? Owen answers this by claiming that industrial 
dem::x::racy and decentralisation would make trade unions nore realistic and IIDre 
involved with winning orders. Decentralisation "WOuld be helped if co-detennination 
and works council legislation similar to that of West Gennany, and stricter 
controls on nonopolies and trusts were introduced. 
His advocacy of realism in wage bargaining and in the market have not d.iJm'ed 
Owen's concern for the less well off in society. 
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II we cannot reverse our relative econanic decline by arguing whether 
competitiveness should take second place to compassion or compassion 
second place to competitiveness. We need them both." 47 
This raises the problem central to <Men's econanic philosophy and the "social 
market approach". 
"How can we eliminate poverty and prcm:::>te greater equality without 
stifling enterprise or imposing bureaucracy from the centre? How 
can we build up the innovating strength of a competitive econcmy while 
ensuring a fair distribution of rewards? We need new definitions of 
social justice and equality . . . . we are still dogged by old ideas of 
social class. " 48 
Did Owen nove the equity garre goal posts to suit his own philosophy? As far 
as this book suggests 1 not really 1 because he still advocated altruism and a theory 
of social justice not based solely on material rreasuremants. 'lb aid our 
understanding of Owen's principles we shall briefly examine Rawl 's ideas of 
justice. 
Justice". 
His idea of equity in the social market draws upon Rawls' "Theory of 
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In 1971 John Rawls published "A Theory of Justice" in which he argued for, 
anong other things, a liberal approach to the redistribution of resources. It 
inmediately carrmanded. critical attention. Rawls attempted to construct a system 
and a workable noral conception to oppose utilarianism. The theory is exceedingly 
complex, and I intend only to give a sketch of same of the main ideas to illustrate 
Owen's conception of social justice. Rawls believed men have an intuitive notion 
of justice which is also fundarrEntal because each person possesses inviolability. 
The original state of society is one of equality where no individual member is 
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aware of his social status, history or race. Under this veil of ignorance rational 
man would adopt the following principles. First, each person has an equal right to 
liberty. Second, inequalities should be to everyone's advantage and attached to 
positions open to all. Thus no increased economic advantages should require the 
sacrifice of any neasure of liberty. These unchangeable liberties are political 
liberty, free speech, free thought and conscience, the rule of law against arbitary 
arrest and the right to hold property. The ilnfx:>rtant point is that all nen must 
have equal liberty. However in such a theory of justice and liberty how can 
inequalities be to everyone's advantage? 
Rawls answered this question by saying that if the veil of ignorance was 
lifted and nen saw themselves as they really are, it would be clear that the 
undeserved inequalities of birth or natural endowrrent would need to be redressed. 
Justice therefore has a priority over efficiency and welfare. Social primacy 
goods: 
II are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of 
any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favoured." 50 
Owen embraced Rawls' principles in as much as he gave liberty the first 
priority. No material advance is worth the sacrifice of liberty. He rejected the 
idea of a trade-off between liberty and equality as a sterile argurrent. He did not 
abandon the idea of equality. He believed in the "good" of redistribution but he 
placed greater emphasis on the protection of liberty than on the achievem:mt of 
equality. The "social market econc::liey" seemed to him to embody Rawls' principles. 
The redistribution of goods can be achieved, Owen argued, only by persuading the 
electorate and not by the ilnfx:>sition of a bureaucratic state. 
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II it is certainly the case that the majority of people in Britain 
could only be persuaded to support redistributive policies if they felt 
that the position of the poor was to be derronstrably improved in 
absolute not just in relative tenns. " 51 
This would introduce a measure of realism into British society. It would 
encourage the better off in society to help the worse off. The poor nanbers of 
society would also be encouraged to participate in the social market by a system of 
tax credits that would reward their enterprise, and on which their benefit payrrents 
would be calculated. This system would in effect reduce the benefits given to the 
weal thy, such as Family Incarre Supplement or certain housing supplements, and 
diminish the tax burden on the low-paid. The final chapter of "A Future that Will 
Work" entitled "Enough of Conservatism with a Big and Small "C" gave a radical 
criticism of Conservatism and placed him fi.nnly on the left. He made it clear that 
all of his policies, especially the "social market approach" rely on a great change 
of attitude away from the underlying conservatism in both British major parties, 
and GoverrmEnt. He used the phrase "The Establishrrent" to describe the ruling elite 
of Civil Servants, Union leaders and politicians who have restricted Britain. 'lb 
counter the conservatism of "The Establishment", 
"The fundarrental change needed is simply stated: Britain has got to 
becarre nore cCilllllErcial, nore competitive and nore aware of the 
disciplines and opportunities in the world market in which~ compete 
for our standard of living. " 52 
A nove towards increasing carrpetitiveness combined with nore open goverrnrent 
helped by decentralisation, a Freedom of Infonnation Act, nore time for the 
Opposition in Parliament, a stronger Committee system and, of course, PR. These 
are measures that Owen advocated in "Face the Future" . His task was still the same 
as when the SDP was fanned, to "break the nould of British politics". The task was 
not easy because: 
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"we are still bitterly divided by class. Opinion is still divided .... 
bet\\een the north and south of the country. We still harbour within 
our country too many prejudices, whether they are prejudices related 
to race, sex or status. " 53 
"A Future that Will Work" reiterates the philosophy of "Face the Future" but 
is important because of the developnent of "the social market approach" to replace 
the idea of the corpratist mixed econOll'!Y. In "A United Kingdcm", a collection of 
speeches and articles written beb.Ben 1984 and 1986 54, Owen looked at the disunity 
m:mtioned in the final passage in "A Future that Will Work" . Much of the book 
repeats, at length, what was said in "Face the Future", the major difference being 
that "A United Kingdom" developed the place of PR in his philosophy. He believed 
that: 
"Proportional Representation can provide the key to building a new 
consensus. As a constitutional nechanism it ensures majority governrrent, 
generally through coalition goverrnnent." 55 
PR 'WOuld be the cornerstone of a constitutional system that 'WOuld create a 
consensus and regenerate British f:Olitics, taking it away fran what Owen described 
as "partial and increasing! y ideological" rerreclies. 
"ProfX)rtional Representation can create new attitidues and put new 
hearts into our d.em:x::racy; its implementation could remake the bonds 
that should unite us as one country. " 56 
The system of PR 'WOuld not, however, cure all of Britain's ills; it needed to 
be combined with other measures and a non-dogmatic philosophy. 
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"It is the nature of the social dem::x::ratic approach to be suspicious 
of dogmas and creeds .... In spite of our advocacy or proportional 
representation we do not try to depict the system as a single 
talisman . . . . that will alone quick! y transfonn our future .... 
Changes of attitudes can only derive from a new constitutional 
settlanent not fran the institutional juggling that we saw in the 
1960s and 1970s. " 57 
The "new constitutional settlement" ONen wanted to see was derived frcrn his 
previously expressed belief in dem:x:racy and decentralisation. He advocated, in a 
revised fonn, the devolution of power so favoured by the Revisionists in the 1974 
Labour QJvernrrent. 
"It is also ilrpJrtant that the UK should start the process of devolution 
with the early establishment of a legislative parlianEilt in Scotland 
and should make progress towards devolved governrrent in Northern 
Ireland, Wales and the English regions. " 58 
For the approach of proportional representation to \~tUrk, a pre-condition \I.Ullld 
be a change in attitudes and for politicians to place their trust in the people. 
'Ib trust the people is to respect their choices, and if their choice is a hung 
parliarrent and coalitional GJvernrrent all the better. 
"Slowly but perceptibly the British people are sensing that the coalitions 
of our European carmrunity partners are successful .... These coalitions 
are not unstable nor are they weak. On the contrary, they are arrong 
the nost stable dem:x:ratic QJvernrrents in the clerrocratic m:xiern \I.Urld. 
Nor is it an accident that so many of these countries are arrong the 
nost successful economically, the nost successful in combatting the 
effects of the recession." 59 
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The strength of the coalitions lies in opening negotiations, breaking dCMn 
party loyal ties and reducing the domination of ideology. This approach rejects the 
usual pattern of British tvJo party majority Governrrents, and <Men therefore with 
same justification clainEd that his p::>licies were a "new" developrent in the rrain 
p::>litical debate. The new constitutional settlement and the new attitudes, <Men 
hoped, would unite and regenerate the nation and would bring into British p::>litics 
p::>licies nore often found in Europe and with them a rejection of past philosophies. 
"We need to stop thinking p::>litically in te:rms of class, left or right. 
We have to trust the people, in the belief that they will understand 
that this refonn (of the constitution) will unlock the energies, talents 
and essential decency of all those who want to see a United Kingdom. 11 60 
Ken Coates in "The Social Dem:x::rats" 61 clainEd that in his writings ~was 
trying on all sorts of other peoples' clothes. 
"He has tried on 'lbny Benn's cammibnent against corporatism, that of the 
IWC and others to workers control and industrial d.em:x::racy, odd socks 
from various ecologists and conservationists, and a big covering cape 
of decentralisation. II 62 
Coates suggested that because Owen had derived his principles from different 
sources his overall approach was inconsistent and fragmented. ~ had also 
complete! y misunderstood the nature of the Labour Party according to Coates. ~n 
had criticised corporatism and centralisation presuming that they had been created 
by the I.Bft in the Labour Party. In fact the corporate state was the child of the 
Revisionists and their supporters. Coates particularly identified Jenkins as being 
resp::>nsible for the corporate state which developed during the I..al:x:mr Q:wernments 
of 1964 and 1974. For Coates the I.Bft were the true charrpions of decentralisation. 
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'lbny Benn, for example, had fought against the Civil Service to bring about 
decentralisation by introducing workers' control and workers' co-operatives. Coates 
called Cklen' s decentralisation the watchword of a hollow prograrme. 
Furt.henrore, Coates highlighted the differences between Cklen and Jenkins over 
the neaning of equality. Cklen had argued for prograrrmes to bring about sorre 
neasure of equity. Coates believed, 
"Fond though he is of the appellations, no one could describe bon 
vivuer, merchant banker and European Cormnissioner Jenkins as fraternal, 
leave alone egalitarian." 63 
The only basis for unity between Cklen and Jenkins was a shared belief in 
m:xieration. However Coates argued that Cklen did not have a record of noderation on 
the issue of equity. Cklen advocated policies to achieve a rrore equitable 
society which are much rrore radical than those suggested by Jenkins. 
Fran his first book "The Politics of Defence" ( 1972) to his latest publication 
"A United Kingdom" (1986) Cklen's basic philosophical beliefs in equality and 
derrocracy had changed in one important aspect. He now believed that liberty and 
freedom should not be eroded to any degree to achieve equity. This change echoed 
the work of Rawls and to a lesser extent Berlin. Cklen still wanted equity and he 
still believed in a rrore equitable and just society. However he rejected any 
centralising or bureaucratic nove to achieve equity. The "social market economy" 
is the mechanism he believed would provide the greater material equity which ~d 
put an end to poverty. 
This belief in liberty, tempered by social concern leads me to view Cklen not 
as an altruistic conservative, or as a socialist with an exaggerated desire for a 
free society, but as a liberal. 
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Chapter 4 
Shirley Wi 11 i ans 
Shirley Williams was bom in 1930, the daughter of Sir George Catlin the 
academic and Vera Brittain the writer. Her parents actively encouraged her to take 
an interest in politics, and throughout her very canfortable childhood, which was 
partly spent in the USA she was in frequent contact with leading Fabians and 
socialists. In 1948-51 she :read Politics and Econanics at Sarerville College, 
Oxford. During her tine at Oxford she was active in the university Labour Club, 
where she net many of her future Labour Party colleagues, including Bill ROOgers, 
and cama into contact with an earlier generation of Oxford labour activists such as 
Roy Jenkins and 'Ibny Crosland. 
Fran 1960-64 she was the General Secretacy of the Fabian Society and after 
unsuccessfully contesting boo seats in 1954 and 1959 she was elected to the House 
of Carm::ms in 1964 as the Labour member for Hitchin. She was i.mrediately appointed 
PPS to the Minister of Health and then nnved.to the MinistJ:y of labour as 
Parliamantacy Secretacy frc.m 1966-70. Between 1970-74 she held various Opposition 
spokesmanships until Harold Wilson placed her in the Cabinet as Secretary of State 
at the DES. In this position she is raranbered as the Minister who enforced the 
ccmprehensive system, and caused the closure of many Gramnar Schools. Fran 1976-79 
she was Paymaster General and frc.m 1970-81 she was a nernber of the Labour Party's 
National Executive Carmittee. After a dramatic and E!llOtional I:eSignation fran the 
Labour Party in 1981 she co-founded the SOP. She holds general fellowships at 
academic institutions, being particularly connected with Nuffield College, Oxford. 
Bradley, ccmparing her with the other nanbers of the "Gang of Four", says: 
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"She is the nost conservative in her thinking and the nost rooted in 
traditional Labour philosophy. She remains fillnly carmitted to the 
ideas of Beveridge and Keynes and is sceptical about p:r:ofX>rtional 
representation and decentralisation. " 1 
let us consider this description. 
Williams' main interests lie in the areas of anploynent policy, education, new 
technology, and social services. Although she is a skilled writer and a very 
experienced Minister her 'WOrk has been criticised for lacking gravitas, and for 
being over enotional. Jenkins and Owen could, it see!I5 1 step back fran their 
carmit:m:mts to the Labour Party to fonn their philosophies dispassionately. For 
Williams this was impossible. Involved in the activity of politics, the bickering 
of Labour Party Ccmnittees, jostling for the patronage of ·the party leader and 
campaigning for causes, she could not divorce herself fran everyday political 
events. Her writings are therefore not as consistent in their thought as Jenkins', 
or as perceptive as those of Ckal. 
In early 1963 as General Secretary of the Fabian Society, and whilst British 
negotiations to join the EEC ~ under way, Williams wrote in the "Political 
Quarterly" about the consequences of Britain joining the EEC. The article dealt 
mainly with issues which nt:M, over twenty years later, are irrelevant. However she 
did canpare British and European socialism. This is important because of the 
unifying effect the cause of Britain joining Europe had on the leadership of the 
SOP. She wrote: 
"If Britain joins the ccmnunity, the socialist group will have mixed 
feelings about its new Labour allies. Clearly on a host of social 
matters the Labour Party will find it easy to "WOrk for the sane 
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objectives as the Continental socialists. But equally obviously there 
are going to be sane angcy confrontations be~ the European Socialist 
group with its well established hanrony of purpose towards European 
integration, and a British Labour Party which is suspicious, reluctant 
to abandon potential control over foreign policy ..•• and had little 
respect for Continental Socialism outside of Scandinavia. " 2 
Clearly Williams, and certain sections of the Labour Party were at odds over 
the value of European socialism. When in 1979 Labour took an anti-European policy 
and, as Williams Y.UUI.d claim, turned its back on internationalism, was it not also 
rejecting those socialist ideals fomed by Revisionists in Gennany and by Crossland 
in Britain? Williams in 1963 expressed her agLeenent with the European socialists 
when camenting on their manifesto. 
"This docunent is no blazing manifesto. It is both sensible and possible; 
it is "revisionist" in tone. Public ownership is fitted into the 
picture as one way of restraining "dominant econcanic positions", 
attained by ITOnopolies or oligopolies. Carm:>n planning, a ccmni:tnent 
to full anploynent, and a larger share for wage-earners . . . • are all 
demanded . . . . The socialists propose a far .reaching federal structure 
which alone Y.UUI.d make their policies feasible. " 3 
It Y.UUI.d sean that at the beginning of her political career she believed 
strongly in the idea of a united Europe, and opposed those foLCes in the Labour 
Party which opposed Revisionism and had voted against Gaitskell over defence in 
1961. Her writings before 1963 are few and now irrelevant, but her actions, 
particularly her organisation of the Fabian Society to support Gaitskell, put her 
finnl y into the Revisionist c~. She held the usual Revisionist belief in the 
mixed econany. In a review of the 1955 General Election for "The Spectator" she 
nentioned another SOP ideal, class de-aligrment, also a Revisionist principle, 
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"The class structure of British society still plays a significant 
part in its politics. Where that structure ranains largely intact, 
as in nost rural areas, the swing to Labour was small. The deferential 
vote counted. but in the urban and particularly the fast growing 
constituencies its importance is decreasing. The traditional loyalties 
too are disappearing. Another decade or so may spell the end of class 
politics in Britain." 4 
Williams was not only predicting the breakdown of class barriers. writing in 
"New Society" in 1972 she gave her opinion of what \\U\lld happen in Britain in the 
following decade. She placed great emphasis on the poor economic perfo:onance of 
the nation. 'lb cure Britain's economic ills she believed: 
"Stop-go policies, frequently repeated, destroy the credibility of 
any policy intended to inspire confidence . . . . So a solution needs 
to be not just econanic but political, even psychological. It would 
lie •... , as IlUlch in institutional change as in fiscal or financial 
neasures. " 5 
The opinions she held in her early career foreshadow many SDP p:>licies, and 
further evidence of this can be found in the articles she wrote for the Revisionist 
magazine "Socialist Cc:mrentary". This nonthly publication was the discussion fonnn 
of the Revisionists. It had a chequered history, sate nanbers of the left claiming 
it was funded by the CIA, and it ceased publication in 1977. It is ~ one of 
the best sources of Revisionist thought in the 1970s. Shirley Williams was asked 
to address the 1973 Conference neeting of "Socialist Carmantary" subscribers and 
she turned her attention to the weakening of party loyalties in the electorate, and 
in particular the increasing support for the Liberal Party. 
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"let ne start by saying that . • . . 'iNe are faced with a major confiderx:e 
crisis on the part of the electors. They are not going to the Liberals 
because that strange coalition of dissidents offers scma remarkable 
positive appeal. They are not going to the Liberals because they are 
necessarily attracted by the increasing populist p::>licies they are 
beginning to peddle . . . . But the m::JVEm:mt of voters both Conservative 
and Labour to the Liberals is a ccmren.t on us rather than on Liberal 
prograntl'es. And it is undoubtedly a ccnmant on the credibility of 
the last few GJverrments. " 6 
Although I doubt that the sane phrases would be used by her nt::JW about the 
Liberals, the analysis of electoral behaviour that she advanced closely corresponds 
to that given by the SOP supporters in 1981. That is, the mass of electors lost 
their confidence in p::>liticians who pranised great things and delivered few. W:>rse 
still those p::>liticians pranised benefits which would be delivered through p::>licies 
founded on class bias, division, electoral voting patterns and ideology, regardless 
of what was p::>ssible, given Britain's econanic p::>sition. Hence the electorate 
becane disillusioned and the ground was prepared for the SOP. 
Williams applied this analysis very effectively to what she saw as the 
problems of the labour Party. These were firstly a conference which made decisions 
that no Goverrment could p::>ssibly follow, secondly the dissatisfaction of the 
electorate with the Party (especially with conference decisions) and t.hll'dly a 
refusal by Labour to view the world other than in tenrs of "gas and water 
socialism", nationalisation and ciarestic p::>licy. In 1980, as 'iNe shall see, 
Williams was using the sane analysis to justify joining the SOP. However in 1973 
the Labour Party could, in her view, still be saved by adopting different attitudes 
and p::>licies . 
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"The Liberals have played a very strong line arout camnmi.ty p.Jlitics 
and~ are showing signs of m::wing in the sane direction. In sate 
ways that's healthy. For exarrple, what one might call petty imperialism 
in local goverrnnent is not a good thing . . . . We should be m::>re aware 
of the desire, the anxiety of people not to be overriden and not to 
be subjected to burea.cratic decisions. " 7 
Williams then rroved on to a central feature of socialism, La1::xmr' s p.Jlicies of 
public CMnerShip. 
"In that policy docurrent ~ are ccmnitted to a very major extension 
of public CMnerShip. I have no quarrel myself with that principle, 
for what has arerged in the last few years is the alnost total 
breakdown in sate fields of private enterprise trying to operate 
on its own." 8 
However she ~ton to say that nationalisation should be made to work, to be 
not only Morrisonian but to manufacture dananded goods. 
"Perhaps ~ can attract sate high minded young nen and w:::m:m out of 
private industry to run our future nationalised industries .... It 
is p_Jssible and has been done in Gennany, but only by a process of 
exhaustive training by trade unions of their m::>st premising nenbers." 9 
She concluded the article by calling for labour to: 
II pick out of our progranme not just a manifesto that is capable 
of being achieved but one which has been neasured against the 
requirelents of that harsh outside world." 10 
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Obvious! y she is no utopian socialist but this article does not address the 
:fundanental differences be~ the Revisionists and the Ieft over public 
ownership. She wanted a "realistic" manifesto but did not define her idea of 
"realism" or describe the probable restraints on a party in GDverrment. At a 
neeting of the Stevenage CLP she again tried to tackle the problan of public 
ownership. 
"The extension of public ownership is an important Labour Party 
principle. Provided the line be~n the private and the public 
sector is clearly drawn, so that both know where they stand there 
is no reason for public ownership to be feared." 11 
"I suspect sare of the genuine concern about public ownership sterns 
fran the fear of a major extension of unrestricted state~· I 
would not wish to see that . . . . For I believe we need not a 
concentration of ~r in our society, but its gzeater dispersal. 
Public ownership can make that possible; public! y owned canpanies, 
they can be run as co-operatives in which many share~; they 
can . . . . be the pioneers of the policies of industrial dan:Jcracy. II 12 
This goes sare way toward clarifying her position on public ownership. It is 
worth noting that she differed slightly from Jenkins' rejection of extending public 
ownership as a method of furthering dem:x::racy and equality. 
It is the issue of equality that Williams next considers. 
"Greater equality is central to labour's philosophy; it is a principle 
anbedded in our social services, above all in health. II 13 
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Williams believed in darocracy and the diffusion of power as rights, which 
also in her opinion happened to be an efficient way to govern. In 1974 these 
principles could still inspire optimism. 
"Here in Britain, ~ have a great and testing opportunity to show 
that darocracy, equality and social justice can be canbined to 
strengthen our own country in the difficult times through which the 
whole world is passing. " 14 
Three years later, as a leading cabinet minister, and having experienced the 
difficulties of Goverrment, Shirley Williams explained the principles and policies 
Labour should advocate in the next General Election, which was held in spring of 
1979. A change can be noticed in her writings on equality. She I1CM canbined it 
with a neasure of individual liberty. This may be a :reaction to the changed, nore 
Conservative philosophy or to the Revisionist debates which noved towards a nore 
decentralised power structure with nore direct involvemant of the electorate. 
"In my view, the crucial area for fresh thinking arrong socialists is 
the need for the decentralisation of power • • • • What matters for the 
quality of human life is to canbine the highest possible denaninations 
of individual liberty, social provision of such services as health, 
education, care of the aged and the standard of living. " 15 
If the diffusion of power was an aim for Williams, what criteria should be 
used to decide who has power? Is that power accountable? And how does~ 
restrict individual liberty? She does not adequately ~ these questions. She 
says where power is not: 
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"The diffusion of power is often seen purely as an econanic question 
where capitalist free enterprise •... is at one end of the scale, 
whilst a central state control of the ecOJ'lai'!Y is at the other ext.I:are. 
This is a 19th century concept, and in my view over simplified. " l6 
But she failed to say who in Britain held power. She did suggest sene areas 
where demJcracy could be extended. Firstly in \\Urker participation, secondly in 
allcrwing council tenants to participate in running their estates, and thirdly in 
extending parental influence in school managemmt. These are hardly likely to set 
~ 
vested interests or town hall appru;tchi.ks quaking in their shoes. As so often in 
" 
Williams' philosophy, she approached the central issues of social demxracy with 
purpose, but on the way she is diverted by everyday p:>litical issues. As a result 
of this, and of the resp:>nsibilities of office only minor writings '11\lere published 
until 1981. Her \\Urk at this tine consisted mainly of newspaper articles or 
published speeches. Therefore during the very traumatic years of the split fran the 
Labour Party her reactions to events within Labour are the best guide to her vi~. 
The recurring thene in her beliefs at this tine is one of change and instability. 
However her writings fran the General Election of 1979 to the fonnation of the SOP 
are \\Urth analysis for 1:\\U reasons. Firstly, they illustrate the vulnerability of 
her beliefs and their shallowness, and secondly, they provide evidence to explain 
why she joined the SOP and what she hoped the SOP would be. These writings act as 
indicators to the beliefs she held while a number of SOP. 
In the General Election of 1979 Shirley Williams was not re-elected to 
Parlianent. This, however, did not nean that she withdrew fran p:>litics. One year 
later when the left was beginning to take control, Williams dismissed the idea of 
fonning a social den:x:::ratic party as: 
145 
II all nonsense and I am not inten!sted in a third party. I do 
not believe it has a futw:e. " 17 
Even when the Wembley Special Conference in Ck:tober accepted "Peace, Jobs and 
Freedan" as policy, Williams responded by proclaiming again Gaitskell 's war cry to 
"fight and fight and fight again to save the party" . It was clear then that she 
did not seriously believe in leaving the labour Party. The Party had mJVed away 
fran her principles and it was in the process of re-appraising the achievarents of 
the GovernrrEnt in which she has been a leading nanber. Her main and nost strongly 
held convictions had been ridiculed and rejected. The party was now anti-EEC, 
unilateralist and strongly ccmnitted to a greater am::runt of public ownership than 
she could tolerate. 
Throughout the Winter of 1980 and into 1981 Williams fought against those whan 
she considered to be "the fascists of the left" . In August of 1980 she had 
published with others an open letter in the "Guardian". It was largely her own 
work, and she tried to canbine her belief in the hopelessness of a centre party and 
the giOWi.ng belief that a breakaway fr:om labour might erne; 
"If the NEC remains camri.tted to pursuing its present course, and if 
consequently 1 fears multiply arrong the people 1 then support for a 
Centre Party will strengthen as disaffected voters nove away fr:om 
labour. We have already said that "We will not support a Centre 
Party for it would lack .roots and a coherent philosophy. But if 
the labour Party abandons its dem:x::ratic and internationalist 
principles the argtment may grow for a new dem:x:ratic socialist 
party to establish itself as a party of conscience and refolll\ 
ccmnitted to those principles. " 18 
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In Novanber 1980 she told her CLP at Stevenage that she could not stand as a 
Lal:xJur candidate again saying: 
"There is no other party in Britain today that I ~uld contanplate 
joining .... Britain needs a party of liberty, equality, canradeship, 
ccmronsense and internationalism." 19 
Slow! y under pressure fran other social demx:rats she was beginning to accept 
the view that she could not stay in the Lal:xJur Party. On February lOth 1981, amid 
scenes of enotional distress and recrimination, Williams resigned fran the LabJur 
Party claiming: 
"The party I loved and ~rked for over so many years no longer 
exists . . . . it is not the demx:ratic socialist party I joined. " 20 
Williams' political position in March 1981, when the SDP was formaci, was 
extrerrely confused, and confusing. Her belief in the LabJur Party as a force for 
"good" had been shattered. She was in a political no-man's land. The views she 
held were "outdated", based upon the political situation five years before. She 
was yet to care to tenns with~ important facts. Firstly she had failed to 
evaluate the .irrpact of the New Right on the British public. Whereas Owen had rroved 
sooe way to encanpass the libertarian viewpoint Williams was unable to believe the 
British could be so, as she saw it, "right wing". Secondly, she hoped the SDP 
\'I.UUld be a social demx:ratic version of Lal:xJur. It was not to be. M:>st of its 
nenbers were middlEH::lass liberals and not at all the benevolent pro-working classs 
Fabians Williams had hoped. At the tine of her resignation fran the LabJur Party 
she had been described as, 
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II a scnewhat indecisive wanan, of middling intellectual attairntents 
and mistaken views." 2l 
This is a harsh judgement but not derived solely fran malice. Her views at 
that tine were confused. However once rem::JVed fran the daily political world with 
tine to reflect and think, Williams drew the strands of her principles together and 
in surtner 1981 published the book which is her political testanent - "Politics is 
for People" 22 This book looks at the European Social Dem:x::ratic achievemant 
since 1945, asks how it failed, and suggests new Social DemJcratic policies to deal 
with the present problE!ll5. 
The breakdown of the Social DemJcratic achievarent was not, for Williams, the 
crisis of an inherently weak capitalist system or of an interventionist state 
snnthering private enterprise. The crisis was a crisis of industrialism. A new 
approach, "a quantum jump" was needed in politics to cCite to tenns with this 
crisis. 'lb fonn a new analysis one must understand the nature and achievemant of 
welfare dem:x::racy. 
"The post-war goals of social dem:x::racy .... were •••• econanic growth, 
full anployn:ent, the abolition of {X)Verty and equality of opportunity." 23 
These goals were large! y achieved using the lessons of Keynes, and thirty 
years of peace, prosperity and anploynent ensued. ~' the econanic House of 
Keynes, built on at least 31/ 2% growth per year, and viewed by Williams as the 
suprare econcmic achievenent, had been destroyed by narrow minded J?eSSimists who 
refused to co-operate with each other and acted to undennine GAT!' and the IMF to 
exploit the Third world. In short, national greed, illustrated by the OPEC crisis 
of 1973, ruined the econanic achievenent. 
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The p:>litical achieverent of social darocracy had been the protection and 
extension of darocracy: 
II the social clarocratic and liberal consensus had a greater respect 
for darocracy than any other p:>litical philosophy that p:receeded it 
or any that has cate after it. " 24 
J:)emx::racy above all other things separated social darocracy fl:an other 
socialist traditions, especially Marxism. 
"The carrmit:nent to persuasion . . . • is of the essence of social demxracy 
and distinguishes it fran other heirs to the socialist tradition." 25 
The effect of this carrmit:nent had 
II m:xtified socialist doctrine because that socialist doctrine 
has had to be acceptable to the electorate. It has created the 
p:>litics of gradualism, and it has also neant that socialism can 
only advance intennittently and will satetines suffer setbacks." 26 
At this p:>int Williams introduced her guru, Tawney. She subscribed to his 
opinion that: 
II socialism in England can be achieved by the use of nethods 
proper to dem:x::racy. It is certain that it cannot be achieved by 
any other. Nor even if it could should the supl:ale goods of civil 
and p:>litical liberty, in whose absence no socialist worthy of the 
nane can breathe, be part of that price. " 27 
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Individual liberty is therefore indispensible to socialism. 
Williams, like Chen, also believed that fraternity, the third elenent in the 
:revolutionary trinity, was equally indispensible. She again turned to Tawney to 
support her belief that socialism is about fellowship. Tawney saw the central 
question of socialism as: 
II not :ma:rel y whether the state owns and controls the rreans of 
prcxfuction . . . . it is also who owns and controls the state. II 28 
Williams applied this Tawney based philosophy, also dependent upon the 
Christian ideal of brotherhood and equality before God, to explain the success of 
the post-war Social Darccrats. The effect of dem:x::racy and holding ~ had 
changed Social DemJcracy, which: 
II has evolved. towards a nore flexible and pragmatic philosophy. 
Thus in 1959 the SOP at its fanous Bad Godesberg Conference recognised 
the rights of private CMnerShip as -well as the significance of public 
ownership. II 29 
Williams argued that any philosophy which put ideology before pragmatism and 
people undennined Social J:Jem:x::racy. 
Here -we have a nore substantial version of Williams' principles. J:Jem:x::racy 
was the key to her belief in socialism. She looked at post-war -welfare socialism 
as being responsible for the creation of a society which was stable, efficient and 
caring. But if this was so, why did the achieverent fail to -weather the stolJIIS of 
the 1970s when ImlCh of Europe was controlled by Social J:Jem:x::rats? 
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Williams attempted to answer this question by claiming that the Social 
Demx:ratic goverrments had been the victims of their own success. They had made 
poverty and insecurity a half forgotten experience of the pm-war years. The 
electorate, two generations remJVed fran the Great Depression of the 1920s and 
1930s, therefore saw Social Demx:racy as tired and irrelevant. VK>rse still, 
socialists prc::xroted the state as their instrurrent. 
"Socialists need to recognise the force of the antipathy that ncM 
exists towards big governrrent . . . . the feeling that goverrment 
already has too large an influence over people's individual lives 
It is a ~ful desire to run oneself and one's own show, not to 
be bothered with fonns and regulations, not to be treated llcAEver 
rationally as a unit rather than a person." 30 
The way for Social Demx:rats to rid th.ernsel ves of the corporatist state yet 
maintain a socialist and demxratic philosophy was decentralisation. 
"Only by greater participation and decentralisation whenever it is 
canpatible with social justice can we begin to resolve this conflict." 31 
Social demxracy accordingly failed to Williams because its supp:>rters lost 
faith in thanselves. The electorate, when faced with depression after 30 years of 
Social Demx:ratic prosperity, rid thanselves of the hitherto accepted conventional 
wisdan. 
The challengers of the Social Demx:rats, the "romantic greens", the new right 
and the statist socialists are all rejected by Williams. As for the New Right and 
rronetarism she believed that they were the negation of dem:x::ratic politics: 
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II societies daninated by free market capitalism are not conducive 
to h\.nllan f:reedan or to d.arocratic political syst:ars. Mm and ~ 
without access to decent working conditions, education, housing and 
health do not fully share in their society. They are not accorded 
the h\.nllan dignity that is intrinsic to the d.emxratic process. " 32 
Controlling the noney supply was a s~listic solution because the social 
partnerships between employers, unions and governments can change the rate of 
inflation virtually regardless of the velocity of noney. In the real world markets 
are imperfect and not likely to fit the nonetarist pattem.. The New Right and the 
New Left statists had, according to Williams, a curious affinity: 
"This affinity is based on their camnn belief that the econcmic 
system should subject the hmnan being to its own requirerrents, to 
econanic laws. I believe, to the contracy, that at a certain level 
of sufficiency .•.. the econanic system and econanic laws should be 
subject to the requirenents of the whole human being, not only to 
his econanic needs. " 33 
Having constructed a theo:ry to explain the decline of Social Demx:racy, and 
having rejected the alternatives offered as uncierocratic, Williams asked, 
"Where does Social IJerocracy go fran here? can it SUillOunt its own 
sudden decline in confidence 0... can it put forward policies and 
theories that are based on the total hmnan being, not just econanic 
man, but econcmi.c, political and for that matter, cultural and 
spiritual man?" 34 
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The remaining part of "Politics is for People" suggested the ne.w principles 
Social Dem:x::racy needed to accept, and the policies it needed to praiDte in order 
to recapture the confidence of the electorate. She fully realised that the 
Revisionist ideas of the 1960s, which depended upon 4% growth, -were useless. M:mey 
was, as she said, "tight" in 1981, 
"The industrial counties have been wildly profligate in the OOaning 
post-war decades . . . . Now as Anthony Crosland said ...• in 1977, the 
party is over ••.• Conservative Governmants are 11CM offering the 
strong rredicine of unanploynent and bankruptcy • • • • The real need, 
however, is for a sober understanding of how' the 'WOrld has changed 
and an econanic policy of m:x:iest self sustaining growth than can 
accamodate to it." 35 
It is not only the econany that needed a radical refonn but also Britain's 
Parlianenta:cy system. To rarove ~' or rather excessive~' fran the 
executive and restore ~ to the House of Cantons she suggested that the ~ of 
select ccmnittees should be increased. In the past: 
II Select Canni.ttees •... have proved to be energetic, controversial 
and detennined. They have laid arout them vigorously, insisting on 
calling witnesses, demanding infonnation, protesting when papers 
have been withheld and criticising goverrment depart:n'ents in outspoken 
tenns. II 36 
In short Select Ccmnittees had led to JIDre open goverrment. They had made 
corporate bodies JIDre accountable. Still the Select Ccmnittees had restricted 
access to certain Governrrent papers and their 'WOrk 'WOuld be helped by a F.reedan of 
Infonnation .Act. 
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"It is high time that Parliamant put a freedan of infon:nation act on 
the statute book, limiting classification of documants to matters of 
state security. " 37 
Open goverrmEilt is only viable when decision-making was devolved, and 
participation increased: 
"The real key to wider participation, however, lies in the devolution 
of decision making fran the centre, both by goverrmEilt and also by the 
social partners. " 38 
It is interesting to note that although she entered into great detail to 
describe voter dissatisfaction in the 1960s and 1970s she did not advocate 
proportional representation. It can be seen in Jenkins' and Owen's ideology and in 
SDP policy that PR was an important, if not the 100st important, principle. Yet 
Williams made no rrention of PR. 
The other important feature of SDP policy is its pro-EEC stance. Willi.arcs 
fully shared this faith in the EEC. 
"The damage to Britain caused by withdrawal fran the European Camn.mity 
would be so extensive as practically to rule it out of practical 
poli\: Lv.S • Quite apart fran the damage to British trade there would 
be a virtual cessation of international investnent in BriWn, which 
has been the main benefici.al:y of Anerican investnent in the European 
ccmnunity since our original entry in 1973." 39 
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She hoped that the EEC would develop a camon stance on foreign policy and 
develop the original intentions of the Treaty of Rare. Unilateral nnclear 
disailllaiiEilt is dismissed, but the possibility of peace and dialogue could be 
realised through the political institutions of the camnmity. 
"Unilateral nnclear disannarrent cannot be a substitute for creating 
effective political institutions to control anns and to prevent war. 
It is in building up and strengthening such institutions that the 
camnmity could be crucial, as it could be crucial for a new deal 
for the developing world." 40 
British involvem:mt in NMO, and the "special relationshoip" between the USA 
and Britain did not nerit a nention. Neither did the possible reaction of the 
super-~ to a European political force as envisaged by Williams. He idea of 
Europe is not just a misty-eyed belief in the ideal of European unity. She 
effectively argued for refonn of the Ccmron Agricultural :policy, for changes in the 
EEC budget. The Ccmnunity could act to inplenent the :recamendations of the 
"Brandt" and "North-South" reports. Having attanpted to refonn the political 
institutions governing the econanic climate she noved. on to suggest a philosophy 
for industrial re-generation. 
The "New' Technologies" are seen by Williams as being the key to econanic 
:recovery. She did not display the Luddite tendency of rejecting new methods of 
production because they were not labour intensive. 
"The achievarent of full ernployrrent will not at first be made easier 
by the advent of the new technologies. They will create jobs, nest 
of them in the info.nnation sector . . . • but they will destroy others, 
especially routine office work . . . . and :repetitive manufacturing jobs. " 41 
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Her objective in introducing new technologies was to accept the inevitable 
whilst still easing the pain of those who would lose their jobs. She felt that the 
technology itself was "norally neutral". It was the challenges which the 
introduction of that technology created and the resulting problans which called for 
noral decisions. 
"It is rather a challenge to those who are responsible for managing 
industry and the unions to find nore acceptable and humane ways of 
working. " 42 
The Croslandite objective of full employnent was rejected as unattainable in 
its original sense. Patterns of work and leisure would change, and instnmental in 
this was an adequate training scherre for potential workers. This training could be 
based on apprenticeships, adult re-training and increasing financial support to 
those in further and higher education. 
"These three elemants of a national training prograrme could help 
transfo:rm Britain's econanic prospects. It would take tine •... 
But even in the intervening years the at:nosphere arrong young people 
and unemployed people would be transfoilll3Ci. It deserves a high 
priority." 
These schenes should be ccmbined with a reduction in the duration of working 
lives, increased governrrent help to support employers in creating jobs, and a 
change in the attitudes of trade unions. 
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Participation by unionists was a way to reduce opposition to new teclmology. 
In spirit she bn>a.dly supported in spirit legislation to I."E!lDVe legal inmunity fran 
unions. But she mixed this with rro:re industrial denDcracy and participa.tion of 
\\Urkers in managanent. Unions however \<l.'e:re :regarded as useful and :responsible 
partners in inccmes p::>licies and the social contract. 
The involvem:mt of individuals was the priority in Williams' philosophy for 
social services. Pri vatisation was dismissed as being not social d.em:x:ratic. 
However, the welfare state had beccme centralised, undem::x:ratic and impersonal. 
The way to :reverse this t:rend was by client participation. 
"The social services lend thanselves to participation, not just by 
the \\Urkers but by the camnmity as well. Given that professional 
interests and the public interest in the social services may diverge, 
it is ilrp:>rtant that \\Urkers and clients are both :represented on 
participatocy bodies. " 44 
Volunteers in the welfare services could be given greater priority. ~ 
when ()wen discussed volunteers in the Health Sel:vice he underpinned their efforts 
with the philosophy of altruism. Williams disappointingly did not. A g:reat deal 
of hard fact verifying her conclusions was given but she offered no :reason why her 
p::>licy was good as well as being efficient. 
In the concluding chapter of "Politics is for People" Williams :reiterated the 
p::>licies she had outlined in detail in the previous chapters. At the beginning of 
the book she pranised a "new" approach, a rro:re up to date, dynamic fonn of Social 
Dem::x::racy. However, Ken Coates in his book "The Social De!rocrats" 45 believed that 
Williams offered nothing new, only the p::>lished bones of a failed Revisionist 
p::>licy. In a sense this was true. No new concept of equality was explained, no 
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developrent of fraternity or altruism, and no acceptance of the influence of the 
New Right on Social Demx:racy. Coates saw Williams as dabbling in every liberal 
tendency f.r:c:m Tawney, E. F. Schmnacher and the ecologists to the Brandt 
ccmnissioners. However no consistent set of policies or principles arerged f.r:c:m so 
many diverse sources. 
The influence of "Politics is for People" on the principles of the SDP was 
limited. It did not have the sane effect as c:Men's "Face the Future" which very 
effectively pulled together the threads of social darocracy after fonnation of the 
SOP. Williams ignored the changing concept of equality, did not fully discuss 
public ownership and did not nention proportional x:epresentation. The usual 
criticism levelled at her is that her principles 'WOUld fonn a good Mark II Labour 
Party. Her policies "Were shared only by William Rodgers fran the "Gang of Four". 
She believed that <:Men was right wing and Jenkins a pragmatic careerist. Finally, 
her beliefs as expressed in "Politics is for People" "Were IIUlddled and shov.a:l an 
attaclment to the policies of Gaitskell 's Labour Party. 
In 1985 Williams published a l:xx>k which dealt mainly with the problems of 
unemploym:mt and technology. Most of the policies expressed in this book, "A Job 
to Live", 46 had already been expressed in "Politics is for People". The book was 
divided into two parts. The first section dealt with job creation and education. 
The second section asked if goverrment could use the new technology to open society 
to greater participation. The basic assmnption of the l:xx>k is that \\Ork is an 
essential elerrent in hmnan life and happiness. This assmnption is one which 
Williams shares with E.F. Schmnacher, whan she quotes as saying: 
" .... the entire experience of mankind daronstrates clearly that 
useful \\Ork, adequately rewarded in sare canbination of material 
and non-material things, is a central need of hmnan beings, even 
a basic yearning of the hmnan spirit." 47 
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However, the New Right influence was DDre marked in "A Job to Live" and the 
desire of the individual to be free of the state is given DDre attention. 
"The desire to recover individuality also manifests itself in a 
growing rejection of mass production. As people get used to a 
higher standard of living . . . . they want to be able to express 
personal choices in their own lives, not to be driven into 
unifonnity. " 48 
She believed, and fully realised that what she labelled "a paradigm shift" had 
occurred in the political ec::oncmy in favour of the New Right. She tempered this 
with a dose of decentralisation. 
"Central govermrents fail to learn the lesson that they can destroy 
initiative and innovation by their own heavy-handedness. In Britain 
central goverment has becare high! y interventionist • . . • It is a 
p::>licy of central control that flies in the face of the new trends 
in advanced ec::onanies. " 49 
Ownership was left undiscussed, except for this brief statan:mt. 
"The best nodels, I believe, will be those in which ownership itself 
is directly shared, leading to a canron carmi:tm:mt to the finn's 
success. " 50 
Is this an acceptance of the New Right ideal of a property and share CMning 
dem:x:racy? we are not told because the debate about ownership is not developed. In 
addition the role of the publicly owned industries in using the new tedmology for 
training or providing arploynent is largely ignored. She has been criticised for 
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looking at Britain's problans with the preconceptions and the prejudices of the 
1970s. An example of this is her view of public industries not as profit-making 
but as mechanisms of social support for the less fortunate nernbers of society. The 
z:emai.nder of "A Job to Live" repeated the policies to be found in "Politics is for 
People". 
Williams' beliefs~ derived fran the traditions of the Revisionists under 
Gaitskell. unlike Jenkins or ONeil she did not develop her thought beyond the 
concepts held by the Revisionists and which ~ worked into the "corporatist" 
system. It may, however, be asked if her enthusiasm for decentralisation and 
devolution of~ was carpatible with a "corporatist" position? Considering the 
evidence provided in her writings I believe that there is a :fundanental 
inconsistency in her policies concerning the corporatist-decentralisation issue. 
Williams' econcmic and social policies required the intervention of a strong 
central organisation. Her policies to reduce UI1€mploynent,_ to standardise 
education, to p:rarote new technology could not be .i..rrplemented by regional 
goverrments alone. At the very least national goverrnrent \\Ullld finance and give 
direction to such policies. The fonn of wage control prc:m:>ted by Williams would 
need the force of national govermrent behind it. Even then, as with the social 
contract of the 1970s, local disputes, local econcmic differences \\Ullld upset the 
set fo:onula of wage control. If Williams wished to devolve only services such as 
housing, social services and education then she was not suggesting a radical refonn 
but was :rrerely tinkering with the present system of administration. She suggested 
that only three tiers of administration should suffice, local, regional and 
national. The institution of this system would effectively scupper her policies on 
wage control, unerploynent, education and new technology which could only be 
.i..rrplenented by an active centralised goverrnrent. Williams could not reconcile her 
belief in devolution with the need for centralised goverrment to carry out her 
policies. This was an .important flaw in her political position. 
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If we consider Williams' record as a minister, the ~tibility of her 
p:>licies with her belief in decentralisation becares evident. As the Secretal:y of 
State for Prices, and as Secretal:y of State for Education Williams was an important 
nanber of an administration that increased the role of central governnent. She was 
reSIX>nsible for a p:>licy which for the first time in a Britain not at war tried 
effectively to control and set prices by a nethod other than cash subsidy. She was 
resp:>nsible for the introduction of a system of canprehensive education and 
increased the influence of Whitehall in the activities of local education 
authorities. At the sane tine she strongly advocated devolution for Wales and 
Scotland. This could be considered as inconsistency. In 1985 she believed in a 
system of devolution of power incanpatible with her centralising p:>licies. She 
gave no explanation of how or why since 1979 she has becare an enthusiastic 
believer in decentralisation. 
Overall her writings do not display the sane depth or intellectual vigour as 
those of CMen or Jenkins. She has not made the required "quanttnn leap" she asks 
for at the beginning of "Politics is for People" to care to tenns with Britain's 
declining industrial econany and the effect of the New Right. The claim made by 
Ian Bradley at the beginning of this chapter would appear to be quite correct. 
Shirley Williams was the nost conservative thinker in the SDP leadership, in that 
she held on to the ideas of Gaitskell 's Labour Party. 
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CHAPIER 5 
'!be Tawney Society 
In ofder to present a comprehensive study of the political principles of the 
SOP it is not enough to examine the beliefs of the leadership only. Therefore in 
this chapter it is my intention to consider the policy-making procedures of the SOP 
and the policies presented to the electorate at the 1987 General Election. It is 
also necessary to examine the principles of influential members of the SOP who were 
outside the leadership. 
Three times every year around six hundred members of the SOP net as the 
"Council for Social Denocracy" to debate, argue, and decide policy. Once every 
year the SOP conference net and perfoJ:ll'Ed a similar function, but the nenbers of 
the two conference groups were not necessarily the same people. In both cases 
members of the conferences were elected by rreetings of ordinary SOP subscribers. 
Each policy motion the conferences produced was presented to the National 
(Executive) Carrmittee, which consisted of members elected in a national postal 
ballot, a President elected in the same way, and the SOP Parliamentary 12ader and 
same MPs. It was at this level that real power lay and at which policy was 
decided. The confereli1 ces were by comparison talking shops. They may have 
presented motions to the National group but they did not have to be accepted and 
could have been vetoed. The National (Executive) Committee was dominated by David 
Owen. Although same voices of dissent were raised and Owen was criticised for 
moving the SOP to the right, his authority was rarely challenged. It will, 
therefore, came as no surprise to see that much of the policy was close! y related 
to Owen's thought. The principles, beliefs and policies of the SOP were presented 
to the electorate during the 1987 General Election in a slim volume entitled, "The 
Time Has Came" 1 At that time the SOP was engaged in an electoral coalition with 
the Liberal Party known as the "Alliance". The book is ascribed jointly to David 
Owen and David Steel who was then leader of the Liberal Party. 
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Both the leaders believed that it was necessary to outline their Parties' 
fun.danental principles. It is interesting to note that one addresses liberty, the 
other equality. 
"The Liberal Party exists to build a Liberal Society in which every 
citizen shall possess liberty, property and security, and none shall 
be enslaved by poverty, ignorance or confonnity. Its chief care is 
for the rights and opportunities of the individual, and in all spheres 
it sets freedom first." 2 
The SOP exists 
"to create an open classless and nore equal society which rejects 
prejudice based on sex, race, colour or religion." 3 
However, in "The Tine Has CarrE" it was denied that the SOP had an ideology. 
"The SOP has ideals rather than ideology. It has therefore been 
able to draw the best of several political traditions. " 4 
Of course no party wishes to be described as ideological because that implies 
intolerance, prejudice and a subjective view of society. There is, however, a very 
fine line, if any at all, between ideals and ideology. It is a debate over words 
and their social meanings, and to avoid confusions I will call the SOP's ideals 
their principles. A surrmary of SOP objectives is provided. 
"Social derrocrats want to redistribute political, social and econanic 
power in order that the potential of all people to lead fulfilling 
lives .... and to make a positive contribution to society is realised." 
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5 
It could be subscribed to by any person within the leftist spectnnn. 
Substitute "Dem:Jcratic Socialists" for "Social Derrocrats" and I prestlllE the Labour 
Party leadership 'INOuld find no objections to endorsing the statem:mt. But ~ 
noble the sentirrents expressed may be, they do not necessarily reflect the policy 
of a party. In fact the 1977 Soviet Constitution reads as a model of liberal, 
dem:x:ratic tolerance, but Soviet policy, in spite of "glasnost" suggests oth.eiWise. 
we should ask if Alliance policies matched their principles. 
To redistribute political power, and to increase the freedan of the citizen 
the Alliance proposed to refonn Governrt'Ent on four principles: 
"Firstly, that government should be by and for all citizens. Secondly, 
that decisions should be made as close as possible to the people 
affected and with their active involvement. Thirdly, that the rights 
of individuals and minorities must be properly protected, and the 
laws must be seen to be fair to all citizens. Fourthly, that the 
surviv al of a free dem:x:racy depends on the rule of law." 6 
The first objective 'INOuld be achieved by the introduction of proportional 
representation, a favourite D.venite cause. The Alliance felt that a large group of 
voters and significant shades of opinions \\Bre never heard, and that a mandate to 
govern could be achieved without the consent of the majority of electors. 
\ 
"The SDP and the Liberal Party have carre to the same conclusion. we 
have considered the various systems in use throughout the world and 
favour a system of comnrunity proportional representation which is 
broad! y similar to that in operation in the Republic of Ireland .... 
The great advantage of this system is that it enable voters to choose 
between candidates as "~Nell as parties. " 7 
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Multi-rrernber constituencies could be fonred, and the effect on governrtEilt 
would be considerable. Coalitions would be the nonn and it had, according to SDP 
thinking: 
II ensured majority goveiTJIIEnts following stable and consensual 
policies throughout Western Europe since the Second World War. " 8 
The "two party system" would end, and the Prime Ministerial prerogative of 
choosing a politically acceptable dissolution date would be removed by the 
introduction of fixed tenn Parliaments. The standing carrmittees of the House of 
Cannons would be given wider powers to control the Executive, and rrore debating 
time would be provided for Private Members Bills. The oppositional and conflictual 
nature of the Ccrrm:>ns would be altered by a "thorough overhaul" of the archaic 
procedures and outdated timetabling of legislation. 
It was not only the Camrrons that was to be refonred. 
"It is unacceptable that there should still be a legislative role 
for peers m:rrely by virtue of heredity. We need a refonred 
Second Chamber which includes a regional dimension. We would 
match these refonns of the Westminister Parliament with a progranne 
of devolution and decentralisation - taking power fran the centre 
and bringing a whole range of services . . . . under dem:x:;ratic 
regional control. " 9 
National parliaments would be given to Wales and Scotland, and the English 
regions would gain regional assemblies funded by a local income tax as would be the 
one tier of local goveiTJIIEnt below them. This may in effect have abolished County 
Councils. 
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'lb ensure nore open governrrent the Alliance intended to repeal Section 2 of 
the 1911 Official Secrets Act and replace it with a Freedom of Infonnation Act 
giving citizens rights of access and rights of protection. The Security Services 
would be ruled by a Cormtittee of Privy Councillors, and public servants would '1.\Urk 
to a charter of rights and responsibilities free from political pressure. 
All of the above :rrentioned policies are carmon to the writings of the three 
SDP leaders and to nost SDP members and organisations. A complem:mtary :rreasure 
would be the introduction of a "Bill of Rights" sc::mati:rres called a "Bill of HLm1an 
Rights" but closely following the European Convention on HLm1an Rights. A human 
rights Ccmnission would be established to nonitor the enact:mant of any laws and 
existing Cormtissions of Equal Opportunity and Race Relations '1.\Uuld be abolished. 
Women would be given nore support to develop their potential and 50% of seats on 
public b:xlies '1.\Uuld be filled by women within a decade if the Alliance had taken 
~· Greater consultation with disabled people, and with racial minorities, 
supported by stronger laws to forbid discrimination, would have been given a high 
priority. 
The Alliance also tried to steal sc::ma Conservative thunder by advocating nore 
support for the rule of law. Although it did not advocate the "law and order", 
"short sharp shock" type of Conservative view, it did condemn attempts to undennine 
the police force. Decentralisation of police services was again the key to 
success. The involverrent of the corrnnunity in a police complaints procedure and in 
police authorities would have increased the accountability of, and trust in, the 
police force. 'lb oversee this procedure a Ministry of Justice was to be 
established. 
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"The Alliance Parties propose nothing less than a new constitutional 
settlem:mt. We believe fundamental political refonn is the key to 
· the creation of . . . . a nnre just society. " 10 
Nowhere in the section of the l:x:x:>k concerned with the refonn of the 
constitution does the word "equality" appear, nor do variations of the word. It is 
sw:prising that greater errq:>hasis is not placed on "equality" considering the aim of 
the SDP constitution to create a nnre equal society, and also considering the 
philosophies of the SDP leadership, especially Williams, which focused upon types 
of "equality". However, the economic policies of the SDP which we will examine next 
reflected nnre strongly the aims of the SDP Constitution. 
Those economic policies rejeeted the laissez faire approach to running 
Britain IS industry o 
"If the nndern economy is to work effectively, government nnlSt 
inevitably play an active role. The role of the state in enabling 
change can be crucial both in what it does, and does not do. 
Laissez faire is not adequate to assure competition in the market 
place, let alone to rooet our other objectives. " 11 
The state nnlSt act to stop IIDnopol y finns or trades unions fran dictating the 
condition of the market and nnlSt also ensure fair competition. A feature of this 
control carried out by the state is the redistribution of rewards from inherited 
wealth and excessive nnnopoly profit to help eliminate poverty. The revenue raised 
from such taxation would help pay for social or welfare services. 
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"Social Dem:lcrats and Liberals believe that the state should provide 
high-quality health care and education services, but should not have 
a nonopoly of those services. We value the significant contribution 
which the voluntary organisations and churches make in these spheres. " 12 
This appreciation of the voluntary services is an echo of ~' s praise of 
"altruism". The Alliance's principles of ownership, a key issue, are sunned up in 
the phrase "The Partnership Economy" . The partnership should exist between 
employer and employee and capital and lalx>ur. In the past, 
"The ideological battle be~n employers and trade unions has bred 
a nrutual suspicion, lack of frankness, and too often outright 
bloody mindedness. " 13 
Partnership was to be created by employee participation, employee share 
ownership, and profit sharing. The trade unions would have their part to play as a 
force for positive change. The anti-union approach of the Conservatives is 
rejected, but the accountability of unions to members by legislation to ensure 
dem::x::racy was supported. The object of wider share ownership in "The Partnership 
Economy" was to break down the concentration of wealth in Britain. The Alliance 
did not feel that the partnership needed to regenerate the economy would be gained 
by polite requests. It proposed legislation to ensure, and enforce, employee 
participation democracy. 
Partnership, it is understood, would not redistribute income to canbat 
:p:werty. Refonn of the tax and social security systems would have been used to 
achieve that aim. 
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"The Alliance believes that the objectives which the social security 
and tax systems must meet are to attack }?OVerty, to ensure equal 
tJ::eatnent . . . . and to p:rarrote enterprise. " 14 
Benefits would be related to needs in one payment in an integrated tax/benefit 
system administered through PAYE. This scherre has often been called tax crediting 
and ~uld rem::we taxation from the lower paid and ensure a basic income. This is 
certainly a nove towards "greater equality" but is not advertised as such. It is a 
fundamental change in the way that the govern:mant distributes benefit, the 
responsibility of claiming being noved from the recipient to the administration. 
It was intended that revenues be taken from the better off members of society, the 
rich, and redistributed to the pcx>r. However, according to the Alliance, the only 
effective way to close the gap between rich and pcx>r was to regenerate the econany. 
The priority in the regeneration of the economy was the reduction of unerployment. 
"Unerployrrent is neither acceptable nor inevitable. Our priorities 
for action are young unemployed people and those unemployed for over 
a year. Unernployrrent entails a human and social cost, but also an 
economic one. " 15 
'lb achieve a reduction in unemployrrent the Alliance ~uld have created jobs 
through increased public spending on job schemes, through an incomes strategy, and 
through controlling the rronetary system by joining the EMS. H~ incentives 
~uld have been offered to small businesses and job creating employers, and there 
~uld have been penal ties for those employers who gave excessive pay rises. These 
penalities were tenred an "inflation tax". 
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The basic principles of Alliance policy concerning the econany ~broadly 
shared by their political rivals the Labour Party in 1987. However when the Labour 
Party proclaimed its policies it did so with emphasis on "equality" and camon 
ownership. The Alliance seerrecl detennined not to give any emphasis to "equality". 
This may have been an electoral tactic to attract Conservative support. But it was 
just as likely to be a result of the writings of Jenkins and Ck.en in which equality 
was interpreted from the standpoint of equity, or justice or fairness. The 
policies of the Alliance in 1987 were never labelled as being socialist. Indeed, 
Jenkins and Ck.en called thernsel ves non-socialist radicals. ~r, Williams did 
call herself socialist, and the SDP has historical connections with socialist 
thinkers such as Tawney and Keynes. 
In the introduction of this study the question is asked "What is the nature of 
the SDP' principles?" On the key issue of "equality and ownership" SDP policy in 
1987 could not be described as socialist. If this is the case we may now ask which 
principles have replaced "equality and canm:>n ownership"? 
"Altruism", the ideal beloved by David Ck.en, was surprisingly not rrentioned 
often and did not underpin the Alliance ideas of social refonn, nor did Williams' 
breed of Tawneyism. Owen believed that the Alliance's principles~ those which 
the Conservatives and the Labour Party felt were nrutually exclusive at that tirre. 
" enterprise and welfare, a market economy and social justice, 
economic developrent and envirol1Il'ental integrity, equality for 'WOll'eil 
and support for the family, British achieverrent and international 
co-operation. " 16 
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This is gcx:x:l prose for fighting elections but it gives no help to anyone 
looking for key issues and principles to explain SDP principles. The nost 
convincing explanation of those principles which replaced "equality and camon 
ownership" is that there are no definite replacerrents. The philosophy behind SDP 
};X)licy in 1987 is best described as "social liberalism". 
"A philosophy of social liberalism, first apparent in the later 
Gladstone administrations and articulated towards the end of the 
century by Liberal thinkers like Hobhouse and T.H. Green, often 
"WOrking with like-minded Fabians, cane to flower in the great 
Liberal Government of 1906, which laid the foundations of the 
welfare state. " 17 
Such a philosophy of "social liberalism" is close to Jenkins' principles. 
Jenkins favoured a "non-ideological" radical approach. He drew his inspiration 
fran the Fabians and also inp::>rtantly sh.ov.a:l a great admiration for the 1906 
Asquith Liberal Government. His attitude was pragmatic, flexible and a mix of 
Fabian and Asquithian preconceptions about society. It might be thought that SDP 
};X)licy reflected Jenkins' principles precisely because it was in an alliance with 
the party of Asquith and Beveridge. The SDP fX>licy, fomed with the Liberals, did 
not however vary in any significant way fran what may be called unadulterated SDP 
Conference decided fX>licy. In short the Liberals' influence was not great. The 
principles in Alliance };X)licy were, like Jenkins' principles, pragmatic, cautious 
and refonnist, not so much in the tradition of Crosland and Gaitskell as in that of 
Asquith and Keynes. 
SDP "official" };X)licy was fomed with one eye fixed on elections and obviously 
it was influenced by the changing };X)litical climate. However, a group within the 
SDP called the "Tawney Society" did not need to take such great notice of elections 
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and everyday politics. The Tawney Society was to the SOP what the Fabian Society 
is to the Labour Party. It was fonned mainly by intellectuals or acadenics but its 
influence was very considerable, and the documents it produced on SOP principles 
-were taken seriously by the Party's leadership. The cautious and long tenn nature 
of the pamphlets that the Tawney Society issued make them a valuable pointer to the 
way SOP principles may have developed. The nnst useful "Tawney Society" pamphlet 
was written by Stephen Mennell of Exeter University and SOP candidate for Exeter in 
1983. It was entitled, "On Social Derrocratic Ideology" 18 Mennell seeks to trace 
the roots of SOP ideology in 
II the original nnral and social concerns of the socialist and 
radical traditions. " 19 
Mennell set the scene of his work by outlining the inherently confused nature 
of the ideological melee, and also rejected Jenkins fear of being seen as 
ideological. Mennell has no shame in using "ideology" to mean what 
II in nnre everyday language is often called "philosophy" or 
"principles" . " 20 
The value of ideology should, believed Mennell, be very high in a party such 
as the SOP which could appear as all things to all men and lose its sense of 
direction. He tackled first in his analysis the fundarrental liberal principle that 
in any contest between the rights of the individual and those of the state, 
individual rights are param:mnt. 
II to say that one is against the principle of freedom of choice 
is like coming out in favour of sin . . . . one of the carraronest issues 
in politics is the case of the Conflict between individual choice and 
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social welfare. Deroocratic decisions are very often a matter of 
weighing collective and individual interests against each other. " 
He resolved this conflict thus: 
"Social Deroocracy is a collectivist rather than an individualistic 
tradition. What that neans is that social dem:Jcrats do not see 
individuals as the separate "atoms" of society: the "freedom of 
the individual" is a philosophic myth, because there are always 
many interdependent individuals whose interdependence in society 
always to a greater of lesser extent limits the "freedom" of each 
of them." 22 
21 
An interesting contradiction indeed to the apparent championing of the 
individual by Owen, and to Alliance policy. Decisions should be made not with 
reference to individual freedom but to cosb benefit analysis based on the Pigovian 
view- of the distinction between private and social net costs. .Mennell felt: 
"Such a view- is inevitable once one rroved away from the (classical) 
liberal notions of society standing over as s<::mething apart from 
its component atoms, separate "individuals" each independently 
exercising a nonad-like judgement unaffected by others." 23 
The aim of social demxrats should be to control the social forces generated 
in an interdependent society. The control must however be dem::x::ratic. It must 
not be translated as state control, which is a distortion of early socialist 
thinking. 
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"The state must obviously retain a major role in econc:nnic management; 
its leading part in the establishlrent of an effective fonnn for the 
developnent of a measure of consensus on wages, prices and economic 
prospects is unavoidable. But social demx:rats . . . . are convinced 
decentralisers of power and control. " 24 
Power must not be seen as being concentrated solely in the hands of a class or 
an econc:nnic group, as Mennell alleged the Labour Party did. To create, or 
encourage the growth of interdependent collectivism, 
" the ethic required will not be a new individualism diluted by 
altruism. It will be a new Collectivist ethic, identifying with 
a collectivity broader than a single econc:nnic class or even a 
single nation, and accepting collective responsibility for 
rectifying misfortunes which beset countless people through no 
individual fault of their own, not necessarily through the intentions 
of any other individuals." 25 
Mennell fired a well aimad shot across the bows of thinkers such as ~. 
:However he concurred with the ~nite view that the SDP was better served tracing 
its roots to continental social demx:racy than the species of social d.em:x::racy 
developed by the Liberal Party after they abandoned individualism. David Marquand, 
however, criticises this view, which ignores British Fabianism. Marquand writes to 
Mennell: 
"I don't think you have got the intellectual ancestry of British 
Social De!rrocracy right. You imply that .... it is part of ... . 
continental social demx:racy. Continental social demx:racy ... . 
is essentially revisionist, in the sense that it was born out of 
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a reaction against classicial Marxism .... British social derrocracy 
is the child not only of a very sui generis British tradition of 
darocratic socialism, but also of an equally sui generis tradition 
of "social liberalism" which has no real continental equivalent." 26 
Mennell politely dismissed Marquand's argument as "academic". Mennell argued 
that "social liberalism" can be applied to many political parties. Only those 
parties such as the Gennan SDP who retained collectivism over individualism are 
truly social dem:x::rats. As, in Mennell 's view, the SDP did place collectivism over 
individualism it could claim to be social democratic in the continental socialist 
tradition. If this was so, the philosophy of <Men has a contradiction within 
itself. If Owen is an individualist he cannot, according to Mennell, draw fran the 
continental tradition. Roy Jenkins, on the other hand, could claim ancestry for 
his principles in both traditions of "social liberalism" and "continental social 
democracy" because he retains a m::>re collectivist view. 
Marquand explained his theory in m::>re detail in his pamphlet "Russet-Coated 
Captains: The Challenge of Social Democracy". 27 He believed that social 
democracy in Britain had a number of definite strands of opinion. The first 
discussed is Fabian Socialism: 
"Central to the Fabian tradition was an unswerving commitment to 
darocracy, to gradualism, and therefore to persuasion. Socialism, 
the early Fabians insisted again and again, was implied by 
democracy. " 28 
This reflected the SOP's cormnit:ment to the politics of persuasion, and their 
view that without democracy socialism was only a m::>dified fo:rm of authoritarian 
rule. However the Revisionists of the 1950s rejected the Fabian idea of socialised 
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means of production as outdated. AllrEd with theories of Keynesian econcmics they 
believed that the pattern of ownership could stay the sane but that by progressive 
taxation, high social expenditure and Govermnent intervention social injustice 
could be eradicated. 
The second strand in Social Derrocracy, according to Marquand, was Asquithian 
Liberalism. This philosophy is committed to: 
II personal freedom, individual initiative and self realisation. 
But they stood the nineteenth century liberal interpretation of 
freedom on its head. Where the classical liberals saw the state 
as enemy, the New Liberals saw it . . . . as a potential ally .... 
The state had therefore to be called in to redress the balance of 
the market: to protect the weak against the depredations of the 
strontg, and to give them the opportunity of self realisation 
which lay at the heart of the whole liberal ethic. " 29 
These Liberals wished, as L.T. Hobhouse put it, 
"to restore the social conception of property to its right place." 30 
The state could create an envirol'lllent in which citizens could realise their 
own aims; it could not tell them what those aims were. 
These two strands, Marquand suggested, had been drawn together to fonn an 
ideology which was: 
"equally ccmnitted to the values of personal freedom and social 
equality. They know of course, that in the real ~rld these 
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values cannot always be reconciled . . . . that in short, they 
have to be traded off against each other. " 31 
A nore important element in Marquand 1 s view of Social Derrocracy is his belief 
in the Social Derrocratic carrmit:rnent to the open society, to: 
"d.em:::>cratic methods, to free enquiry, to rational debate, to 
increrrental change and above all to exper.i.nEntal methods in 
politics. " 32 
The idea of the open society was borrowed from Sir Karl Popper, and it holds 
as a fundamental truth the stupidity of doctrine and dogma and the value of 
tolerance. It also attached great importance to the influence of the unintended 
consequences in politics. All political judgements must be tentative and 
provisional. Open societies diffuse IXJWer and this suited the SDP belief in 
decentralised IXJWer. Doctrines, or rather philosophies, should canpete in 
elections for the electorate to accept them or reject them. Popper 1 s idea of the 
open society rejected utopianism. Pragmatism does have a role in the SDP policy, 
and in the writings of Jenkins and <Men in particular. Marquand also cited 
pragmatism as a reason why social d.em:::>crats believed in the mixed economy. 
"Social Derrocrats are carrmitted to the mixed economy partly for 
pragmatic reasons. Despite its faults . . . . the mixed econcmy is 
overwhelmingly the nost successful which mankind has ever known •••• 
They are carrmitted to it because it is in the mixed economy that 
their canunit:rnents to liberty, equality and the Open Society can 
best be realised in practice. " 33 
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The Social Demx:ratic idea of the mixed economy, suggested by Marquand was 
much discussed in the Tawney Society; and Alex de Mont examined one particular part 
of that economy, the "social market" much favoured by David c:Men, and published his 
findings in a Tawney pamphlet called "A Theory of the Social Market" . 34 
De Mont believed that the social market can save social derrocracy fran the 
left who claim::rl that social derrocracy has delayed the arergence of a socialist 
society by ccmbining capitalism with social justice. The New Right clailred that 
the mixed econany bred paternalism and state bureaucracy. De Mont believed that 
the social market eliminated paternalism. De Mont also accepted the serious 
problems of "old style social derrocracy" and attempted to re-'WOrk the ideals of the 
mixed economy into a theory which 'WOuld offer a solution to Britain's economic 
problems. If de Mont's theory _is dependent on the idea of "the market" in a 
IIDnetarist British econany, how did his theory differ fran that of the nonetarists? 
"Firstly Social Demx:rats favour political intervention as a device 
for correcting market failures, either to make provision for public 
gocx:is or to rerred.y perceived differences between private and social 
costs. Secondly Social Demx:rats assume that the liberal cc:mnitnent 
to negative freedom, .... is a one-sided and limited view which 
fails to do justice to the noral ideals which it is held to eml:xx:iy." 35 
This implies that social d.errocrats give preference to the social rights of the 
individual over the operation of the market. The state, within a liberal darocracy 
therefore pursues specific social objectives to correct market failures. 
"It is the pursuit of these objectives contrained by considerations 
of liberal freedoms which detennines the character of the balance 
between the public and private sectors in the mixed economy. " 36 
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The social market society rebels against the bureaucracy of the corporate 
social democracy of the 1970s. The reconstructed version for the 1980s: 
II encompasses the themes of derrocratisation of power in industry, 
the developnent of deregulation and competition policies to break 
open a number of public and private nonopolies, the decentralisation 
of government at all levels, the enhancement of social rather than 
economic equality .... the expansion of wider patterns of ownership." 37 
The state '1,\DUld maintain a "safety net" of "Welfare services but also increase 
individual initiatives. This is a tall order for any philosophy to turn its 
attention to. Reconstructed social derrocracy, which de Mont argued could combine 
freedom and social justice, aspired to fulfil:: the aims listed above. The theory 
also took in the liberal principles of pluralism, tolerance and consensus. At the 
heart of social derrocracy and the social market theory, 
II is an implicit assumption about the existence of a ccmnunity 
which is capable of h.anronising, transfonning and redefining 
particular economic interests in a manner which can claim the 
social allegiance of members of the community. " 38 
Essentially de Mont argued for the social market against the Right, and 
focused upon the benefits to the economy from both social justice and "Wealth 
producing markets. Which people benefit from the social justice, and haw much is 
put into that fund is discussed in a Tawney panphlet, "Unveiling the Right" 39 . 
This is the '1,\Drk of "The John Rawls Creative Study Group" and is edited by Kevin 
Carey. The Group addressed the above questions by trying to apply Rawls' 
principles of justice and equality. A just Gaverrnnent should, according to the 
Rawls Group, divide its activity into four branches. The first is to keep prices 
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stable and control markets. The second is to maintain reasonably full employrrent. 
The third is to transfer resources to ensure a social -welfare safety net. The 
fourth is to distribute taxation and property rights to ensure justice. ~r as 
Rawls' first principle is liberty: 
II individuals must be pennitted to buy goods in the free market 
in such anounts that they do not thereby reduce the liberties of 
others." 40 
It is not clear if this applies to health or education. If these goods are 
provided in the free market the familiar anomaly of classes of service arise. 
The Group attempted to merge Rawls' principles with a social market approach. 
They ran up against the problem which all SOP writers must eventually confront. 
How can the values of liberty and equality be combined into a philosophy which is 
logically consistent? This question runs through all SOP writings. The Rawls 
Study Group handled it very -well. They introduced into Rawls' theories of justice 
the concept of the social market economy much favoured by David Owen. This 
approach contended that the best way to generate -wealth was to allow entrepreneurs 
freedan in the market place. The theory allowed for choice, self interest and self 
advancerrent. It also accepted that different individuals \\Ould be able to buy for 
themselves different levels of service. However there must also be an equal 
opportunity for every individual to create -wealth. The state \\Ould fund 
institutions that v.lOUld support the disadvantaged and provide a safety net by 
setting a mininrum standard of living. The Group claimed, 
"A social market approach involves the prom::>tion of a free market 
system. In it, the basic institutions would guarantee a free 
enterprise economy. The state would deliberately try to create 
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conditions for economic growth, on the principle that .... this 
~uld best meet the needs of the disadvantaged . . . . It ~uld 
encourage the genuine freedom of enterprise rather than the cosy 
cushioning of large scale semi -nonopolies . . . . The increased 
profits from such deregulation of business .... to effect 
redistribution in favour of the least advantaged. " 41 
This view sees "justice as fairness" and the pamphlet believed that on the 
basis of "a social market econany": 
" a society constructed according to Rawls' principles begins 
to look uncanninly like the society to which SOP policies ~ld 
lead." 42 
The work of the pamphlet ~ld, despite its title, nove the principles of the 
SOP away from socialism and into liberalism. Other pamphlets especially Marquand's 
have already pushed SOP principles towards liberalism. And this shift of emphasis 
towards liberal views had changed their conception of equality. 
"It can be hardly emphasised strongly enough that the subject matter 
of SOP Social policy is the inexorable reduction of inequality and 
not the pursuit of equality. " 43 
The abstract ideal of equality has been superceded by the ideal of liberty. 
The authors of "Unveiling the Right" went as far as to say that the pursuit of 
equality poses an unacceptable threat to the enjoymant of liberty. Mark Goyder 
interpreted this p:rarrotion of liberty over equality in the following way: 
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"Social Derrocracy canmits us to the greatest degree of equality that 
is consistent with hmnan independence and self reliance." 44 
It would seem that Goyder and the other Tawney writers wanted the best of roth 
worlds. They failed to recognise the argument that distribution to the p:x>r 
requires same administrative ITEChanism. They seerred to favour a system without 
control and :p::>ssibly even dependent on charitable gifts. They interpreted liberty 
as freedom without mantioning the res:p::>nsibilities of that freedom. They also 
failed to give any credence to the argurrent that to enable a person to be involved 
in society by welfare benefits also increases that person's liberty. Giving such 
liberty is a :p::>sitive benefit of the welfare state. If the Tawney Society writers 
intended only to encourage egalitarian :p::>licies when convenient, did they becare 
nothing nore than 'lbry Derrocrats? Policies to encourage liberty had a well worked 
out philosophy to support them, but equality has becare marely a welcare by-
pnx:iuct. The Tawney writers should have asked themselves if they had relegated the 
SDP Constitutional idea "to create and defend an open, classless and nore equal 
society" into the sane :p::>sition as Labour Party's Clause IV? The answers to these 
questions were not given. Apologists for the Tawney writers could say that I have 
over exaggerated their relegation of equality, and that the two values of liberty 
and equality are cample.roontary and that the welfare state concept of equality is a 
very narrow materialistic one. It is nonsense, they could say, to claim welfare 
would be in the hands of the private sector as the state would provide a social 
minimum, a safety net. The Constitutional statement is, like Clause IV, open to 
interpretation. The advantage of pursuing a flexible and pragmatic :p::>licy to 
achieve greater equality is that such a :p::>licy can res:p::>nd to changing economic 
conditions. It is therefore nore likely to succeed than a rigid plan. QJyder 
described the nora! code which should sup:p::>rt any decisions made pragmatically. For 
that nora! code he turned to Victorian values. However they are not the sane 
values that present-day Conservatives believe in. Goyder turned to William M:)rris 
for nora! guidance: 
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"What I mean by socialism is a condition of society in which there 
should be neither rich nor poor, neither master nor master's man .... 
in which all rren would be living in equality of condition . . . . the 
realisation at least of the meaning of the word carmonweal th. " 45 
However MOrris' concept of a "cOili!TOnwealth" was too abstract to fonn a 
cornerstone of Goyder's rroral code. He added to it R.H. Tawney's version of 
redistribution as: 
II The pooling of sw:plus resources by rreans of taxation and the 
use of the funds thus obtained to make accessible to all, irrespective 
of their incane or occupation and social position, the conditions 
of civilisation which, in the absence of such rreasures can only be 
enjoyed by the rich." 46 
Again very canrrendable sentiments but too abstract. :Much of Goyder' s "V.Ork is 
in the same generalising style. He did not provide a suitable rroral code, or even 
explain fully the concept of "'Tho Dimensional Social Dem:x::racy" . A rrore 
substantial explanation is given by Ibrothy Errmet in "The MOral Roots of Social 
Derrocracy" 4 7 
Professor Emmet believed that the essential condition for the existence of a 
"rroral dem:x:::racy" is the existence of an attitude of generosity of spirit. This is 
similar to Owen's view of altruism. This "generosity of spirit" ensures ~lfare 
institutions will give each adult person due recognition. If citizens protested 
that same people received better treat:rrent f:ran the state, and if in practice a 
class of lesser citizens is perceived to grow, inequality arises. 
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En'lret subscribed to Tawney's view of derrocracy as a philosophical value rather 
than a nurrerical notion. However in one respect she disagreed with Williams alx>ut 
Tawney. Williams believed that Tawney was: 
" to J;X>litical thought what Vaughan Williams was to music: 
48 pastoral, gentle, humane. " 
Errmet Carrm:!nts: 
"Those of us who listened to Tawney will hardly recognise the master 
of IRJral invective in a distinguished style under this description." 
Equality is not a concept which occurs to ease existence, to act as a 
soJ;X>rific to lull a disgruntled class into a sense of security as Williams 
suggested. For Emmet equality was the: 
" insistence that everyone should have sufficient rreans of living 
as a full member of the canmunity. " 50 
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For an equitable state to be realised the "IRJral derrocracy" must control 
vested power and interests. It was to do this using three forces . 
The first force is "custom" which influences individual and state IRJral 
decisions mainly through education, religion and public opinion. Elaoonts in many 
"customs" give credence to egalitarian principles, and can ease the introduction of 
measures weakening the power of vested interests. Customs also engender a 
cc:mmmity feeling and encourage altruism. Errmet also noted that they can w:::>rk, and 
often do w:::>rk, to encourage J;X>licies of social stabilisation or reaction. 
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Secondly she advocated the use of nora! principles. 
"Moral principles can be taken as defining not only how people are 
expected to behave, but how they ought to behave. " 5l 
Principles should be applied with consistency, without fear or favour. This is 
the concept of "justice as fairness" . This is the concept of "justice as 
fairness". Enrcet realised that "fairness" was not an easy concept to deal with. 
"It is not always easy to say what is fair, since what would be fair 
in one set of circumstances could be unfair in another. " 52 
We return again to the relative nature of equality, and the pragmatism which 
underlies rrost SDP conceptions of it. Errnnet felt that it is unfair to exploit 
others, to take advantage of them. All very laudable sentinents, but not a great 
deal of help infonning a rrore precise SDP concept of equality. 
Thirdly the "spirit of generosity" would provide the good will and the 
p:::>litical art needed to implement egalitarian p:::>licies. It would be the: 
" deeply personal side of rrorality which cannot be prescribed in 
any set of principles however rational. " 53 
This concept has been expressed according to Emmet, throughout history as 
"grace", "benevolence" or "good will". 
"I.Dve has too many connotations. "Charity" and "philanthrophy" 
sound patronising (whereas the old Latin word, caritas, and the 
Greek, "philanthropia" love of makind come near to what we want)." 
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Yet "caritas", cla.i.rred Errnnet, could not replace the :rrorality taken for granted 
in customs, nor could it replace the need for rules governing the administration of 
welfare. However, any state which distributed welfare without "caritas" would be 
guilty of inhuman actions. This implied a criticism of the corp:::>rate state, which 
puts pressures on officials to administer welfare impersonally. If welfare was 
distributed according to a decentralised, locally decided set of policies F.rmet 
felt that the inhuman aspect of welfare could be eliminated. Private provision of 
welfare by indi victuals although important could not cover the needs of those 
"afflicted or distressed in mind, body or estate" as the Book of Carmon Prayer puts 
it. Emmet astutely recognised the fact that decentralisation of the administration 
of welfare could make decision-making more personal but could also prejudice the 
ability of the administrator to act without fear or favour. At all tines, 
administration should be carried out with generosity of spirit. 
Erluret rejected the assmnption that the primary motivation of individuals was 
to increase their income. Not all rroti vations, she thought, are financial and 
capable of being stimulated by tax incentives. She theorised that the main 
rrotivation for individuals is a sort of "altruism". The aim of social dem:x::racy 
should be the creation of a society to fulfill the altruistic spirit of 
individuals, and the cost would be a reduction in the real income of same and the 
renoval of power from others. Ermnet believed: 
"We are at a parting of the ways: we can get an increasingly divided 
society and a spread of the callousness that in the end breeds 
tyranny. Or can we get a deepening of the genorosity of spirit 
that breeds civic friendship." 55 
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The work of the rrembers of the Tawney Society compares interestingly with SDP 
policy. Same strains of Tawney Society work have influenced policy, particularly 
the work of Alex de .Mont in economic policy. However no elenent of Tawney Society 
work is inconsistent with official policy. The evidence in this chapter leads rre 
to believe that the SDP, like the Labour Party has many diverse philosophical 
traditions, drawn into one set of principles. The a.rgurrent be~ Mennell and 
Marquand settles nothing. The fact is that the SDP has many traditions in its 
"philosophy" . 
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The thesis of this dissertation, as expressed in the Introduction, is that 
the political thought of the Social Dem:x:ratic Party can be nost adequately 
understood by an analysis of the relationship between liberty and equality within 
that political thought. An examination of this relationship was expected to 
indicate in which of the three major ideological traditions SDP political thought 
can be placed. 
The description of the disputes in the Labour Party which involved the future 
leaders of the SDP detennined the SDP' s ethos. The future SDP leaders were 
Revisionists, supporters of Hugh Gaitskell. They drew their inspiration from the 
work of Anthony Crosland. They identified with the liberal elements within the 
Labour Party. They fought against those Labour Party members, M.P. 's and trade 
unionists who they believed were essentially Marxists. They were prepared to lead 
the Labour Party away from nationalisation, ideas of economic equality and the 
directly inte:rventionist state. They favoured Goveillll'Ent playing a strategic role 
in the economy and meritocracy. They were multi-lateralists, supporters of 
N.A.T.O. and pro-Europeans. Their shared experiences had convinced them that, in 
their opinion, the Left in the Labour Party were their enemies. They were prepared 
to depart from the traditional practices and policies held by the Labour Party. 
The ethos of the future SDP leaders was as much liberal as socialist. 
The writings of the SDP leaders indicated that they shared liberal principles 
such as tolerance, pluralism and dem:x::racy. Time and again they placed the rights 
of the individual before the state and equality. Roy Jenkins, an admirer of the 
Asquith and committed Gaitskellite rejected nationalism and economic equality. 
He favoured the individual, Europe, N.A.T.O. and a pluralistic society. David Owen 
was influenced by the idea of the social market economy, individual enterprise and 
a belief in equity. Shirley Williams, errotionally attatched to the Labour Party 
but pronoting liberal ideas of education, the economy and employrrent. 
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The Tawney Society which acted as an SDP equivalent of the Fabian Society 
produced panq;>hlets which prarroted liberal ideas of the economy and society. Their 
concept of two d.:im:msional social derrocracy put greater influence on individual 
liberty over equality. 
The evidence examined in this dissertation suggests that the political thought 
of the Social Dem:x::ratic Party can be nost appropriately placed in the liberal 
ideological tradition. Of course it should be recognised that the study of 
political thought is not an exact science. As the material examined has been 
published within the recent past there is still scope for further research into 
the subject. It should also be noted that political events such as the electoral 
alliance between the SDP and the Liberal Party and the eventual nerger between 
those two parties into the Liberal Dem:x::rats lends support to the suggestion in 
this thesis that the political thought of the Social Dem:x:ratic Party is 
essentially liberal. 
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